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Abstract 
The aim of this research is to investigate the influence of TurkeyÕs European Union (EU) 
candidature on its foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours, namely Iran and Syria. 
It argues that EU conditionality and adaptation pressure for the convergence and 
alignment of TurkeyÕs authoritarian political regime to the EU acquis communautaire 
have produced unintended outcomes in TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards its non-EU 
neighbours, in addition to the intended outcomes in TurkeyÕs domestic politics. To 
investigate these phenomena, this study poses the following questions: how, to what 
extent and in what direction has TurkeyÕs foreign policy changed towards its non-EU 
neighbours during the countryÕs EU candidature, and how has TurkeyÕs EU candidature 
to the EU played a role in this? This study utilises Europeanization, and the rational 
choice and historical versions of the new institutionalist theory as its theoretical 
framework. Interview and case study methods were employed to answer this research 
question, and triangulation and the creation of counterfactual scenarios were used to 
substantiate the validity of the studyÕs findings and interpretation. 
The findings indicate that, first, Turkish foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours 
has undergone a deep transformation from being merely security-oriented disengagement 
to politically and economically-oriented engagement. Secondly, although 1) due to the 
nature of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the literature on 
Europeanisation in the field of foreign policy primarily addresses socialisation and 
experimental learning related to the impact of the EU on member and/or non-member 
statesÕ foreign policies, and 2) due to the nature of EU-Turkey relations, the literature on 
the impact of the EU on TurkeyÕs foreign policy mostly focus on TurkeyÕs foreign policy 
towards TurkeyÕs EU neighbours and primarily addresses EU conditionality and 
adaptation pressure in the field of foreign policy as it is related to the impact of the EU on 
TurkeyÕs foreign policy, the findings of this research show that, in fact, EU conditionality 
and adaptation pressure in the fields of democracy and the rule of law, and in the 
economic realm, has unintentionally left a very visible influence on Turkish foreign 
policy towards TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours by: (a) changing the institutions, 
institutional structures and institutional power relations, (b) empowering the government 
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and civil society against the militaryÐbureaucratic elites in political decision making, (c) 
accomplishing political and economic stability and growth, (d) increasing respect for and 
protection of religious and minority rights, and transferring domestic religious and 
minority issues into the realm of normal politics, and thus (e) changing the institutions, 
interests, preferences and demands that are involved in foreign policy-making towards 
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Research Questions and Hypotheses, Europeanisation and Outline of 
Chapters  
1.1 Introduction  
The influence of the EU on the transformation of the polity, politics and policies of 
member and candidate states, including Turkey, during its EU membership and 
candidature has increasingly become a subject of discussion within the academic 
literature. However, the influence of the EU on the foreign policy of member and 
candidate states in general and Turkey in particular is a relatively new subject of 
academic debate. Despite its newness, the influence of the EU on TurkeyÕs foreign policy 
towards its EU neighbours, namely Greece and Cyprus during its EU candidature has 
already been the subject of several studies, however, the influence of the EU on TurkeyÕs 
foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours has not been the subject of discussion 
within academic literature. Thus, a gap in the literature exists in terms of explaining how, 
under what conditions and to what extent member and/or candidate state foreign policies 
have been reoriented by EU membership or candidature, including TurkeyÕs foreign 
policy towards TurkeyÕs EU neighbours and in particular towards its non-EU neighbours. 
The aim of this study is therefore to contribute to the growing literature on 
Europeanisation and the influence of the EU on candidate state foreign policy as well as 
interregional relations by analysing the influence of the EU on the transformation of 
TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours during the process of the 
countryÕs accession to the EU. 
Europeanisation scholars primarily argue that due to the nature of CDSP, the influence of 
the EU on member and candidate state foreign policy, a horizontal pattern of learning and 
socialization occurs. On the other hand, students engaged in Turkish studies argue that as 
a result of EU conditionality, adaptation pressure and asymmetric power relations during 
the accession process, the influence of the EU on the polity, politics and policies of 
Turkey, even on its foreign policy, is to a large extent a vertical, Ôtop downÕ process. This 
study argues, however, that the influence of the EU on TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards 
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its non-EU neighbours is neither a horizontal pattern of learning and socialisation nor the 
result of EU conditionality and adaptation pressure in the field of foreign policy. The 
liberalisation and modernisation of TurkeyÕs authoritarian political regime through the 
harmonisation reforms undertaken to adapt to the EU acquis communautaire have had a 
very visible influence on TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours. 
Although the primary objective of EU conditionality in the fields of democracy and the 
rule of law, as well as in the economic realm, is not to change TurkeyÕs foreign policy 
towards its non-EU neighbours, it has unintentionally caused changes in the rules, ideas, 
interests, priorities and demands involved in the formulation of this policy through 
liberalising TurkeyÕs political system. Accordingly, the focus of this study is the 
liberalisation of TurkeyÕs authoritarian political regime through the harmonisation 
reforms undertaken to adapt to the EU acquis communautaire and the consequent 
influence on TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours. 
1.2 Research questions and hypotheses  
The following overarching research question is examined in this study: how, to what 
extent and in what direction has TurkeyÕs foreign policy changed towards its non-EU 
neighbours during the countryÕs EU candidature and how has TurkeyÕs candidature to the 
EU played a role in this? This can be divided into three further questions: (1) Has there 
been any change in TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours since it 
achieved candidate status in 1999? (2) If so, to what extent and in what direction has 
TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours changed during the countryÕs EU 
candidature? (3) How has TurkeyÕs candidature of the EU played a role in the 
transformation of its foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours?  
The study is founded on two hypotheses. It is suggested that since Turkey first achieved 
candidate status in 1999, its foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours has undergone 
a deep transformation from merely security-orientated disengagement to politically and 
economically orientated engagement. Secondly, EU conditionality and adaptation 
pressure in the fields of democracy and the rule of law and in the economic realm, aimed 
at the convergence and alignment of TurkeyÕs authoritarian political regime to the EU 
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acquis communautaire, have produced unintended outcomes in TurkeyÕs foreign policy 
towards its non-EU neighbours in addition to the intended outcomes in TurkeyÕs 
domestic politics. This has come about through: (a) changing the institutions, institutional 
structures and institutional power relations; (b) empowering the government and civil 
society against the militaryÐbureaucratic elites in political decision making; (c) 
accomplishing political and economic stability and growth; (d) increasing respect for and 
protection of religious and minority rights and transferring domestic religious and 
minority issues into the realm of normal politics, and thus (e) changing the institutions, 
interests, preferences and demands that are involved in foreign policy-making towards 
TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours. 
1.3 Analysis of the domestic impact of European integration  
Europeanisation is a concept1 that is employed to describe different forms and processes 
of change at both the domestic and European levels generated by European integration 
throughout the EU. According to the conceptual framework2 of Europeanisation, in order 
to engender changes at the domestic level there must be some degree of ÔincompatibilityÕ 
between the EU and the domestic levels in terms of polity, politics and policy that 
requires the associated states to make changes to adapt to the EU acquis communautaire. 
A high level of incompatibility between the EU and domestic levels generates a high 
level of adaptation pressure at the domestic level. This is expected to result in a high level 
of change in the associated state (Brzel & Risse, 2003; see also Brzel & Risse, 2007, 
2009, 2012; Schimmelfennig, 2010) (for further detail on Europeanisation, see Chapter 
II). 
As noted above, this study argues that the ÔincompatibilityÕ, between Turkey and the EU 
in relation to democracy, the rule of law and economics has driven adaptation and started 
Turkey down the path of the liberalisation of its political regime, resulting in the above-
mentioned hypothesised changes in the formulation of TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards 
its non-EU neighbours. Drawing on the Europeanisation literature and EUÐTurkey 
                                                              
1 A concept is an idea or thought about Ôwhat something is or how it worksÕ.  
2 Europeanisation can be considered a conceptual framework rather than a theory (Featherstone, 2003, 
p.12). A conceptual framework is Ôthe way ideas are organized to achieve a research projectÕs purposeÕ 
(Shields & Rangarjan, 2013: p. 24). 
  16 
relations as they relate to democracy, the rule of law and the economic realm, all of 
which require the obligatory implementation of EU law, it seems that there is a 
relationship between the existing gap, EU adaptation pressure and ongoing changes at the 
domestic level in Turkey. Thus, in this study, the Europeanisation concept is employed to 
describe different forms and processes of change in Turkey, generated by its EU 
candidature. 
As argued by Europeanisation scholars (see Brzel & Risse, 2003, 2007, 2009, 2012; 
Schimmelfennig, 2010), numerous factors matter in responding to EU pressure to adapt, 
and thus exert an influence on the domestic impact of the EU, in particular: the ability of 
domestic actors and institutions, the quality and state of peace relations between EU-
associated states, the varying nature of different countries and the policy field, and the 
cost/benefit calculation of domestic actors. Due to the nature of the CSDP, which does 
not include an Ôobligatory implementation of EU lawÕ (Major, 2005: p.180), and the 
intergovernmental decision-making mechanisms, it is not always possible to address the 
obligatory implementation of EU directives and rules in the sphere of foreign policy 
(Wong & Hill, 2011: 231), even if there is an incompatibility (see Section 2.5). The 
Europeanisation framework does not provide explanatory instruments to analyse how 
they matter when responding to the EU adaptation pressure arising from the misfit gap 
between the EU and the domestic level and/or the domestic impact of the EU. The term 
ÔEuropeanisationÕ itself thus suffers from a lack of comprehensive explanatory 
instruments to analyse the domestic impact of the EU in general and specifically the role 
of the EU in the liberalisation of the Turkish political system and the transformation of 
TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours during its EU candidature. There 
is therefore a need for tools from other approaches to address this shortcoming. To 
overcome this shortcoming of Europeanisation in analysing the domestic impact of the 
EU Europeanisation scholars (Brzel & Risse, 2003, 2007, 2009; Knill & Tosun, 2009; 
Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2010; Schimmelfennig, 2009, 2010; Schimmelfennig & 
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Sedelmeier, 2005; Sedelmeier, 2011, 2012; Wong & Hill, 2011) primarily embed it 
within Ônew institutionalismÕ theory.3   
New institutionalism theory puts institutions and the structures through which they 
operate at the centre of its analysis of political behaviours, and stresses that Ôinstitutions 
matterÕ (Rosamond, 2003: p.114; Schmidt, 2010: p.304, 2011: p.63), Ôinstitutions affect 
outcomesÕ (Aspinwall & Schneider, 2000: p.3) and Ôinstitutions constrain the actions of 
the actors who establish themÕ (Pollack, 2004: p.139, 2005: p.20). In short, the way 
institutions are formed, as well as their features, strongly influence Ôhow smoothly the car 
runs, which roads it can take, and how sure we can be that the car will not break downÕ 
(Peterson & Schackleton, 2002: p.5). There are several versions of new institutionalism, 
but three, historical, rational choice and sociological institutionalism, and more recently 
discursive institutionalism, are usually embedded with Europeanisation in analyses of the 
domestic impact of European integration throughout the EU. In general, they Ôunderstand 
institutions as rules and normsÕ (Aspinwall & Schneider, 2000: p.6; Schmidt, 2010) and 
define them as (formal and informal) rules: Ôthe formal (and informal) rules, compliance 
procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between 
individuals in various units of the polity and economyÕ (Hall, 1996, as cited by Aspinwall 
& Schneider, 2001: p.1; Schmidt, 2010: p. 304, 2011: p. 63).4  
Rational institutionalism (RI) proposes that individuals adapt new institutions, ideas, 
values or regulation if the costs of change or adaptation are less than the benefits, and if 
doing so will serve their interests and welfare (Blyth, 2002: p.306; Schmidt, 2008: p.321, 
2010, 2011). The argument is that people are rational utility maximisers who conduct 
cost/benefit analyses in their choices and act strategically to maximise their own gain. 
Before acting in a particular way, therefore, they ask themselves Ôwhat do I get out of this 
action?Õ; they do something if they calculate that they will gain more by doing than by 
not doing it. From this perspective, the harmonisation reforms undertaken to close the 
existing gap between the domestic and European levels are closely related to the 
                                                              
3 Theories are constructed generalisable statements to explain, predict and understand how and/or why a 
phenomenon occurs (see Friedman and Kreps, 1991; Kim, 1995; Lomax, 2010). 
4 For more information about the new institutionalism, see Aspinwall and Schneider (2000: p.3); Bulmer 
(2007); Goldmann (2005); Hall and Taylor (1998); Harmsen (2000); March and Olsen (1989: pp.40-46); 
Rosamond (2003: p.113); Schmidt (2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b, 2008, 2010, 2011).  
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cost/benefit calculations of domestic actors regarding rule compliance (see Brzel & 
Risse, 2003, 2007, 2009; Knill & Tosun, 2009; Schimmelfennig, 2009, 2010; Sedelmeier, 
2011, 2012). The keenness of Turkish actors for harmonisation reforms to adapt to the 
EU acquis communautaire is seen in light of the cost/benefit calculation of being an EU 
member, or at least being on the EU track. Thus, the cost/benefit calculation is a fruitful 
concept to explain the keenness of Turkish actors in responding to EU pressure in relation 
to democracy, the rule of law and economic matters. 
The RI approach pays attention to Ômultiple veto pointsÕ and Ôformal institutionsÕ and 
emphasises the importance of the empowerment of new actors and institutions against 
veto players through harmonisation reforms and the EUÕs technical and economic support 
in the absence of capable domestic actors and institutions in responding to EU adaptation 
pressure (Brzel & Risse, 2000, 2003, 2007, 2009; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2010; 
Schimmelfennig, 2009, 2010; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005). As argued above, 
this study takes the position that the harmonisation reforms undertaken to adapt to the EU 
acquis communautaire have empowered the Turkish government and civil society against 
the military-bureaucratic elites in the Turkish political system through changing the 
institutions, institutional structure and institutional power relations, and redistributing the 
resources and power at the domestic level. RI thus provides a theory about which or 
whose interests and ideas, and the changes to them, bring about harmonisation reforms 
and how they have driven events, processes and institutional and political changes in 
Turkey. I therefore employ the explanatory instruments of RI in analysing the causes of 
changes in the Turkish political system and the countryÕs foreign policy towards its non-
EU neighbours and the role of the EU. 
In contrast, the sociological institutionalism (SI) school sees identity and cultural 
motivations as the main driving forces behind institutional and political change 
(Bretherton & Vogler, 1999: pp.30Ð36; Hill, 2003: pp.98Ð126; Schmidt, 2008, 2010, 
2011; Tonra, 2003). The SI school argues that people are ÔsatisficersÕ, rather than self-
interested utility maximisers. Thus, before acting in a particular way, they ask themselves 
Ôwhat should I do?Õ or Ôwhat is appropriate?Õ and further, they act habitually to satisfy 
their consciences, rather than to acting strategically to maximise their rational self-
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interests (March & Olsen, 1989). People thus act in a way that is appropriate in the 
environment in which they live, or within society. Institutions are seen as socially 
constituted norms that frame a personÕs appropriate behaviour.  
From the SI perspective, domestic adaptation to EU norms and standards comes into 
practice through increasing socialisation and experimental learning. Domestic actors and 
institutions that are engaged with the EUÕs actors and institutions socialise with and learn 
from them. Their identity, ideas and culture thus change over time and they increasingly 
find the EUÕs values, ideas, norms and standards more appropriate than the alternatives. 
As such, they increasingly adapt to the EU norms and standards (Brzel & Risse, 2003, 
2007, 2009, 2012; Hall & Taylor, 1996; March & Olsen, 1989; Schimmelfennig, 2010; 
Tonra, 2003). Accordingly, there is an ontological problem in combining RI and SI in 
analysing the domestic impact of the EU. On the other hand, due to the significant 
differences between Turkey and Europe in terms of identity and political culture, changes 
in TurkeyÕs identity and political culture through socialisation and experimental learning 
requires time and intensive relations. Bearing in mind the intensity of EUÐTurkey 
relations and the diversity in their identities, it does not seem likely that the explanatory 
instruments of socialisation, experimental learning and political change provided in SI 
theory will be fruitful in analysing the changes in TurkeyÕs political system and foreign 
policy towards its non-EU neighbours during its EU candidature and the role of the EU. 
SI theory is therefore excluded from the theoretical framework. 
Historical institutionalism (HI), on the other hand, combines the perspectives of RI and 
SI in that it regards people as both ÔsatisficersÕ and utility maximisers, although not in a 
straightforward manner. It argues that, depending upon the context, rules and persons, 
behaviour or a political outcome can be the product of conscience satisficing and/or 
maximising self-interest. In other words, it is argued that whether a logic of 
ÔappropriatenessÕ or of ÔconsequencesÕ is followed depends on the context, rules and 
persons. The question is thus how to ascertain which logic is dominant in specific choices 
and political outcomes. Institutions are seen as historically established patterns in HI. In 
this vein, historical institutionalists search for historical evidence, junctures and records 
to ascertain which aspect is the most important in determining the chosen behaviours and 
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political outcomes (Mayr, 2004; Pierson, 1993, 2000, 2004; see also Thelen & Steinmo, 
1992).   
The main concepts that the HI literature considers when explaining how institutions, 
political and social phenomenon, or policies occur, evolve or change are Ôpath 
dependencyÕ, Ôcritical junctureÕ, Ôpunctuated equilibriumÕ and Ôunintended consequencesÕ 
(for details, see Chapter II). Historical institutionalists (Hall & Taylor, 1996: pp.941Ð942; 
Pierson, 2005: pp.43Ð44; see also Merton, 1936: p.895; Thelen, 1999; Vachudova, 2007) 
argue that a juncture punctuates equilibrium and starts a new path or institutional change. 
Thus, institutions remain at equilibrium until they are punctuated by an external juncture. 
The path or institution that is adapted purposefully produces unintended outcomes in 
addition to intended consequences. From this perspective, critical junctures in EU-
associated state relations punctuate the equilibrium at the domestic level and provide a 
starting point for institutional change and adaptation to a new path, which is expected to 
produce unintended consequences in addition to intended outcomes. 
As detailed above, this study argues that the announcement of Turkey as an EU candidate 
in 1999 Ð a critical juncture in EUÐTurkey relations Ð punctuated the equilibrium and 
started the country down the path to liberalisation. This liberalisation, adopted by Turkey 
as a result of EU conditionality and adaptation pressure, has unintentionally produced 
changes in rules, ideas, interests, priorities and demands in the formulation of TurkeyÕs 
foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours in addition to the intended outcomes in the 
fields of democracy and the rule of law and in the economic realm. The concepts of 
Ôcritical junctureÕ, Ôpunctuated equilibriumÕ and Ôunintended consequencesÕ are therefore 
useful in explaining the liberalisation of TurkeyÕs authoritarian political regime, changing 
the countryÕs foreign policy towards its neighbours and the role of TurkeyÕs EU 
candidature in this process. These concepts are thus employed in the analysis. 
As noted by many historical institutionalists (Katznelson & Weingast, 2005; Lieberman, 
2002; Marcussen, 2000; McNamara, 1998; Steinmo, 2008), however, institutional or 
political changes are the products of changes in actorsÕ interests, values and ideas. As 
noted above, this study considers changes in ideas, interests, priorities and demands in the 
formulation of TurkeyÕs foreign policy as the main driving force behind the 
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transformation of foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours. HI focuses on 
structures, processes and junctures but pays little attention to the actors whose actions, 
ideas and interests Ð and changes to them Ð bring this about (Schmidt, 2008). As rightly 
noted by Steinmo (2008: p.168), junctures themselves do not give people agency (see 
also Streeck & Thelen, 2005; Thelen, 2004). HI therefore does not provide a 
comprehensive explanation or theory of what brings about junctures, which interests and 
ideas change and how, or how they drive events, processes and institutional and political 
changes (Schmidt, 2008; Steinmo, 2008; Streeck & Thelen, 2005; Thelen, 2004) in 
general and specifically in relation to TurkeyÕs political system and foreign policy 
towards its non-EU neighbours during the countryÕs accession process to the EU. To 
overcome this shortcoming in HI, I use the tools of the RI approach which, as argued 
above, puts actors and their cost/benefit calculation and changing interests at the centre of 
analysis in explaining institutional and political change.  
In contrast to the older versions of new institutionalism, the most recent version, 
discursive institutionalism (DI) follows the Ôlogic of communicationÕ. It places ideas and 
discourse in an institutional context, following along the lines of one of the older versions 
with which it is engaged, and emphasises the role of ideas and discourse in constructing 
behaviour and/or political action. It argues that ideas and discourse matter in the 
construction and reconstruction of norms and interests and thus in the construction of 
behaviour and/or political action. According to the logic of DI, institutions serve Ôboth as 
structures that constrain actors and as constructs created and changed by those actorsÕ and 
thus they are internal to the actors (Schmidt, 2008: p.321, p.304). ÔBy combining 
background ideational abilities with foreground discursive abilities, DI puts the agency 
back into institutional change by explaining the dynamics of change in structures through 
constructive discourse about ideasÕ (Schmidt, 2008: p.309).  
DI differs from older versions of new institutionalism in several respects. Institutional 
change is dynamic in DI (Schmidt, 2008: p.321), whereas it is static in older versions of 
new institutionalism (for details, see Schmidt, 2008, 2010; see also Chapter II). Interests 
are also defined as ideas in DI and are thus subjective, whereas they are objective and 
material in RI (Schmidt, 2008: p. 321; see also Schmidt, 2006a, 2006b, 2010). Ideas and 
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discourse may have a causal influence on the construction and reconstruction of norms 
and interests however, drawing on the Europeanisation literature and analysis of EUÐ
Turkey relations, the assumption in DI that Ôeverything is related to ideas and discourse, 
with no neutral incentive structures and no objective and material interestsÕ (Schmidt, 
2008: p.321) is challenged by the reality of EU-associated relations in general, and 
specifically in EUÐTurkey relations. Thus, DI is not deemed appropriate for addressing 
the causality issue in this study.  
In addition to new institutionalism, there are other approaches which offer theories 
related to the integration of Europe throughout the EU such as neo-functionalism, 
intergovernmentalism and liberal intergovernmentalism.  Neo-functionalism employs the 
concept of ÔspilloverÕ in explaining widespread European integration and argues that 
cooperation in specific economic areas, such as coal and steel, lead to integration in other 
economic sectors and then other fields in Europe. The argument is that integration in a 
policy sector creates pressure for cooperation in other areas. National and subnational 
actors that benefit from integration create pressure for integration in other areas, so as to 
pursue their interests (Haas, 1958; Moravcsik, 1993; Rosamond, 2000, p.51Ð52; Wallace 
et al, 1983; Wiener & Diez, 2009).  
On the other hand, intergovernmentalism emphasises the role of the national governments 
of the member states in the process of European integration. Intergovernmentalists argue 
that nation states renounce their sovereignty in favour of their interests. When they have 
shared goals and their interests converge in a policy sector, they pool their sovereignty 
and speed up the integration process, but when their interests, goals and preferences 
diverge in a given field, they slow the integration process in this field. Spillover can thus 
be seen in Ôlow politicsÕ (Rosamond, 2000, p. 132). Liberal intergovernmentalism, 
developed by Moravcsik (1993) on the basis of the intergovernmental theory of European 
integration, emphasises the role of the national governments of the member states and 
inter-state bargains in the process of European integration. It differs from classical 
intergovernmentalism, however, by highlighting the role of domestic interest groups in 
the formation of national government interests and preferences in the process of 
European integration. The argument is that various domestic interest groups compete to 
  23 
influence the national government to pursue and maximise their interests. The outcomes 
of this struggle determine the positions taken by the national government in inter-state 
bargains in the process of European integration (Moravcsik, 1993, 1997; Rosamond, 
2000, Wallace et al, 1983; Wiener & Diez, 2009). Liberal intergovernmentalists consider 
the role of supranational institutions limited in this process, and thus, it differs from the 
perspective of neo-functionalists in explaining the process of European integration.  
As seen above, these approaches all offer theories related to integration of Europe 
throughout the EU, but not the domestic impact of this integration process, which is the 
subject of this study. They thus do not provide theory related to the transformation of 
TurkeyÕs political system and foreign policy during the EU accession process and the role 
of the EU, and so are also excluded from the theoretical framework. Consequently, 
Europeanisation, embedded in the rational and historical versions of new institutionalism, 
constitutes the analytical toolkit used to examine the hypotheses and research questions in 
this study (for the operationalisation of the theory, see Section 1.4 and for further detail, 
see Section 3.3.5). 
1.4 Data collection and analysis 
Particular methods of enquiry, such as qualitative, quantitative or mixed methods, are 
employed to collect, process and analyse data for testing and building hypotheses and/or 
theories according to the purpose of the research. Quantitative research focuses on 
collecting statistical, mathematical or numerical data through polls, questionnaires or 
surveys and their measurement. To explain what is observed, the collected data is 
analysed using statistical and numerical analysis. Qualitative research, on the other hand, 
focuses on collecting verbal data and considers its meaning (Ritchie & Spencer, 1994).  
Qualitative research uses observation, interviews (individual in-depth interviews, 
structured and non-structured interviews), case studies, focus groups, reflexive journals, 
content or documentary analysis and archival research methods. The collected data is 
organised according to identified themes and then analysed to discover the underlying 
meanings and patterns of relationships between themes.  The aim of qualitative research 
is to identify Ôthe form and nature of what existsÕ, to investigate Ôthe reasons for, or 
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causes of, what existsÕ (Ritchie & Spencer, 1994) and to provide a complete, detailed 
description of what is studied. By its nature, qualitative research is usually more 
exploratory.  
Depending on the topic studied, each model has its strengths and weaknesses. As 
described above, the quantitative model is employed to answer research questions using 
numerical evidence. The qualitative approach, on the other hand, is better at explaining 
how and/or why a particular event took place, or a particular phenomenon is the case, 
through verbal evidence (Ritchie & Spencer, 1994). This study aims to assess TurkeyÕs 
foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours and the changes made in foreign policy 
during TurkeyÕs accession process to the EU, as well as the reasons for, and/or causes of, 
the changes in TurkeyÕs foreign policy, primarily through examining verbal evidence. For 
this reason, the qualitative approach is chosen for the collection, processing and analysis 
of data. In specific, case study, interviews, academic journals and documentary analysis 
technics of qualitative method are used to collect, process and analyse data, but, 
quantitative data, such as tables, graphs and figures, are also used to illustrate changes in 
TurkeyÕs domestic politics, in its economic conditions and in its exports and imports with 
its selected neighbours during the EU accession process.  
With regard to case study methods, the deviant case method seems likely more beneficial 
in choosing cases that our analytical interests lie within and to probe causal relationships 
to test the hypothesis of our study in a more specific manner (for details see section 3.3.2 
in Chapter III). Thus, a deviant case method is employed. Accordingly, we identified sets 
of background factors in accordance with the analytical requirements of the study and 
then selected Turkish foreign policy towards Iran and Syria in accordance with these 
factors (for details see section 3.3.2 in Chapter III). By examining selected deviant cases 
we arrived at exceptional and untypical explanations for changes in Turkish foreign 
policy towards its non-EU neighbours during TurkeyÕs EU candidature. These include, as 
noted above, the fact that EU-fostered changes at TurkeyÕs domestic political and 
economic dynamics generated by the harmonisation reforms have unintentionally caused 
the changes in TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbour. As noted below 
and detailed in chapter III, in order to further establish the causal importance of EU-
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fostered domestic changes in changes in TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards its non-EU 
neighbours, we also utilised the creation of a counterfactual scenario approach (see 
Chapter V).  
Primary sources include systematic databases, official reports and legal documents, such 
as political and economic agreements between Turkey and selected countries, European 
Council Presidency Conclusions, the Negotiation Framework for Turkey, the Accession 
Partnership with Turkey, and Commission Progress Reports, harmonisation reforms and 
interviews in both print and electronic forms. Semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with twenty people in Turkey (in Istanbul and Ankara) and in Brussels, including 
officials from the Turkish Foreign Ministry, think tanks, trade unions and human rights 
organisations. These aimed to shed light on the experiences, knowledge, opinions and 
attitudes of informants in relation to TurkeyÕs domestic politics and policy, Turkish 
foreign policy and TurkeyÐEU relations. Secondary sources include books and 
publications from seminars, conferences and other scientific gatherings, and academic 
journals in four key disciplines (specific studies on EUÐTurkey relations, TurkeyÕs 
foreign policy, Europeanisation, new institutionalism), as well as journalistic accounts in 
both print and electronic forms, and information from the internet.  
The collected data is organised according to thematic fields identified during the research 
process, such as: Europeanisation (misfit gap, EU conditionality and adaptation 
pressure); Theory: RI (empowerment of new actors and institutions, cost/benefit 
calculation of rule compliance), HI (path dependency, punctuated equilibrium and 
unexpected consequences); Turkish political system (institutions, norms, ideas, actors and 
policies in the fields of democracy and the rule of law and economic matters at the 
Turkish level before the EU accession process in 1999, and changes in them during the 
EU accession process); EUÐTurkey relations (EU conditionality in the fields of 
democracy and the rule of law and the economic sphere, the EUÕs technical and 
economic support structures and harmonisation reforms); TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards 
non-EU countries (TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards Iran and Syria before 1999 and 
changes in foreign policy towards them during the EU accession process). The patterns of 
relationships between the themes are analysed with the guidance of selected theories to 
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uncover changes in TurkeyÕs political system and foreign policy towards its non-EU 
neighbours during the EU accession process and the causes of the changes (for details of 
data collection, processing and analysis, see Sections 3.3.3; 3.3.4 and 3.3.5). 
Using the primary and secondary data, the misfit gap between Turkey and the EU in the 
fields of democracy and the rule of law, as well as in the economic sphere, are first 
explored by examining the sets of rules, norms, ideas, actors and policies at the EU and 
Turkish levels. EUÐTurkey relations are then explored to establish whether the gap 
between the Turkish and EU levels in these fields has generated (high-level) EU 
adaptation pressure. Thirdly, harmonisation reforms undertaken to adapt to the EU acquis 
communautaire are examined in order to probe TurkeyÕs compliance with EU standards 
and discover whether, as hypothesised, they have brought about liberalisation in the fields 
of democracy and the rule of law, and in the economic sphere. Fourthly, the EUÕs 
technical and economic support structures and the quality and stability of EUÐTurkey 
relations are also assessed and a cost/benefit analysis of compliance with EU standards is 
undertaken by Turkish actors to ascertain the role of the EU in the liberalisation of the 
Turkish political system during the EU accession process.  
Having examined whether the announcement of Turkey as a candidate punctuated the 
equilibrium at the Turkish level (thus providing a turning point for the liberalisation of 
the political regime and bringing about the changes hypothesised in 1.2 above), and if so 
how, a case study is employed to reveal alterations in TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards its 
non-EU neighbours, namely Iran and Syria, during the process of accession to the EU, 
and the causes of such changes (for details of case selection methods and selected cases 
see Section 3.3.2 in Chapter III). The analysis therefore examines TurkeyÕs foreign policy 
towards Iran and Syria before and after 1999. Finally, the study explores the influence of 
the developments identified in TurkeyÕs domestic political situation, generated by EU 
conditionality and adaptation pressure for the convergence and alignment of TurkeyÕs 
authoritarian political regime to the EU acquis communautaire, in changes in rules, ideas, 
interests, priorities and demands in the formulation of TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards 
selected cases and thus the transformation of this policy. As such, the unintended 
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consequences for TurkeyÕs foreign policy of EU conditionality and adaptation pressure 
are analysed.  
To demonstrate the credibility and validity of the data analysis, triangulation and the 
creation of counterfactual scenarios are undertaken. The information and/or evidence 
presented in the study are gleaned from data cross-referenced between interviews, 
documents and secondary sources, as well as within the data types, in a process of 
triangulation. Counterfactual scenarios are also developed to establish the causal 
importance of the EU and substantiate the claim that in the absence of EU conditionality 
relating to democracy, the rule of law and the economy, there would have been no 
changes in TurkeyÕs domestic political situation, and thus its foreign policy towards its 
non-EU neighbours over the last decade. The absence of EU influence and TurkeyÕs EU 
candidature are hypothesised, but other potential explanatory variables remain unchanged 
(for details see Section 3.4.2). As such, multiple sources of evidence and methods are 
used to substantiate the validity of the findings and the interpretation of the data. 
1.5 Outline of chapters 
The following chapter, Chapter II, presents a literature review for Europeanisation, in 
order to provide a basis for assessing the influence of the EU on the polity, politics and 
policies of associated states. The existing definition of Europeanisation is critically 
assessed, conceptualised and delimited for this study. I then discuss the mechanisms, 
forms and conditions for domestic change in general and specifically foreign policy 
generated by the EU. In terms of the mechanisms, I consider existing direct and indirect 
mechanisms relating to the domestic impact of the EU and introduce a new mechanism. 
Finally, the chapter elaborates on the versions of new institutionalism and how these can 
be of help in analysing the influence of the EU on the transformation of TurkeyÕs foreign 
policy towards its non-EU neighbours during the EU accession process.  
The third chapter discusses the research design, setting out the models and methods used 
to collect and process data, as well as delineating the research questions and hypotheses 
underpinning the study of the domestic impact of the EU. It first critically assesses 
existing research design models and introduces a new research design model specifically 
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designed to study the unintended consequence of the domestic impact of the EU. It then 
describes the data collection, processing and analysing procedures. In particular, it 
addresses the case study approach and interview analysis used in this thesis to answer the 
research questions. It introduces these methods and provides an account of precisely how 
these methods help to answer the research questions and to substantiate or disconfirm the 
hypotheses. Finally, it introduces counterfactual scenarios and triangulation approaches 
and an account of how these are helpful in demonstrating the credibility and validity of 
the data analysis, findings and interpretations.  
Chapter IV explores the liberalisation of TurkeyÕs political, economic and legislative 
systems in the EU accession process. It empirically examines how the harmonisation 
reforms undertaken by the Turkish government to adapt the countryÕs political and 
economic systems and legislation to the EU acquis communautaire have brought about 
the hypothesised changes in TurkeyÕs domestic politics. It first, explores the Turkish 
political system before the EU accession process, followed by the reorientation of 
TurkeyÕs political regime in parallel with the EU acquis communautaire as a result of EU 
conditionality and adaptation pressure, as well as considering the technical and economic 
supports established in the post-Helsinki period. By doing so, it assesses how and to what 
extent the changes made have been generated by TurkeyÕs EU accession process. 
Chapter V explores the transformation of TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards Iran and Syria 
over the last decade. It compares TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards these countries before 
and during the EU accession process to discover whether, as hypothesised, TurkeyÕs 
foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours has undergone a deep transformation from 
security-orientated disengagement to political and economic-orientated engagement. It 
then assesses the causes of changes in TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards these neighbours 
during the EU accession process. Here, it evaluates how changes in TurkeyÕs domestic 
politics generated by the harmonisation reforms undertaken to adapt to the EU acquis 
communautaire have played a role in the increasing transformation of TurkeyÕs foreign 
policy towards Iran and Syria by changing the rules, ideas, interests, priorities and 
demands underpinning the formulation of TurkeyÕs foreign policy.  
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The thesis concludes with Chapter VI. In the light of the research, it provides a general 
conclusion on the transformation of TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards its non-EU 
neighbours over the last decade, and the role of TurkeyÕs EU candidature in the 
transformation of TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards them. It considers how the theoretical 
framework, the mechanism introduced to examine unintended consequences, and the 
research design model as a whole are beneficial in shedding light on these phenomena. 






Europeanisation and New Institutionalism 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter explores the utility of Europeanisation as a conceptual framework to analyse 
the impact of the EU on the foreign policy of member and candidate states. We first 
critically assess, conceptualise and delimit the existing definition of Europeanisation.  
After defining it as a Ôdomestic change generated by the EUÕ we will discuss the 
mechanisms, forms and conditions for the domestic change generated by the EU. We 
seek to clarify the applicability of Europeanisation as a conceptual framework for 
analysing the changes in member and candidate state foreign policy. Several examples 
and conceptual frameworks of the Europeanisation of member and candidate state foreign 
policy are discussed. Finally, we elaborate on the versions of new institutionalism for 
analysing the domestic impact of the EU. 
2.2 Europeanisation and EUisation   
For two reasons we use the term ÔEUisationÕ instead of Europeanisation. First, since the 
last period of the Ottoman Empire, the notions ÔWesternisationÕ, ÔCivilisationÕ, 
ÔModernisationÕ and ÔEuropeanisationÕ have been used interchangeably to describe the 
transformation in Turkish political, economic and social life. As far as European impact 
on Turkish politics is concerned we therefore need to examine the events of the 
nineteenth century. They started with the ÔWesternisationÕ movement of ÔTanzimat 
FermaniÕ (1839) and continued with the ÔIslahat FermaniÕ (1878). 5 This westernisation 
movement also continued with the Republican period reforms. In other words, TurkeyÕs 
keenness to integrate into the Western bloc is a result of its modernisation project. 6 
                                                              
5ÔTanzimatÕ and ÔIslahatÕ are the names of two reform packages in the Ottoman Empire. The aim of the 
reforms was to modernise the Ottoman administration and the military for integration in the European state 
system. For more details, see Karaosmanoglu, 2000; Aydõnlõ and Waxman, 2001.  
6 Turkey became a founding member of the United Nations in 1945, a member of the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1948, a member of the Council of the Europe in 1949, joined NATO 
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Becoming a member of the EU is a major step in this process; and it is considered 
confirmation of TurkeyÕs ÔEuropeanÕ, ÔWesternisedÕ, and ÔmodernÕ identity (see Oguzlu, 
2006; 2010; Aydin; 2012; Aydõnlõ & Waxman, 2001). When assessing how and to what 
extent Turkish foreign politics has re-orientated as a result of TurkeyÕs EU candidature 
we therefore use the term ÔEUisationÕ instead of ÔEuropeanisationÕ. 
Although the debate on ÔEuropeanisationÕ over the last two decades has entirely focused 
on European integration throughout the EU and its impact on nation states, it is neither a 
new phenomenon, a simple synonym for European regional integration, nor a response to 
it. It is a much broader concept and a long historical process. According to different 
agents, structures, processes, direction of norm diffusion and conceptualisation of ÔweÕ 
and ÔothersÕ this process can be divided into different stages.7 Institution building at a 
European level, and its impact on domestic institutions and policies, are the last stage of 
Europeanisation. When we are talking about European integration throughout the EU and 
a response to the EU regulations, directives and norms, we will therefore call 
ÔEuropeanisationÕ EUisation.  As H. Wallace put it, ÔEuropeanisation is more than and 
different from EUisationÕ8. 
As a historical phenomenon, Europeanisation is a way of continental life including social 
and cultural behaviours (in terms of eating, drinking, and lifestyle), cultural beliefs, 
religion (Christianity), values, norms and political principles (tolerance, solidarity and 
liberty), state system, capitalist methods of market and production, and their diffusion to 
other continents and regions in a historical process through wars, trade, colonisation and 
globalisation (Kohn, 1937: Weber, 1947, p. 208; Mjoset, 1997; Kohout, 1999; 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
in 1952, signed the European Convention on Human Rights and finally became an associate member of the 
Western European Union in 1992. It applied for associate membership of the European Common Market in 
1959, shortly after the foundation of the ECM with the Roma Treaty in 1947. For more information about 
TurkeyÕs association with other international organisations see: S. Calis, 2000; Karluk, 2007; Heper, 2005; 
Oguzlu, 2006; Karaosmanoglu, 2000. 
7Trine Flockhart (2010) divided the historical process of Europeanisation into five periods: (1) Ô450: The 
period of European self-realizationÕ, (2) Ô1450 Ð1700: The period of Proto-EuropeanisationÕ, (3) Ô1700 Ð 
1919: The period of Incipient EuropeanisationÕ, (4) Ô1919 >: The period of Contemporary (inward) 
EuropeanisationÕ, (5) Ô1945 > The period of Contemporary (outward) Europeanisation and EUisationÕ. 
8For more information about how the term ÔEUsationÕ is different from ÔEuropeanisationÕ see also H. 
Wallace, 2000; H. Grabbe, 2001; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002; Schmit and Wiener, 2005; and 
Graziano and Vink, 2007, p. 11. 
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Featherstone, 2003, p. 5). In other words, Europeanisation has a broad scope and long 
historical process that involves the diffusion of the advanced institutions, norms and 
policies of Western European civilisation to other regions and continents. In this manner, 
it is, to some extent, connected with current debate on EUisation. The method and 
mechanism of EUisation, however, are different from Europeanisation.  
2.3 EUisation? 
EUisation is a concept that has been employed for decades to describe different forms 
and processes of change, at both domestic and European levels, caused by European 
integration throughout the EU, including: Ôregional integration and institution building at 
the European levelÕ (Risse, 2003; Cowles et al., 2001, p.3); Ôa shift in institution agendasÕ 
(Wessels & Rometsch, 1996, p.328); Ôa change in domestic institutions, actors, procedure 
and paradigm and politics generated by European governanceÕ (Buller & Gamble, 2002; 
Brzel, 2005; Bulmer & Radaelli, 2005; Kassim, 2005; Ladrech, 2005); Ôinstitution and 
consensus building in western EuropeÕ (Zaborowski, 2002); Ônew norms and identity 
developmentÕ (Checkel, 2001, p. 80); and Ôdomestic impact of European-level 
institutionsÕ and Ôexporting European institutionsÕ (Olsen, 2002, p. 944-921).9 It is a 
complex mix and a dynamic process, which is difficult to separate. Some (Kassim, 2000, 
p. 235) even argue that it does not have any precise meaning, but there are some systemic 
studies, which map its mechanisms, different uses and definitions (Caporaso, 2007; 
Brzel & Risse, 2003, 2009, 2012; Graziano & Vink, 2007; Lenschow, 2005; Radaelli, 
2003; Haverland, 2005, 2007; Exadaktylos & Radaelli, 2009, 2012; Olsen, 2002). For 
example: Olsen (2002) categorised six different forms of EUisation: the Ôchanging 
boundary of ÔEurope', Ôdeveloping institutions at the European levelÕ, Ôdomestic impact 
of European-level institutionsÕ, Ôcentral penetration of national systems of governanceÕ, 
Ôexporting European institutionsÕ, and Ôpolitical unification of EuropeÕ. Featherstone 
(2003, p. 13-4) has also divided it into four broad categories: Ôhistorical processÕ, 
Ôcultural diffusionÕ, Ôprocess of institutional adaptationÕ and Ôthe adaptation of policies 
and policy processÕ. 
                                                              
9 For debate on how to define ÔEuropeanisationÕ, see Brzel, 2005; Brzel & Risse, 2003, 2007, 2009, 
2012; Cowles et al, 2001; Falkner, 2003; Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003; Mair, 2004; Radaelli, 2003.  
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For analytical reasons, however, the process is broadly divided into two mutually 
dependent processes known as Ôbottom-upÕ and Ôtop-downÕ (Brzel & Risse, 2000, p.15, 
2007, 2009, 2012; Bulmer & Lequesne, 2005; Caporaso, 2007; Exadaktylos & Radaelli, 
2009, 2012, p.9; Knill & Lehmkuhl, 1999; Radaelli, 2003, p.30, 2004, p.5; Radaelli & 
Pasquier, 2007; Lenschow, 2005; Schimmelfennig, 2007, 2010, p.3; Sedelmeier, 2006, 
2011). ÔBottom-upÕ refers to a process of institution, norms, rules and policy building at 
the European level (Brzel & Risse, 2007, 2009, 2012; Bulmer & Lequesne, 2005, p.47; 
Colino, 1997; Heritier, 1999; Risse, 2001; Schimmelfennig, 2007, 2010; Sedelmeier, 
2006, 2011; Wallace & Wallace, 2000). ÔTop-downÕ refers to a reorientation process of 
domestic institutions, policies, norms, rules and practices in parallel with the EUÕs, as a 
result of EU adaptation pressure (Brzel, 2002, p.193; Brzel & Risse, 2007, 2009, 2012; 
Bulmer & Lequesne, 2005,p.47; Featherstone, 2003, p. 6-12; Radaelli, 2003, p.30, 2004, 
p.5; Exadaktylos & Radaelli, 2009, 2012; Ladrech, 1994, p.17; Olsen, 2002, p. 923; 
Schimmelfennig, 2007, 2010; Sedelmeier, 2006, 2011).  Consequently, it is defined in a 
broad sense as a process of institution-building and decision-making at European level 
and its impact on national institutions, patterns of governance, domestic structure, 
identities, policy preferences, interests and norms (Brzel & Risse, 2012; Bulmer & 
Burch 2005, p. 864; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009, p. 795; Radaelli, 2003, p.30, 
2004, p.5, 2012, p.9; Radaelli & Pasquier, 2006; Schimmelfennig, 2010, p.3; Sedelmeier, 
2011; Wong, 2007). There is a mutual dependency between these stages and processes 
(Brzel & Risse, 2003, 2007, 2009; Hill & Wong, 2011, p. 210; Radaelli, 2004; 
Schimmelfennig, 2010; Wong, 2007); they are different, but related, and complete each 
other. 
For decades most studies (Colino, 1997; Heritier, 1999; Moravcsik, 1999; Stone, Sweet 
& Sandholtz, 1998; Risse, 2001; Wallace & Wallace, 2000) on EUisation focused on the 
institution-building and decision-making process at EU level by showing how domestic 
conditions affect supranational institution-building and decision-making at EU level. This 
refers to the first stage of EUisation, which is a Ôbottom-upÕ process. It is an Òevaluation 
of European institutions as a set of new norms, rules and practicesÓ (Brzel, 2002, p. 93). 
Consequently, for decades, the Ômirror imageÕ of the concept, the domestic impact of the 
EU, remained poorly explained. To fill this gap in the literature the impact of the EU on 
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member, and recently non-member state patterns of governance, policy preferences, 
interest and identities have increasingly become the subject of study (See, for example, 
Alter 2012; Alter & Helfer 2010; Barbe et al. 2009; Brzel, 2005; Brzel & Risse, 2007, 
2009, 2012; Bulmer & Radaelli, 2005; Dimitrova & Dragneva 2009; Elbasani, 2011; 
Farrel, 2009; Kassim, 2005; Knill & Tosun 2009; Ladrech, 2005; Lavenex et al. 2009; 
Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2010; Noutcheva & Duzgit, 2012; Schimmelfennig, 2007; 
2009; 2010; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005; Sedelmeier, 2006; 2011, 2012; Sepos, 
2008; Terzi, 2010; Wong & Hill, 2011; Weber, 2007). The Ôtop-downÕ correlation of 
EUisation defined as Ôa process of reorienting the direction and shape of politics to a 
degree that EC political and economic dynamics becomes part of the organisational logic 
of national politics and policy-makingÕ (Ladrech, 1994, p. 69). It is employed to analyse 
how domestic institutions, patterns of governance, policy preferences, interests, identities 
and norms change as a result of institution-building and policymaking at EU level 
(Brzel & Risse, 2007, 2009, 2012; Radaelli, 2003, 2004; Schimmelfennig, 2009, 2010; 
Sedelmeier, 2011, 2012).  
Although scholars mostly limit the term ÔEUisationÕ to the Ôtop-downÕ approach, there 
are some scholars who take into consideration the inter-relationships between bottom up 
and top down stages of EUisation and describe it as an interrelated two-way process 
(Beyers & Trondal, 2003; Bomberg & Trondal, 2000; Brzel, 2002, 2003; Howell, 2004; 
Torreblanca, 2001; Radaelli, 2003, 2004, 2012; Vink, 2002; Wong, 2007; Wong & Hill, 
2011). For instance, Howell conceptualised it as a downloading, uploading and cross-
loading process (Howell, 2004, p. 20-25; see also Exadaktylos & Radaelli, 2009; 2012; 
Wong & Hill, 2011) This third conceptualisation, a bottom-up, top-down style and inter-
relations between these stages and processes, portrays it as Ôan ongoing, interactive and 
mutually constitutive process of change, linking national and European levels, where the 
responses of the member states to the integration process feed back into EU institutions 
and policy processes and vice versaÕ (Major, 2005, p. 177). In other words, while 
member states are actively shaping European policies and institutions, they and candidate 
states  -in some cases non-candidates - are also (having) to incorporate(ing) them at the 
domestic level (Brzel, 2001, p. 2; Wong, 2007; Wong & Hill, 2011).  In this sense, 
Radaelli (2004, p. 5) gave one of the comprehensive definitions of EUisation:  
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 ÒEuropeanisation consists of processes of: a) construction, b) diffusion and c) 
institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 
'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and 
consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic 
(national and sub-national) discourse, political structures and public policiesÓ10. 
As Major put it, however, ÔBeing bound up in a circular movement is of little help as it 
blurs the boundaries between cause and effect, dependent and independent variableÕ 
(Major, 2005, p. 177). There is thus a need to delimit the meaning of EUisation and 
clarify which definition of EUisation is relevant to this study in order to achieve 
methodological consistency. We will therefore broadly focus on a Ôtop-downÕ approach 
to understanding and explaining the role of the EU in the transformation of a stateÕs 
(Turkish) foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours during its accession process to 
the EU. In other words, we are interested in understanding the significance of TurkeyÕs 
EU candidature on its foreign policymaking process and foreign policy outcomes towards 
its non-EU neighbours. As noted previously, this study argues that the changes in the 
institutions, institutional structures and institutional power relations, and in the interests, 
priorities and demands in foreign policy-making that have resulted from the liberalisation 
of the TurkeyÕs authoritarian political regime, which was generated by EU conditionality 
in the convergence and alignment of TurkeyÕs political system to the EU acquis, have 
become the main driving force behind the transformation of TFP towards its non-EU 
neighbours. Thus, this study considers EU pressure, incentives and the outcomes of 
European integration throughout the EU to be an independent variable, while changes in 
the institutions, institutional structures and institutional power relations, and the interests, 
priorities and demands in foreign policy-making that have resulted from TurkeyÕs 
increasing adaptation to the EU acquis are considered to be an intermediate variable, and 
changes in Turkish foreign policy outcomes (TFP)11  (for this study, TFP towards 
TurkeyÕs non-European neighbours) are considered to be a dependent variable. This 
                                                              
10 In parallel with this definition Vink (2002) also describes EUisation as a two-way process involving: i) the 
evaluation of European institutions, rules, norms and implementations, and ii) their impact on the political 
structure and process of the member and candidate states. 
11 Accordingly the  dependent variable in our study is not measured as ÔEUisationÕ but foreign policy 
change. 
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reflects a relationship between A (independent variable), B (intermediate variable) and C 
(dependent variable).  
In this regard, for the purpose of this study, we briefly define EUisation in parallel with 
the Ôtop downÕ approach, but we narrow it down to the realm of foreign policy: a process 
of change in institutions, institutional structures, institutional power relations, foreign 
policymaking mechanisms, foreign policy preferences, interests and policy outcomes that 
are directly and/or indirectly and intentionally and/or unintentionally impacted by 
institution-building and policymaking at the European level. As previously noted, our 
study is interested in analysing the influence of TurkeyÕs EU candidature on its foreign 
policy towards its non-EU neighbours. Considering the lack of EU conditionality related 
the TFP towards TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours (see EC Yearly Progression Reports on 
Turkey) our analysis is limited to the process of foreign policy change at the national 
level that is generated indirectly and unintentionally by the EU. Accordingly, we use 
EUisation as a conceptual framework to describe the process of change in institutions, 
institutional structures, institutional power relations, and the interests, priorities and 
demands in foreign policy-making at the Turkish level caused by TurkeyÕs EU 
candidature. The question herein is how to measure and assess the influence of the EU on 
Turkish political system and foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours  
2.4 Mechanisms of EUisation  
There is no single content or mechanism to analyse the domestic impact of the EU in any 
field, state or region (Schimmelfennig, 2010: p.10). Different states and regions, as well 
as policy fields, require the use of a different analytical logic because of the disparate 
natures of different institutions, identities, traditions, policies, states and regions. 
Consequently, Europeanisation scholars (Brzel, 2003, 2007, 2009, 2012; Checkel, 2001; 
Heritier et al., 1996; Knill & Lehmkuhl, 1999; Knill & Lenschow, 1998; Lavenex & 
Schimmelfennig, 2010; Lehmkuhl, 1999; March & Olsen, 1995; Schneider, 2001; 
Sedelmeier 2011, 2012; Wong, 2007; Wong & Hill, 2011) focus on different variables to 
explain the domestic impact of the EU, including: the misfit gap between the domestic 
and EU levels (Brzel & Risse 2003, 2007, 2009; Heritier et al., 1996; March & Olsen, 
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1995), the change in the domestic opportunity structure (Brzel & Risse 2003, 2007, 
2009; Knill & Lehmkuhl, 1999; Schneider, 2001), the ability of institutions and actors 
(Brzel, 1999; Brzel & Risse 2003, 2007, 2009, 2012; Knill, 2001; Wong, 2007), 
changes in the norms, beliefs and the expectations of domestic actors, and changes in 
ideas, preferences and institutions (Brzel & Risse, 2009, 2012; Checkel, 2001; Knill & 
Lehmkuhl, 1999; Schimmelfennig, 2010).  
Although Europeanisation scholars (Brzel, 2003, 2007, 2009, 2012; Checkel, 2001; 
Heritier et al., 1996; Knill & Lehmkuhl, 1999; Knill & Lenschow, 1998; Lavenex & 
Schimmelfennig, 2010; Lehmkuhl, 1999; March & Olsen, 1995; Schneider, 2001; 
Sedelmeier 2011, 2012; Wong, 2007; Wong & Hill, 2011) focus on different variables to 
account for the domestic impact of the EU, their arguments, to some extent, are that, first, 
the EUisation of domestic institutions and policies exhibits diversity because, as noted by 
Olsen (2002: p.936), ÔEuropean signals are interpreted and modified through domestic 
traditions, institutions, identities and resourcesÕ. Second, the degree of misfit between the 
domestic and European levels determines the EU adaptation pressure and the changes 
that are required at the domestic level. Third, misfit is necessary for domestic EUisation, 
but it is not sufficient to carry out the required changes. Therefore, fourth, they, to a large 
extent, embed the Europeanisation approach with a logic of consequences (rational 
institutionalism) and a logic of appropriateness (sociological institutionalism) in order to 
account for domestic EUisation through the benefits that are obtained from its variables, 
methods and mechanisms. In this context, by embedding Europeanisation with the 
rational and sociological versions of the new institutionalist approach, Schimmelfennig 
(2010) and Brzel & Risse (2009, 2012) explicitly emphasise the direct and indirect 
mechanisms that account for domestic EUisation. 
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Sources: Adapted from Schimmelfennig (2010) and Brzel & Risse (2012). 
According to Schimmelfennig (2010) and Brzel & Risse (2009, 2012), through direct 
mechanisms, the EU takes an active role and intentionally seeks to spread its polity, 
politics and policies in its interactions with domestic actors and institutions. By contrast, 
through indirect mechanisms, the EU either plays an active role or intentionally aims to 
diffuse its polity, politics and policies. Nevertheless, a domestic actor that views the EUÕs 
polity, politics and policies as Ôbest practicesÕ simply transfers them to the domestic level 
to solve problems and/or overcome crises that it encounters.  
2.4.1 Direct mechanisms of EUisation 
The first direct mechanism of domestic EUisation is conditionality, which works through 
instrumental rationality and relies on the manipulation of the utility calculations of  
domestic actors and the empowerment of pro-EU actors and institutions (Ôcapacity-
buildingÕ). The EU creates positive and negative incentives through Ôsetting conditions 
that domestic actors have to meet to obtain rewards and/or to avoid sanctions from the 
EUÕ (Schimmelfennig, 2010: p.8; see also Brzel & Risse, 2012: p.8). In addition, if 
domestic actors and institutions are not capable of meeting the EUÕs conditions, the EU 
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empowers them against veto players. 
In this regard, Brzel & Risse (2003, 2007, 2009) propose a three-step EUisation 
framework (adaptation pressure, intervening factors and domestic change) that is largely 
cited and accepted by Europeanisation scholars; it suggests that a high level of 
incompatibility and inconsistency between EU and domestic levels requires substantially 
more adaptation pressure, effort, collaboration and altruism to achieve the expected 
changes at domestic level. In this instance, the level of ÔmisfitÕ or compatibility 
determines the adaptation cost and pressure during the domestic EUisation process, with 
a high level of ÔmisfitÕ incurring greater adaptation costs and additional adaptation 
pressure. Therefore, according to this argument, misfit and adaptational pressure 
constitute the first step of domestic EUisation. As Europeanisation scholars put it, Ô[t]he 
degree of fit or misfit constitutes adaptational pressures, which is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for expected changeÕ (Brzel & Risse, 2000: p. 1, see also 2007, 
2009). The second step is the presence of capable actors and institutions that respond to 
EU regulations and directives by implementing the necessary changes at the domestic 
level.  
If there is a ÔmisfitÕ, there is need for domestic reforms and transformation to reduce the 
gap between the domestic and EU levels. The EU thus sets conditions that associated 
actors and institutions must meet to obtain the EUÕs rewards, and sometimes, to avoid the 
EUÕs sanctions. The rewards usually consist of accession, trade agreements and financial 
aid, and sanctions are the suspension and/or termination of aid and/or such agreements 
(Schimmelfennig, 2010: p.9). As such, the EU pressures member and non-member states 
to carry out the required reforms and changes at a domestic level. The effectiveness of 
conditionality therefore depends on intervening factors, including: a) the size and 
certainty of EU rewards (the credibility of the EUÕs conditionality)ÑEU rewards must be 
higher than domestic adaptation costs and the domestic actor Ôneeds to be certain that it 
will receive the rewards only when the conditions are metÕ (Schimmelfennig, 2010: p.9); 
and b) the presence of capable domestic actors and institutions to carry out the necessary 
reforms and changes at the domestic level.  
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If domestic actors and institutions are not capable or the domestic structure is not legally 
and physically suitable to perform the required reforms and transformation to meet the 
EUÕs conditions, the EU empowers domestic actors and institutions. This comes into 
fruition in two ways: (a) through the EUÕs technical and economic support (Brzel, 1999; 
Brzel & Risse, 2003, 2007, 2009; Knill, 1999, 2001)Ñthe EU provides technical and 
economic support, such as funding, education and various forms of assistance to domestic 
institutions and actors to improve their ability and capacity to carry out the necessary 
reforms at the domestic level (Brzel & Risse, 2000, 2003; see also 2007, 2009); and (b) 
by the redistribution of power and resources through the liberalisation of the domestic 
political system that results from democratic and market-oriented harmonisation reforms 
(Brzel & Risse, 2003, 2007, 2009; Schimmelfennig, 2005; Vachudova, 2005).  
As such, the EU plays an active role and intentionally seeks to spread its polity, politics 
and policies in its interaction with a state and/or an actor by setting conditions, employing 
pressure, empowering pro-EU actors and institutions and manipulating the cost/benefit 
calculations of domestic actors. As noted by EUisation students (Brzel & Risse, 2009, 
2012; Brzel & Pamuk, 2012; Kelley, 2004; Lenz, 2012; Noutcheva & Duzgit, 2012; 
Sedelmeier, 2012; Spendzharova & Vachudova, 2012; van Hullen, 2012), this 
mechanism is generally expected to be particularly relevant for the candidate countries 
that seek EU membership and the European neighbourhood and other countries that seek 
access to the EU market.  
Considering EU conditionality, adaptation pressure and technical and economic support 
for the alignment of TurkeyÕs political system to the EU acquis in the field of democracy 
and the rule of law, and in the economic realm, this mechanism is useful for assessing the 
influence of the EU on the liberalisation of TurkeyÕs political regime over the last decade. 
This study therefore utilises this mechanism to analyse the influence of the EU on the 
liberalisation of TurkeyÕs authoritarian political regime over the last decade. Due to the 
lack of EU conditionality, adaptation pressure and technical and economic support for the 
alignment of Turkish foreign policy towards its non-EU countries to EU/CSDP norms 
and values, this mechanism itself does not provide a comprehensive analytical tool to 
assess the influence of the EU on the transformation of TFP towards TurkeyÕs non-EU 
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neighbours.  
The second direct mechanism is socialisation, which Ôworks through normative 
rationality or the logic of appropriatenessÕ and is based on the alteration of beliefs, 
identities and interests through social learning and persuasion (Brzel &d Risse, 2012: 
p.9; see also Checkel, 2005; Johnston, 2007; March & Olsen, 1989, 1998). The argument 
is that EUisation is a kind of collective learning process that takes place in the context of 
reducing the incompatibility between policies and institutions at the EU and domestic 
levels and results in the development of a new identity by the adaption of domestic rules, 
norms, policies and procedures to the EU structure (Brzel & Risse, 2003, 2007, 2009; 
Schimmelfennig, 2010). Without coercion, or directly effecting and/or manipulating the 
rational calculations of domestic actors through the use of various communities and 
advocacy networks, the EU tries to convince domestic actors of the appropriateness of its 
rules, norms and values through social learning and persuasion. As a result, associated 
domestic actors redefine their beliefs, identities and interests in accordance with those of 
the EU Ôif they are convinced of their legitimacy and appropriateness and if they accept 
the authority of the EUÕ (Schimmelfennig, 2010: p.9; see also Checkel, 2005). 
In this sense, the EU plays an active role and intentionally seeks to spread its rules, norms 
and values by acting as a Ôsocialisation agencyÕ and a Ôteacher of normsÕ, but it is 
important to note that the domestic EUisation process, through socialisation and 
persuasion, not only involves the incorporation by domestic actors of new norms and 
rules into existing institutions, but also, active contention and resistance (Schimmelfennig 
& Sedelmeier, 2005; Sedelmeier, 2011). The effectiveness of this mechanism therefore 
depends on intervening factors, including the degree of coherence between the domestic 
and EU traditions, norms, and practices, and the frequency and density of interactions 
between the EU and domestic actors. Reducing high-level inconsistency between the EU 
and domestic levels in terms of beliefs, traditions and practices requires long term and 
dense interactions between the EU and domestic actors and institutions. On the other 
hand, the frequency and density of interactions between the EU and domestic actors and 
the Ôhigh resonance of EUÕs norms, traditions and practices with those of the domestic 
actorsÕ provides favourable conditions for effective persuasion, and thus, EUisation, 
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throughout socialisation (Schimmelfennig, 2010: p.10; see also Checkel, 2001: p.562-
563; Risse, 2000: p.19).  
This process of domestic EUisation is observed in candidates, neighbourhood countries 
and other regions of the world. As argued by many Europeanisation scholars (Checkel, 
2005; Kelley, 2004; Knill, 1999, 2001; Vachudova, 2005; Schimmelfennig, 2005, 2010; 
Sedelmeier, 2011), and as noted by Brzel & Risse (2012: p.10), Ôaccession 
conditionality is always accompanied by efforts to persuade candidate countries of the 
normative validity and appropriateness of the EUÕs institutional modelsÕ.12 However, due 
to fewer incentives being offered by the EU in the promotion of its rules and norms in its 
dealings with other regions of the world, the mechanisms of persuasion are particularly 
employed to promote the rule of law, democracy and human rights in dealing with third 
countries (Brzel & Risse, 2009, 2012; Jetschke & Murray, 2012; Lenz, 2012). In this 
regard, considering, 1) the high level of inconsistency between TurkeyÕs and EUÕs 
traditions, identities and political cultures, 2) the problematic relations between Turkey 
and the EU, and 3) the employment of this mechanism to promote the rule of law, 
democracy and human rights, this mechanism does not seem to provide useful analytical 
tools to assess the influence of the EU on the ongoing changes at the Turkish level in 
general, and on TFP towards non-EU countries specifically, during the process of 
TurkeyÕs accession to the EU.  
     2.4.2 Indirect mechanisms of EUisation 
Emulation is an indirect mechanism of EUisation: it is based on the emulation by external 
actors of the EUÕs rules, policies and practices without an active role and/or efforts by the 
EU. In other words, in contrast with conditionality, socialisation and persuasion, 
emulation does not include an active role and/or efforts by the EU to promote its norms, 
policies and practices (see Brzel & Risse, 2012: p.10; Schimmelfennig, 2010: p.9). 
                                                              
12 As will be explained below in the section that addresses the new institutionalism, due to TurkeyÕs 
problematic relations with the EU and the fact that its culture is significantly different from that of Europe, 
this mechanism of EUisation would not be helpful in expanding the ongoing process of EUisation at the 
Turkish level, especially in its foreign policy.  
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Domestic actors simply incorporate EU regulations and practices to solve their specific 
issues and/or to achieve their specific political and economic objectives. Brzel & Risse 
(2012: p.9-12) divide such emulation into two categories: Ôfunctional emulationÕ and 
Ônormative emulationÕ. Functional emulation is based on instrumental rationality and 
normative/mimicry emulation is based on the logic of appropriateness.  
Brzel & Risse (2012) distinguish two mechanisms of functional emulation, namely, 
ÔcompetitionÕ and Ôlesson-drawingÕ. Competition is encouraged between domestic actors 
for the Ôbest practiceÕ to achieve their political and economic goals, both in their regions 
and globally. Applicant, candidate and neighbourhood countries, as well as some other 
third countries, negotiate bilateral agreements with the EU based on their performance 
with regard to their adoption of EU rules, norms, practices and policies. With no pro-
active promotion by the EU, they unilaterally adopt the EUÕs policies and practices by 
calculating the benefits of bilateral agreements and close relations with the EU. That is, 
as noted by Schimmelfennig (2010: p.9), Ôits (the EUÕs) sheer ÔpresenceÕ
 
as a market and 
a regional system of governance produces (sometimes unintended or unanticipated) 
externalities. External actors adopt and follow EU rules because ignoring or violating 
them would generate net costsÕ (see also Allen & Smith, 1990: p.19-39). 
This study investigates the influence of the EU on TFP towards third countries13. The 
collected secondary and primary data, including the interviews, reveal that TurkeyÕs 
relations with these countries are not a part of the EU-Turkey negotiations (see Yearly 
Progression Reports on Turkey; DIP4; DIP6; CIV4; CIV7; CIV9; CIV12). TurkeyÕs 
performance in solving its problems with and developing close political and economic 
relations with third countries might have some indirect influence on TurkeyÕs relations 
with the EU in the long term. It is not possible to talk about the net cost of TurkeyÕs 
relations with them with respect to its relations with the EU, however, or TurkeyÕs 
competition for the best practice of EU/CSDP norms and values in its relations with third 
countries. It is thus not possible to talk about the TurkeyÕs intentional unilateral 
adaptation to EU/CFSP norms and rules, or the calculation of its benefits on its relations 
with the EU. This mechanism of EUisation does not therefore provide a useful analytical 
                                                              
13 By the Ôthird countriesÕ we refer to non-European countries. 
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tool to assess the influence of the EU on TFP towards TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours.   
Lesson-drawing, like competition, is based on instrumental rationality. However, rather 
than competition for best practices, it works through the search by domestic actors for 
institutional solutions that are suitable for solving the particular political and economic 
problems that they face. In other words, domestic actors strategically adapt EU 
institutions and practices to solve their particular problems with no pro-active role or 
effort by the EU. It is therefore a selective adaptation to EU norms and policies, rather 
than a wholesale transformation of institutional solutions at the domestic level (Brzel & 
Risse, 2012: p. 11; see also Alter, 2012; Jetschke & Murray, 2012; Lenz, 2012).  
This process of domestic EUisation is observed in candidates, neighbourhood countries 
and in other regions of the world. As argued by many Europeanisation scholars (Checkel, 
2005; Kelley, 2004; Knill, 1999, 2001; Schimmelfennig, 2005, 2010; Sedelmeier, 2011; 
Vachudova, 2005), and as noted by Brzel & Risse (2012: p.10), Ôaccession 
conditionality is always accompanied by efforts to persuade candidate countries of the 
normative validity and appropriateness of the EUÕs institutional modelsÕ.  
The second indirect mechanism of EUisation is mimicry (normative emulation), which is 
based on the social logic of appropriateness. Domestic actors emulate the EUÕs rules, 
norms and values, with no help from the EU, if they find them appropriate according to 
their prior identity, practices and beliefs. Thus, the driving force behind the transference 
of EU norms and practices to the domestic level is normative rationality, rather than 
instrumental rationality. In this sense, it resembles socialisation; however, in contrast to 
socialisation, it does not include an active role or effort by the EU to persuade domestic 
actors of the appropriateness of its norms and practices. Domestic actors simply 
incorporate the EUÕs norms and practices into their domestic context only if they find 
them legitimate and appropriate (Schimmelfennig, 2010: p.10; Brzel & Risse, 2012: 
p.10). 
Considering the discourse of Turkish foreign policy-makers (see Sections 5.3.1; 5.3.2; 
5.5.3; 5.5.4 in Chapter V), it is possible to discuss the influence of both lesson-drawing 
and the mimicry of EU practices on the transformation of TFP towards its non-EU 
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neighbours. Research findings, however, (see Sections 5.6.1; 5.6.2; 6.3 in Chapter V) also 
reveal that changes in the institutions, institutional structures, institutional power 
relations, interests and priorities in foreign policy-making that have resulted from the 
liberalisation of the Turkish political regime have had a visible influence on TFP towards 
its non-EU neighbours. These mechanisms themselves do not therefore fully explain the 
influence of the EU on TFP towards its non-EU neighbours during the process of 
TurkeyÕs accession to the EU. As Brzel & Risse (2000: p.4) put it, Ôthe issue is no 
longer whether Europe matters, but how it matters, to what degree, in what direction, at 
what pace, and at what point of timeÕ. The problem is, however, as Knill and Lehmkuhl 
argue, Ôthe lack of a comprehensive explanatory framework to account for varying 
patterns of domestic adaptation across policies and countriesÕ (1999: p.11). The question 
is therefore how to measure and assess the domestic impact of the EU in general, and 
more specifically the influence of the EU on TFP toward TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours 
during the EU accession process, despite the absence of EU conditionality, adaptation 
pressure and persuasion related to TFP towards its non-EU neighbours. We thus propose 
an additional indirect EUisation mechanism: the secondary domestic EUisation 
mechanism. 
 2.4.3 Secondary domestic Euisation mechanism  
Although they focus on different intervening factors, the mechanisms discussed above 
elucidate the direct and indirect ÔprimaryÕ domestic impact of the EU, and thus they can 
be called the Ôprimary domestic EUisation mechanismsÕ. I will, however, investigate an 
alternative domestic EUisation mechanism, in addition to the aforementioned domestic 
EUisation mechanisms. I call it the secondary domestic EUisation mechanism, and it is 
based on the alteration of institutions, institutional power relations and interests in field(s) 
through EUisation in another field(s). The changes in a field(s) arise from, or are 
triggered by, the alterations in another field(s) that are generated by the aforementioned 
direct and/or indirect primary domestic EUisation mechanisms. In this mechanism, the 
EU neither intentionally seeks to diffuse its norms, practices and policies nor to play an 
active role in the diffusion of those norms, practices and policies at the domestic level, 
however, the empowerment of new actors and the diffusion of EU norms, practices and 
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policies in (a) domestic field/s unintentionally causes changes in interests, priorities and 
demands in another field(s), which thus change the rules, practices and policies in this 
field. As such, the EU indirectly causes changes in this field without having such an 
intention or playing an active role. In this sense, to some extent, it resembles the indirect 
mechanisms of domestic EUisation, however, in contrast, domestic actors do not also 
intentionally seek to adapt to the EUÕs rules, practices and policies or to directly and 
intentionally emulate them. Thus, although neither the EU nor the domestic actors 
intentionally seek EUisation in a field, changes in rule(s), practice(s), institution(s) and/or 
policy(ies) in a field(s) which are generated by the EU, unintentionally cause changes in 
the rules, norms, implementations and policies in another field(s).  For instance, as 
mentioned above, and as will be further explained in following chapters (Chapters V and 
VI), the findings of our research show that neither the EU nor Turkey has aimed to 
change TFP towards its non-EU neighbours through the liberalisation of TurkeyÕs 
political and economic system that occurred as a result of harmonisation reforms 
undertaken to meet EU conditionality in the fields of democracy and the rule of law, and 
in the economic realm. However, the harmonisation reforms have unintentionally played 
an important role in the transformation of TFP towards its non-EU neighbours by 
changing institutions, interests, preferences and demands in foreign policy-making (for 
details, see Chapter V, specifically Sections 5.6.1 and 5.6.2).  
Consequently, our study will benefit from the conditionality mechanism, especially 
examining how liberalisation in TurkeyÕs domestic politics is brokered by the EU. In 
considering the transformation of TFP towards TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours, it is not 
possible to discuss EU conditionality and adaptation pressure in the field of foreign 
policy, thus we will benefit from the aforementioned indirect secondary EUisation 
mechanism in the assessment of the influence of the EU on TFP towards TurkeyÕs non-
EU neighbours during the countryÕs accession process to the EU.  
2.5 EUisation in high politics 
The majority of empirical studies on the domestic impact of the EU focus on the impact 
of the EU on member state socio-economic policies and practices. The impact of the EU 
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on member state foreign policies in general and more specifically on non-member state 
foreign policies has become less popular with researchers. As will be explained below, 
with the emergence of a Common Foreign and Security policy (CFSP), however, an 
increasing number of studies began to focus on the impact of the EU on the foreign 
policies of associated statesÕ. Whether, if so, how and to what extent the member and 
candidate statesÕ foreign policies have been influenced and re-orientated by EU 
membership and/or candidature have become subjects of these studies. One of the most, 
if not the most, comprehensive research in this regard is the National and European 
Foreign Policies Towards Europeanisation, which is a book written by Wong and Hill 
(2011). The concept of Europeanisation is employed to analyse the interaction between 
the EUÕs foreign policy and national foreign policies. This concept examines the 
interaction between the foreign policies of ten member states and EU foreign policy 
toward third states in terms of uploading, downloading, and cross-loading dimensions of 
EUisation, and is the first systematic study of a large group of member states. The study 
covers a range of ten different old and new member states14 to build an effective sample 
of 28. Based on the previously developed Europeanisation frameworks, it assesses the 
questions of ÒHow does the influence run? In what issue areas? With what significance?Ó  
Regarding the EUisation of national foreign policies, Wong and Hill concluded that first, 
in varied degrees, the foreign policies of the member states towards the different issue 
areas had become more coherent through EU membership (Wong and Hill, 2011, p. 230). 
ÒThere is a trend, albeit broad and slow, towards convergence. Even where the 
effectiveness, or impact, of European foreign policy is limited, as over the 
Israel/Palestine disputeÉ.Ó (Wong & Hill, 2011, p. 232). Second, factors such as 
socialisation, leadership, external federators, politics of scale, legitimisation of global 
roles and geo-cultural identity promote the EUisation of national foreign policies (Wong 
& Hill, 2011, p. 220). Third, factors such as the ideological hostility to further 
integration, differences in identity, historical ties and foreign security and economic 
policies, and the uneven patterns of special relationships which the member states enjoy 
                                                              
14 Namely, France, Germany, Italy, UK, Denmark, Greece, Spain, Finnish, Poland, and Slovenia. 
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with third countries, obstruct the EUisation of national foreign policies (Wong & Hill, 
2011, p. 224-226). 
The other three most significant studies (National Foreign Policies and European Political 
Cooperation (1983), as a continuation of The Actors in European Foreign Policy (1996) 
and the last volume The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (2003) were written by Hill. 
He focused on how the evolving European economic and political cooperation has 
affected the foreign policy of member states by discussing the effects of socialisation on 
changing public and elite opinion and of domestic and administrative factors in relation 
and adaptation to the CSDP. Although it was not a major theme, the top-down model of 
EUisation was addressed, and Hill concluded that the foreign policies of the member 
states towards each other and the EU had become more coherent through EU membership 
(Hill, 1996; see also Wong & Hill, 2011).  
In parallel, it is also argued that through the adaptation and transformation process, 
national identity and foreign policy interests are reshaped and redefined by a growing Ôwe 
feelingÕ and a common Ôrole identityÕ as a consequence of expanding socialisation, 
engagement and cooperation (Aggestam, 2004, p. 81-98; Wong & Hill, 2011, see p.228-
232). The argument is that increasing consensus and consultation in foreign and security 
policy at EU level limits the potential of nation states to behave and react independently 
in the international arena (Tonra, 2001; Wong & Hill, 2011).  Throughout this process 
new rhetoric, habits and beliefs come into practice which shape the behaviours of 
associated states at both the domestic and global scale (Terzi, 2008, p. 7-8; 2010; Wong 
and Hill, 2011). It is correctly argued, however, that although the EUisation of foreign 
policy has occurred particularly fast for new members (Whitman & Manners, 2000), 
foreign policies towards third countries amongst the founding member states must still 
undergo reform in order to foster a more harmonised foreign policy at EU level 
(Whitman & Manners, 2000; Wong & Hill, 2011, p. 230-232).  
The other influential study in this regard is ÔThe Foreign Policies of European Union 
Member StatesÕ, by Manners and Whitman (2000), which discusses how the involvement 
in CSDP reoriented the actions, choices and opportunities of the foreign policy of nation 
states. Such factors as adaptation, socialisation, national bureaucracy, and self-interest 
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and Ôspecial relationsÕ shaping the foreign policy of member states were covered in this 
study. The authors examined the effects of adaptation and socialisation15 on changing 
national foreign policy interests and preferences. Adaptation was explored as an 
alignment with the CSDP requirements. Socialisation was assessed as one of the main 
factors behind the changing Ôpractices, perceptions and interest of policy makersÓ 
(Manners and Whitman, 2000, p. 7-8). Like Aggestam, they found that the foreign 
policies of nation states are increasingly restricted and shaped by the EU as a result of 
acquiring a Ôwe feelingÕ, a common Ôrole identityÕ and a feeling of Ôcommon destinyÕ as a 
consequence of increasing coordination, socialisation and flow of information among 
member states. The common argument is that member states redefine their national 
interests and identities as a result of intensifying relations in the EU context, bringing 
about changes in the associated states' foreign policy, which fit with the sociological 
institutionalist explanation of EUisation.  
The term ÔEuropeanisationÕ was explicitly employed by Tonra to analyse how Dutch, 
Danish and Irish foreign policy has changed throughout their EU membership. Norms 
and values were the focus point of this comparative study. The argument was that 
national norms and values in relation to the EU have changed over time. This 
internalisation of norms and values has changed beliefs and expectations of national 
foreign policy actors who bring about transformation in national foreign policy rhetoric 
and practices (Tonra, 2001). EUisation is explained in foreign policy terms as ÔA 
transformation in the way in which national foreign policies are constructed, in the way 
in which professional roles are defined and pursued and in the consequent internalization 
of norms and expectation arising from a complex system of collective European policy 
makingÕ (Tonra, 2000, p. 245).  
There are very few studies that have examined the influence of the political, economic 
and social development generated at a domestic level by EU membership on national 
foreign policy. ÔEuropeanisation of Spanish Foreign PolicyÕ written by Torreblanca 
                                                              
15 The authors examined how member states changed their foreign policies in parallel with the CFSP 
towards other member states and third countries.  İn this process socialisation was considered as a factor 
shaping foreign policy interests and preferences of the member states in line with that of the EU. See Jan 
Manners and Richard G. Whitman  (2000, p. 8-7). 
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(2001) is one, if not the only one16. Torreblanca argues that Ôchanges in Spanish foreign 
policy are part of a wide process of political, economic and social modernizationÕ 
(Torreblanca, 2001, p.1). The importance of the democratisation process and market-
oriented reforms resulted in multilateralism, specifically stressed in this study as the main 
factor behind the changes in Spanish foreign policy. New institutionalism (rational and 
sociological versions of it) with ÔEuropeanisationÕ was employed as a theoretical 
framework in this study. It is argued that the EUisation of Spanish foreign policy is a 
consequence of both Ôlogic of appropriatenessÕ and Ôlogic of consequentialityÕ 
(Torreblanca, 2001). The argument was that there are different logics and motivations 
behind the policy convergence and policy transfer. One of the main motivations behind 
the policy convergence is becoming a full and loyal member of the EU, and for the policy 
transfer the promotion of national interests. In fact, the typology of policy change as a 
Ôpolicy convergenceÕ and a Ôpolicy transferÕ, and the explanatory instruments such as 
democratic and market-oriented reforms used in his study to explain the changes in 
Spanish foreign policy through EU membership, are in many ways helpful in explaining 
the changes in traditional TFP towards TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours (see Chapter V). 
While arguing how actor preferences and interests are shaped or constrained in socialist 
and conservative governments, Torreblanca (2001) concluded that they were seeking 
international acceptance and recognition. This argument, to some extent, seems useful to 
explain why the ruling AK Party-Justice and Development Party- (AKP) followed the 
multidimensional ÔEuropeanisedÕ foreign policy approach (See Chapter IV and V).  
A conceptual framework for measuring how EU membership has been shaping the 
foreign policy of associated states was advanced by Smith (2000), who conceptualised 
four indicators for domestic adaptation to CSDP requirements: (1) elite socialisation, (2) 
bureaucratic restructuring, (3) constitutional changes, and (4) the increase in public 
support for CFSP. His argument about elite socialisation, which is shared by authors such 
as Pomorska (2007), Nuttall (1997) Manners and Whitman (2000) and Wong and Hill 
(2011), is that policymakers are socialised into the institutionalised network system and 
                                                              
16 In this regard, the examination of the influence of the political, economic and social development at 
Turkish level, generated by EU membership, on TFP towards its non-EU neighbours, as undertaken by this 
study, would contribute to the Europeanisation study. 
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develop a certain trust and a common understanding. ÔThe success of EPC came through 
socialisation. All participants in CFSP attest to the beneficial effect of the club 
atmosphere in bringing points of view closer together and making consensus easierÕ 
(Nuttall, 1997, p. 3). Examining national bureaucratic adaptation to CSDP, Smith (2000) 
claimed that although EU members had not yet fully harmonised their foreign policy 
rhetoric and practices they had visibly organised their foreign ministry in accordance with 
CSDP requirements, and he stressed three changes: (1) the establishment of new officials 
such as Political Director, (2) the expansion of most national diplomatic services, and (3) 
reorientation of national foreign ministries towards ÔEuropeÕ. Constitutional amendments 
in adaptation to CSDP are not usually required owing to the nature of CSDP, but some 
associated states, as Pomorska (2007) argued in the Polish case, have reoriented their 
national legal structures to meet CSDP requirements and norms. Polity and political 
adaptation to the EU acquis communautaire seems to be a first step towards policy 
changes in the EUisation of the foreign policy of associated states. We acknowledge that 
policy changes are, to some extent, a consequence of polity and political adaptation to the 
EU acquis communautaire, and therefore SmithÕs conceptual framework would, to some 
extent, serve this study's assessment of changing TFP towards TurkeyÕs neighbours.  
As noted previously, the other argument about the Europeanisation of national foreign 
policy is that European foreign and security cooperation through the EU provides a 
channel for global and regional influence on both the EU and also associated states, by 
advocating and promoting their national interests and values on a global scale 
(Couloumbis, 1994; Rua, 2008; Wong & Hill, 2011). Associated states have therefore 
increasingly promoted cooperation in foreign and security policy realms. The traditional, 
cultural and historical background of associated states plays an important role in their 
acting as a regional and international power, but EU membership, and even candidate 
status, also enhances the acceptability of an associated state as a regional and 
international power. This provides an instrument and bargaining chip for defending their 
national foreign and security interests (Wong and Hill, 2011, 228-230).17 This has 
                                                              
17 For a similar argument see Couloumbis (1994), who argued that Greece ÔuploadedÕ its national interests 
and preferences to the EU level and thus its national interests and preferences in solving its foreign policy 
problems with its neighbours gained international status. In parallel with that argument, Savina (2008) also 
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resulted in the emulation of EU rules and adaptation to CSDP, in some cases voluntarily 
rather than as a result of EU adaptation pressure or conditionality (Jacoby, 2004; Wong & 
Hill, 2011).  
Most of the studies in this area focus on the influence of the EU on the foreign policy of 
associated states. The main component of CSDP European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP) has, however, recently become the subject of study (Gross, 2007, 2009; Ericson, 
2006; Howorth & Keeler, 2004; Wong & Hill, 2011). Until now, there have been very 
few studies (Howorth & Menon, 1997; Wong & Hill, 2011) of the domestic impact of 
EU/ESDP. The increasing enthusiasm of member states for ESDP was emphasised by 
Howorth and Menon (1997). Freedman and Menon (1997, p. 155-156) and Wong and 
Hill (2011), however, concluded that the EU had no direct impact on member state 
security and defence policies. Although this situation has changed considerably today, the 
influence of the EU on the security and defence policies of associated states is still the 
weakest point of the EU.  The influence of the EU on British, French and German 
policymakers in responding to international crises is analysed by Eva Gross (2009) in her 
new study ÔEuropeanisation of National Foreign PolicyÕ18 . She rightly argues that 
although the EU has increased its ability for military operations when responding to 
international crises, member states still consider NATO a more capable and credible 
institution than the EU in this situation. The influence of the EU on national choices in 
the security field is therefore still relatively limited. This does not mean, however, that 
the EU does not have any influence on the defence and security policies of associated 
states; by virtue of its character the ESDP is largely dependent on member state 
contributions for military operations and thus member states have considerable impact on 
ESDP (Gross, 2009). The EU/ESDP also has a major impact, however, on member state 
security policy, and several structural and administrative reforms generated at domestic 
level to adapt to ESDP requirements (Fredrick, 2008).  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
argued that EU membership provided Finland with an opportunity to promote its important interests and 
values and strengthen its international status.  
18 Although it was not the main focus of their study, the influence of the EU on ten EU members (France, 
Germany, Italy, UK, Denmark, Greece, Spain, Finland, Poland and Slovenia)  responding to international 
crises was analysed by  Wong and Hill (2011) in their new study ÔNational and European Foreign Policies 
Towards EuropeanisationÕ. 
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Although they are few, there are some studies that specifically focus on the influence of 
the EU on ÔnewÕ member and candidate state foreign policies. The changes in Polish 
foreign policy as a result of EU membership and the ability of Poland to ÔuploadÕ its 
foreign policy interests to the European level were explored by Kaminska (2007). She 
concluded that the successful adaptation of bureaucratic and administrative structure to 
EU legal regulations and CSDP generated by EU adaptation pressure changed the Ôway 
of thinkingÕ of bureaucratic and political elites and brought about changes in Polish 
foreign policy. At the same time, successful adaptation to EU/CSDP and increasing 
dialogue provided the Polish Ministry for Foreign Affairs with the ability to ÔuploadÕ its 
national interests and foreign policy preferences to EU level.  
On the other hand, PomorskaÕs (2007, p. 25-51, 2011, 167-187) studies of the EUisation 
of Polish foreign policy embrace two terms of EUisation processes: before and after EU 
accession. She addresses changes in domestic organisational structure, institutional 
culture and everyday practices, and analyses the adaptation process of the Polish Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs to EU membership and participation in CSDP. It is rightly argued that 
the adaptation process started with the accession negotiation and accelerated especially 
after Poland became an active observer of the EU and began to attend meetings inside the 
Council (Pomorska, 2007, 2011, p. 184). Consequently, the experimental learning and 
socialisation of diplomats has increased, which has brought changes in Polish foreign 
policy in line with the CSDP (2011, p. 184). She also observes that in comparison with 
the EU membership phase, changes and transformation in Polish foreign policy and the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs in negotiation processes, were mainly caused by EU 
conditionality (Pomorska, 2007). The process of EUisation experienced in Polish foreign 
policy has generally been shared by other new member states (Pomorska, 2007, 2011). 
Kajnč (2011) examined the impact of the EU on Slovenian foreign policy before and after 
EU accession19. She concluded that, first, the EUÕs conditions for membership provided 
structure for the Slovenian foreign ministry, foreign policy-making, and foreign policy, 
especially in the field of trade policy. Second, adaptation to the EUÕs conditions for 
                                                              
19 It is important to note that KajnčÕs (2011) and PomorskaÕs studies also examined the influence of Poland 
and Slovenia on the agenda of the EU foreign policy; in other words, the uploading dimension of 
EUisation.  
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membership, taking part in CSDP and the 2008 EU Presidency, broadened the foreign 
policy of Slovenia in geographic and thematic terms. Thirdly, as do many smaller states, 
Slovenia played an active role as an honest broker during its EU Presidency. Fourthly, 
there was increasing socialisation into European politics, especially during SloveniaÕs EU 
Presidency20 (Kajnč, 2011:206-207). 
It is argued, however, that Ôthe EUÕs application of conditionality varies across issue 
areas, target countries, and over timeÕ (Sedelmeier, 2006). Some scholars have 
questioned the effectiveness of conditionality (Grabbe, 2006; Pridham, 2005; Smith, 
2003). As argued above, some alternative strategies such as socialisation of the elite, 
experimental learning, persuasion and voluntary adaptation also played an important role 
in the EUisation of candidate state foreign policy rhetoric and practices. In addition, some 
studies have also focused on the role of mediating actors in the EUisation process. They 
conclude that mediating actors gained power in this process as a result of democratic and 
economically-oriented reforms generated by the EU, and that therefore, they are playing a 
positive role in candidate state adaptation to EU/CSDP, and also in changes in their 
foreign policy (see Schimmelfennig, 2005; Vachudova, 2005).  
There are also studies that analyse the impact of the EU on TFP (Akcam, 2001; Belge, 
2004; Bilgic & Karatzas, 2004; Brewin, 2000; Diez & Rumelili, 2004; Eryilmaz, 2007; 
Heper, 2005; Rumelili, 2005, 2007; Karaosmanoglu & Tashan, 2004; Kutlay, 2009; 
Kirisci, 2006; Oguzlu, 2004; Tocci, 2005; Terzi, 2005, 2008; 2010; Tekin, 2005; Tekeli, 
2000). They mostly assess the influence of the EU on TFP towards TurkeyÕs EU 
neighbours, namely Greece and Cyprus. They primarily use the conditionality mechanism 
and base their conceptual frameworks on rational institutionalism. However, systemic 
research into how, to what extent and under what conditions the TFP towards its 
neighbours have been reoriented by EU candidature is in its early stages. Thus, the 
examination of the influence of the EU on TFP toward TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours 
                                                              
20 However, Kajnč also noted that tracing membership in NATO also shifted Slovenian orientation Òfrom 
that of a ÔEuropeanistÕ to a more ÔAtlanticistÕ position, which evolved into a foreign policy characterized by 
the principle of ÔbalanceÕÓ Kajnč, 2011:207). 
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would contribute to the increasing literature on the influence of the EU on national 
foreign policies in general and on TFP in specific. 
As noted by Europeanisation scholars (Hill, 1993; Ginsberg, 1999; Tonra & Cristiansen, 
2004, cited in R. Wong, 2007, p. 322; White, 2001, 2005, p. 54-55; Smith, 2002; Wong 
& Hill, 2011) European Foreign Policy (EFP) is analysed under three subtitles: a) the 
national foreign polices of member states; (b) EC external trade relations and 
development policy, and (c) the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU 
(CFSP/ESDP). The issue here is that there are also different meanings of EUisation in the 
context of CSDP, and therefore, we should identify which one is relevant to this study. In 
terms of the EUisation of Greek foreign policy Agnantopoulos (2005, p. 2) distinguished 
at least four different uses of the term ÔEUisationÕ: (1) a process of convergence to a 
European mainstream, (2) a diplomatic lever and using EU instruments in the pursuit of 
national goal, (3) a process of adaptation of national foreign policy structure to the EU 
standards (to adapt national foreign policy structure to the CSDP requirements refers to 
the constitutional and administrative reforms at domestic level), (4) the influence of the 
EU on Ôdomestic sourcesÕ of foreign policy. From this perspective, changes in foreign 
policy are considered part or a result of reforms generated by the EU and its 
conditionality in the fields of democracy, rule of law and the economic realm. We will 
limit the scope of our analysis to the changes in TFP towards it non-EU neighbours 
during the EU candidature. The third and fourth meaning of EUisation is thus more 
relevant to this study. In other words, we will analyse the impact of democratic and 
economic reforms, generated by the EU conditionality in the fields of democracy, the rule 
of law and in the economic realm, on Ôdomestic sourcesÕ of TFP towards its non-EU 
neighbours.  
It is worth noting, however, that political and polity adaptation to EU/CSDP, and policy 
change is not the same thing. Changes in foreign policy can be a result of polity and 
political adaptation to the EU/CFSP, the internalisation of EU norms and values, and 
democratic and market-oriented reforms caused by the EU. One could choose any or all 
of these variables. We choose democratic and market-oriented reforms as the main 
variables that play a role in changing TFP towards TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours. In 
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contrast to the general argument of EUisation scholars in the field of foreign policy, we 
argue that the transformation of TFP towards its non-EU neighbours over the last decade 
is, to a large extent, an unintended consequence of EU conditionality in the field of 
democracy, the rule of law and in the economic realm which brought about an alteration 
in domestic sources of TFP and a broadening of the TFP approach to include different 
dimensions.  
All in all, the literature review of the domestic impact of the EU demonstrates that: 1) 
there are different definitions of EUisation, as well as different models, mechanisms and 
approaches to analysing the domestic impact of the EU; 2) critical junctures in EU-
associated states relations play a determinant role in punctuating equilibrium and starting 
the process of EUisation at a domestic level; 3) to a large extent domestic institutions 
matter in the domestic EUisation process; 4) the domestic response to the EU and its 
adaptational pressure varies owing to the variegated nature of formal and informal 
domestic institutions mediating for domestic change and adaptation to EU/CSDP; 5) in 
comparison to other policy fields, Òthere is a usually great sensitivity among most 
governments about foreign policy as a special domain in which national concerns 
dominate international or European interestsÓ (Smith, 2000, p. 614; see also Wong and 
Hill, 2011, p.230-232); 6) in contrast with the nature of the other fields, the field of 
foreign policy does not include Ôobligatory implementation of EU lawÕ (Major, 2005, p. 
180) and there is an intergovernmental decision-making mechanism (Wong & Hill, 2011, 
p. 228): 7) so the capacity of the EU as a supranational authority is relatively limited in 
the foreign policy realm. To observe a wide range of changes in the foreign policy realm 
in a limited time is therefore relatively difficult (Wong and Hill, 2011, p. 232); 8) 
methodologically, it is difficult to distinguish the impact of the EU from other exogenous 
and endogenous factors in the changing approaches, and/or outcomes, of the foreign 
policy of associated states (Major, 2005, p. 183; Radaelli, 2004, p. 9; Wong & Hill, 2011, 
p. 228-230); 9) because of the varying nature of different policy realms and countries, 
different policy fields, as well as countries, require the use of distinct analytical logic. As 
a result, Europeanisation scholars have developed a variety of conceptual frameworks 
and focused on different variables to explain the domestic impact of the EU; 10) 
Europeanisation is not a theory (Bulmer, 2007, p. 47; Wong & Hill, 2011: 231) and its 
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framework suffers from methodological weaknesses in identifying the variables that 
mediate changes. Accordingly, the term itself does not provide a comprehensive 
analytical framework to measure and analyse how, and to what extent, the EU policies, 
rules and norms generate changes in the domestic political systems and policies; 11) 
although theoretical framework is always selective (Goetz and Mayer-Shaling 2008, p. 
19) and Europeanisation scholars focus on different variables and mechanisms to account 
for the domestic impact of the EU, EUisation is generally embedded within the new 
institutionalism in analysing the domestic impact of the EU. As Graziano and Vink 
(2013, p.11) observe in their recent survey of the literature, studies of EUisation Òhave 
mobilized all strands of the Ônew institutionalist approachesÕÑ historical, rational choice 
and sociologicalÓ. 
2.6 New institutionalism 
There are several versions of new institutionalism, but three, historical, rational choice, 
and sociological institutionalism, and more recently, discursive institutionalism, are 
usually embedded with EUisation in analyses of the domestic impact of European 
integration throughout the EU. The following section will describe the four versions of 
new institutionalist theories and the key differences between them. All four might shed 
light on the domestic impact of the EU, as well as the importance of TurkeyÕs EU 
accession process in the transformation of TFP towards its non-EU neighbours. As 
argued in the first chapter, and as will be elaborated below, however, the rational choice 
and historical versions of new institutionalism are likely to be the most useful in 
analysing and assessing the changes in Turkey, including TFP towards its non-EU 
neighbours, during the EU accession process, and the role played by the EU.  
2.6.1 Historical institutionalism 
Similarly to other versions of new institutionalist theories, HI defines institutions Ôas the 
formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the 
organisational structure of the polity or political economyÕ (Hall & Taylor, 1996: p.938). 
It also conceptualises and stresses the relationship between institutions and individual or 
political behaviour. However, HI regards the institutions as the Ôresults of large-scale and 
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long-term processesÕ and stresses the connection and relationship between historical 
development and institutions (Schmidt, 2011, p. 63). To understand and explain why a 
certain choice was made and/or Ôhow something came to be what it isÕ (Pierson, 2005: 
p.34), HI focuses on the development of institutions and how they structure actions and 
outcomes. It considers the phases of change, the path dependencies and unintended 
consequences that result from historical developments (see Hall & Taylor, 1996: p. 938; 
Hall & Thelen, 2006; Meunier & McNamara, 2007: p. 4; Schmidt, 2008, 2011; Steinmo 
et al., 1992; Thelen, 1999).  
The argument of historical institutionalists is that current change and development is not 
only a response to contemporary demands, but also to previous circumstances (Hall & 
Taylor, 1996). In other words, they regard Ôthe timeÕ and Ôhistorical developments as 
crucial in order to understand and explain later events and their causes. For this reason, 
they believe that an examination of the period of institutional origin provides them with a 
richer sense of the nature of a contemporary policy or political or social phenomenon (see 
Pierson, 1996: p.127). ÔThe examination of a political phenomenon is best comprehended 
as a process that unfolds over timeÉ and many of the contemporary implications of these 
temporal processes are embedded in institutions Ð whether these be formal rules, policy 
structures, or normsÕ (Pierson, 1996: p.126). As such, they engage in historical research 
by according special importance to the origins and the development of institutions21, and 
their influence on contemporary polities, politics and policies (Almond, 1956; Annett, 
2010: p.4). In researching states, politics, policies and policy-making, and in evaluating 
them and the changes in them, they Ôcombine effects of institutions and processesÕ and 
pay attention to the ÔtimeÕ, Ôcritical juncturesÕ, ÔsequencesÕ and Ôtracing transformationsÕ, 
and how the processes of interaction between institutions and organisations shape and 
reshape them.   
This study investigates the transformation of TFP towards TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours 
over the last decade, and the role of TurkeyÕs EU candidature in its transformation. It also 
addresses the important puzzle of why and how Turkey has developed close political and 
economic relations with its non-EU neighbours over the last decade, through abandoning 
                                                              
21 They are situated in time. 
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its traditional disengagement foreign policy towards them. In other words, the study 
analyses how TFP toward TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours came to be what it is. It argues 
that many of the contemporary institutions and implications of TFP are, to large extent, a 
direct or indirect, and/or intended or unintended result of turning points in EU-Turkey 
relations over the last decade. In this regard, engaging in historical research by according 
special importance to the origins and the development of institutions at the Turkish level, 
and how the processes of interaction between institutions and organisations throughout 
the process of TurkeyÕs accession to the EU have shaped and reshaped them, seems 
crucial to understanding and explaining the increasing changes in TFP towards TurkeyÕs 
non-EU neighbours and their causation. Examining these factors together, the historical 
institutional approach would contribute to an understanding and explanation of the 
increasing changes in TFP toward TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours over the last decade, as 
well as their causes. For this reason, our study will consider both the effects of 
institutions and processes and will interweave the historical legacy with current 
conditions. Furthermore, as will be elaborated below, the concepts of HI, including the 
Ôcritical junctureÕ, Ôpath dependencyÕ, Ôpunctuated equilibriumÕ and Ôunintended 
consequencesÕ provide advantages in examining what has precipitated the changes in 
TFP during the EU accession process. We will benefit, therefore, from the analytical 
toolkits of HI in identifying the explanatory variables and factors that have mediated 
changes in TFP toward TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours during the EU accession process.22 
The main concept that HI literature considers in explaining how institutions, political and 
social phenomenon, and policies occur, evolve or change is ÔPath DependencyÕ. Sewell 
defines path dependency, as Ôa relationship whereby what happened at an earlier point in 
time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in 
timeÕ (Sewell, 1996: pp.262Ð263). In this regard, it means that the adaptation to a 
particular institution or policy at an earlier point in time will produce an additional 
adaptation of a similar nature in institutions or move on the same track at a later point in 
time (Kay, 2005: p.255; Skocpol and Pierson, 2002). As understood in accordance with 
Skocpol and PiersonÕs (2002) definition, which states that Ôoutcomes at a Òcritical 
                                                              
22 The implementation of this theoretical framework in the study will be described below and in subsequent 
sections.  
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junctureÓ trigger feedback mechanisms [negative or positive] that reinforce the 
recurrence of a particular pattern into the futureÕ, it is closely linked with the notion of 
Ôcritical juncturesÕ. 
ÔCritical juncturesÕ are political, social, or economic upheavals, historical moments or 
critical turning points in which dramatic changes occur and constitute starting points for 
the alteration of formal and informal institutions or preferences: they represent the 
starting points for path dependent processes. As Pierson, (2005: p.135) puts it, 
Ò[j]unctures are ÔcriticalÕ because they place institutional arrangements on paths or 
trajectoriesÓ,23 and they also determine the choice and power of agency and long-term 
development patterns. In the context of domestic EUisation, becoming an EU candidate 
or a member, and important agreements or disagreement and crises between associated 
states and the EU, are critical junctures that constitute the starting points for EUisation or 
deEUisation in domestic institutions or polices, and thus, for path dependent processes. 
Path dependency therefore means that once an EU institution or policy is incorporated at 
the domestic level, it is followed by additional adaptation to EU institutions or policies 
(Cowles and Curtis, 2004: p.300). In this context, how the critical junctures in EU-
Turkey relations have triggered feedback mechanisms and how those mechanisms have 
reinforced the recurrence of particular institutions and policies in TFP at a later time will 
be investigated. As noted by Capoccia and Kelemen (2007: p.4), counterfactual analysis 
and narrative process tracing provide a rich analytical toolkit to analyse the role of critical 
junctures in changing institutions, policies and political outcomes. Critical junctures and 
counterfactual analysis, therefore, will be employed to enable us to benefit from their rich 
analytical toolkit in analysing how TurkeyÕs process of accession to the EU has created 
enduring effects on TFP towards its non-EU neighbours. In this sense, as will be 
explained in the following chapter, we will conceptualise institutional and political 
changes that are the result of critical junctures, as well as their unintended impact on 
other fields (for this study, the field of foreign policy).  
                                                              
23 Although analyses of path dependence Ñ except for the macro historical analyses of the development of 
entire polities Ñ pay little attention to critical junctures and often focus on ÔreproductiveÕ phases, such as 
increasing returns, lock-in and the sequencing that is launched after a path-dependent process is initiated, 
critical junctures are important in the analysis of path dependence because institutional trajectories change 
at that time.   
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Pierson (2000: p.252) asserts that the concept of path dependency is closely connected 
with the idea of ÔstickyÕ and increasing returns. Increasing returns means that Ôthe 
probability of further steps along the same path increases with each move down that pathÕ 
(Pierson, 2000: p.252). Increased adaptation to a chosen institution or policy, on the one 
hand, increases the Ôrelative benefitsÕ of maintaining that established institution or policy 
structure; on the other hand, it increases the cost of exiting the chosen alternative 
institution or policy (Pierson 2000: p.252). As such, due to the increasing returns of 
adaptation and the increasing costs of switching to an alternative, once an institution or a 
policy is established, it becomes 'sticky' (Pierson 1996: p.143) and it locks itself in 
Ôequilibrium for extended periodsÕ (Pollack 2005: p.20). As such, the concept of Ôpath 
dependencyÕ is also connected with the notion of Ôlocking inÕ and equilibrium.  
As previously discussed, however, a critical juncture is the starting point for path 
dependency. Thus, the original and/or chosen path is sticky and locks in equilibrium until 
an external critical juncture punctuates it and starts a new process on another path. In 
other words, institutions remain at equilibrium until they are punctuated by an external 
juncture. From this perspective, the explanation of change is Ôpunctuated equilibriumÕ 
(see Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). As argued previously, this study proposes that, for at 
least the past two decades, critical junctures in EU-Turkey relations have directly and/or 
indirectly occurred at turning points that have altered the institutions and institutional 
structure at the Turkish level and have started new eras in TurkeyÕs domestic, as well as 
foreign, policies.24 The equilibrium in TurkeyÕs institutional structure, as well as its 
domestic and foreign policies, has been punctuated by critical junctures in EU-Turkey 
relations. The concepts of Ôcritical junctureÕ and Ôpunctuated equilibriumÕ are, therefore, 
useful to explain the new processes of EU-Turkey relations and the liberalisation of 
TurkeyÕs authoritarian political regime.  
                                                              
24As will be described in the following chapters, the announcement of Turkey as a candidate in 1999 
initiated a new era in EU-Turkey relations and in the liberalisation of TurkeyÕs political and economic 
system by providing Turkey with a roadmap to begin accession negotiations with the EU, as well as 
guidance for the democratisation of TurkeyÕs authoritarian political regime. 
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Historical institutionalists argue that institution and policy building processes are 
complex and include a large number of factors, including unpredictable factors, which is 
why institutions are not merely the intended consequences of an actorÕs choices. The 
actions of institutions or peopleÑespecially political actionsÑalways have unanticipated 
or unintended consequences and effects. The path or institution/s that is/are purposefully 
adapted produces unintended outcome/s, in addition to intended consequences (Hall & 
Taylor, 1996: pp.941Ð942; Pierson, 2005: pp.43-44; see also Merton, 1936: p.895; 
Thelen, 1999; Vachudova, 2007). As detailed previously (see Chapter I, see also Chapters 
III and V), the main hypothesis of this study proposes that the institution and policy 
structures that have been adapted by Turkey as a result of EU conditionality and 
adaptation pressure have produced unintended outcomes in TFP towards its non-EU 
neighbours, in addition to the intended outcomes in the fields of democracy, the rule of 
law, and in the economic realm. The argument is that, although EU conditionality in the 
fields of democracy, the rule of law, and in the economic realm, did not (primarily) 
intend to change TFP towards TurkeyÕs neighbours, it has had an unintended impact. 
There is, therefore, a clear connection between TurkeyÕs EU candidature and its path of 
liberalisation, as well as its engagement in politically and economically-oriented close 
relationships with its neighbours, after decades of a policy of disengagement towards 
them. The concept of Ôunintended consequencesÕ is a useful toolkit to explain the 
hypothesis in this study, and consequently, we will utilise the Ôcritical junctureÕ, 
Ôpunctuated equilibriumÕ and Ôunintended consequencesÕ concepts of HI to analyse the 
new processes, developments and changes in TurkeyÕs domestic and foreign policy over 
the last decade. 
As seen above, however, HI focuses on structures and processes and, to some extent, on 
events through critical junctures; however, it does not give much attention to what brings 
about the critical junctures that spur change, and which or whose actions, ideas and 
interests, and which changes to them, spurred those events, structures and processes. 
From this perspective, the political or institutional changes are seen as products of bursts 
of fate, a view that has been increasingly criticised and found to be flawed by historical 
institutionalists, who argue that reliance on junctures Ôgives human beings no agencyÕ 
(Steinmo, 2008: p.168; see also Streeck & Thelen, 2005; Thelen, 2004).  
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As argued by many historical institutionalists, institutional changes are the products of 
changes in actorsÕ interests, values and ideas (Katznelson & Weingast, 2005; Lieberman, 
2002; Marcussen, 2000; McNamara, 1998; Steinmo, 2008). It is thus important to better 
understand the ways that actor interests and ideas change and the ways that they affect 
politics and history. In this vein, Streeck and Thelen (2005) identify five sets of common 
models of institutional change,25 however, they do not really offer an explanation or 
theory regarding the ways that actor interests and ideas change, or the ways that they 
bring about institutional change (Schmidt, 2008). HIÕs framework itself, therefore, lacks 
an understanding and explanation of what brings about junctures, and which or whose 
actions, ideas and interests, and/or changes in them, drive events and processes, and thus, 
institutional and political changes.   
In this vein, there is a need for tools from other approaches to overcome this shortcoming 
(Hall and Taylor, 1996: pp. 940-941; Schmidt, 2006). To this end, historical 
institutionalists primarily benefit from elements of the rational choice institutionalist 
approach (RI) and/or the sociological institutionalist approach (SI) (see e.g. Dobbin, 
1994; Fligstein, 1990; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Immergut, 1992; Katzenstein, 1996; Streeck 
& Thelen, 2005; Thelen, 2004). In our approach, for several reasons (that will be 
explained below), we benefit from elements of RI, which pays more attention to the 
actors, ideas and interests behind events and processes. As such, in addition to the 
aforementioned concepts of HI, the notions of Ôempowerment of actorsÕ, Ôcost/benefit 
calculationÕ and Ômaximisation of interestÕ will be enhanced (as we shall see below).  
2.6.2 Rational and sociological institutionalism 
As in other versions of new institutionalism, RI and SI argue that there are interactions 
between individual behaviours and institutions. Institutions are a consequence of human 
action and, at the same time, they play a significant role in the determination of 
                                                              
25 Such as a) ÔdisplacementÕ, in which one institution displaces another; b) ÔlayeringÕ, in which an 
institution adopts new functions on top of older functions; c) ÔdriftÕ, in which the environment surrounding 
an institution changes, but the institution does not adapt in a stepwise fashion (see also Jacob HackerÕs 
chapter in Thelen and StreeckÕs volume); d) ÔconversionÕ, in which institutions take on new functions, 
goals or purposes: and e) ÔexhaustionÕ, which refers to institutional breakdown and failure. 
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individual behaviours. Individuals construct institutions and, later, the institutions 
constrain and shape their behaviours in the political arena (Peters, 1999: p.141). Both the 
RI and SI schools seek to explain the role of institutions in the determination of 
individual behaviour and the relationships between institutions, individual behaviour and 
political outcomes. They focus on different institutions, both formal and informal, and the 
motivations that play a determinant role in individual political behaviours.26  
Rational choice institutionalism sees individuals as Ôutility maximisersÕ and argues that 
individuals conduct cost-benefit analyses and act strategically to maximise their material 
objectives and interests. It gives priority to the rational calculations and interests of 
actors, instead of the role of institutions, because it maintains that institutions are created 
by individuals to pursue and maximise their own interests and welfare (Blyth, 2002: 
p.306; Schmidt, 2008: p.321, 2011). The argument is that individuals calculate the 
benefits of adaptation to new institutions. If the costs of change or adaptation are less 
than the benefits, and if it will serve their interests, they make the necessary arrangements 
and changes to adapt to the new norms, values, rules and regulations (Schmidt, 2008, 
2010). From this perspective, institutions may not initially determine actor interests and 
preferences in the political arena, but they have an impact on their strategic calculations 
(Harmsen, 2000: p.59).  
As argued earlier, adaptational pressure is a required, but not sufficient, condition for 
domestic change. Mediating factors also play a significant role in this process (Brzel & 
Risse, 2003, 2007, 2009; Schimmelfennig, 2009, 2010; Sedelmeier, 2011, 2012). In this 
regard, the rational institutionalist approach emphasises the importance of two Ômediating 
factorsÕ, namely Ômultiple veto pointsÕ and Ôformal institutionsÕ, in the domestic 
EUisation process (Brzel & Risse, 2000, 2003, 2007, 2009; Lavenex & 
Schimmelfennig, 2010; Schimmelfennig, 2009, 2010; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 
2005). The number of institutional vetoes would particularly increase at the early stage of 
domestic EUisation. This makes it difficult to obtain the necessary consensus regarding 
the required changes at the domestic level for adaptation to the EU acquis. In such cases, 
                                                              
26For more information about the debate between rational choice institutionalism and constructivist 
institutionalism, see Hall and Taylor (1996). 
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the EU empowers pro-EU actors and institutions through providing technical and 
economic support to make the required changes at the domestic level (Brzel & Risse, 
2000, 2003, 2007, 2009; Lee, 2005; Schimmelfennig, 2009, 2010; Schimmelfennig & 
Sedelmeier, 2005; Sedelmeier, 2011, 2012). In this process, the redistribution of 
recourses and power through the harmonisation reforms also empower pro-EU actors and 
institutions (Brzel & Risse, 2007, 2009).  
In this regard, from a rationalist perspective, making the required arrangements at the 
domestic level to close the existing ÔmisfitÕ gap between the domestic and European 
levels is closely related to the cost/benefit calculation of rule compliance made by 
domestic actors, and the changes in the existing balance of power at the domestic level. 
The EUisation process, on the one hand, provides new opportunities to some groups and 
institutions (generally, NGOs and civil society), on the other hand, it may weaken and 
constrain the ability of some domestic actors and institutions to pursue their interests: 
ÔEuropeanisation leads to domestic change through a different empowerment of actors 
resulting from a redistribution of resources at the domestic levelÕ (Brzel & Risse, 2003: 
p.58, 2007, 2009; Knill & Tosun, 2009; Schimmelfennig, 2009, 2010; Sedelmeier, 2011, 
2012). It is argued that the empowered formal institutions and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), especially economic elites and organisations, play a significant 
role in countering resistance to change and adaptation in the domestic EUisation process 
(Brzel & Risse, 2003, 2007, 2009, 2012; Knill, 1999; Schimmelfennig, 2005, 2009, 
2010; Vachudova, 2005). 
In this regard, TurkeyÕs enthusiasm for reforms that comply with the EU accession 
criteria could be explained by rational institutionalism. According to the rational choice 
approach, Turkish actors act according to the Ôlogic of consequentialityÕ, they calculate 
that compliance with EU rules, regulations and normsÑregardless of the considerable 
domestic adaptation costsÑwill bring greater long-term benefits than the status quo. As 
noted by Wolfgang (1997) the aspiration amongst governmental and non-governmental 
actors to adapt national norms to EU guidelines to gain entry to the EU is largely a 
rational choice. The EUÕs technical and economic support, as well as market-oriented 
reforms and harmonisation laws that are undertaken to close the existing misfit gap 
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between the Turkish and EU levels, also changes the existing balance of power in the 
Turkish political system by providing new opportunities to governmental and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and by constraining the power of autocratic state 
institutions, such as the military, old bureaucratic elites and the National Security Council 
(NSC), to pursue their interests.27 By calculating their economic and political interests, 
these empowered actors and institutions seek to adapt the EUÕs norms and directives. As 
such, this changing balance of power in the Turkish political system, based on the 
rational calculation of Turkish actors, plays an important role in TurkeyÕs increasing 
adaptation to the EU acquis. In this vein, in the Turkish case, civil and economic elites, 
and the government, represent strong adapters, whereas the military and the two main 
opposition parties (the National Movement Party and the Republican People's Party), 
despite their rhetoric favouring EU integration, remain weak adapters in this process. For 
the purposes of this study, we can even describe them as veto points. 
Sociological institutionalism, in contrast, gives priority to the role of the culture, ideas 
and informal institutions of individuals in its analysis of their political behaviours. It 
argues that Ôbehaviour is not fully strategic but bounded by an individualÕs worldviewÕ 
(Brzel & Risse, 2007, 2009, 2012; Hall & Taylor, 1996: p.939; Schmidt, 2008: p.321). 
According to sociological institutionalist logic, the political behaviours of actors are not 
strictly rational; cultural and ideological motivations, norms and values, and identity are 
the main driving forces behind the determination of actor preferences and interests in the 
political arena (Bretherton & Vogler, 1999: pp.30-36; Hill, 2003: pp. 98-126; Schmidt, 
2008, 2010, 2011; Tonra, 2003). Actors act according to what is right, according to the 
values and norms that prevail in the environment in which they are acting; this is called 
the Ôlogic of appropriatenessÕ (March and Olsen, 1989). As a result of the Ôcognitive 
influenceÕ of political institutions, actor values, norms, interests, identities and beliefs are 
shaped (March & Olsen, 1989: p. 17) by Ôproviding the cognitive scripts, categories and 
                                                              
27 There are strong and weak adapters in the EUisation process. Lee (2005) divided them into two 
categories, from the micro-level fusion perspective. He argues that, across Europe, as a whole, 
governmental apparatus and administration, heads of government and foreign and finance ministers 
particularly arise as strong adapters; opposition parties and national parliaments remain largely weak 
adapters (Lee, 2005).  
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models that are indispensable for actionÕ (Hall & Taylor, 1996: p.15). Consequently, the 
role of persuasion, socialisation and learning in changing the interests and preferences of 
actors is emphasised. The argument is that, as a result of intensifying relations, actors 
who act in the same environment socialise and learn from each other, and thus, the shared 
understanding of values, ideas, norms and identity among those actors increases over 
time (Hall & Taylor, 1996: p.15; Schmidt, 2006, 2008, 2010). Actors therefore feel 
obliged to act in accordance with recognised roles, norms and values. In other words, 
identities, values and norms motivate actors, and they choose the most appropriate or 
legitimate rules, norms or behaviours from the alternatives (the logic of appropriateness). 
They are forced to act in accordance with the dominant norms, values and beliefs (Peter, 
1999: p.29; Schmidt, 2006, 2008: p.321, 2010; Simon, 2005: p.377). 
Sociological institutionalist logic also emphasises the importance of Ôchange agentsÕ as a 
mediating factor in domestic EUisation. The actors and institutions that are increasingly 
engaged with the EUÕs actors and institutions in the accession process assume the role of 
change agents. As such, at the domestic level, political culture and identity change over 
time, and thus, the EUÕs values, ideas, norms and calls are increasingly found to be more 
appropriate and legitimate than the alternatives, making the necessary consensus 
regarding the required changes at the domestic level easy to achieve. As such, member 
and candidate states increasingly adapt to the EUÕs norms and directives. 
The logic of RI and of SI Ôare not mutually exclusive, any particular action probably 
involves elements of each. Political actors are constituted of both their interests, by which 
they evaluate their anticipations of consequences, and by the rules embedded in their 
identities and political institutionsÕ (March & Olsen, 1989: p.12). Depending on the actor 
and the case, the logic of one will play a more important role than the other. As Risse 
observes, Ôdomestic adaptation with national coloursÕ does occur (Risse et al., 2001: p.1). 
In this regard, as previously noted, considering the significant differences between 
TurkeyÕs and EuropeÕs identities and political cultures, and TurkeyÕs problematic 
relations with the EU, changes in TurkeyÕs identity and political culture, and thus, in its 
polity, politics and policies through socialisation and experimental learning require much 
more time and intensive relations. Thus, the Ôlogic of appropriatenessÕ plays a role that is 
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considerably less important than the Ôlogic of consequencesÕ in TurkeyÕs increasing 
adaptation to EU acquis in the field of democracy, the rule of law and in the economic 
realm and transformation of TFP toward its non-EU neighbours during the EU accession 
process. The logic of the rational institutionalist approach is thus more helpful than the 
logic of SI in identifying the explanatory variables and factors that mediate changes in the 
context of our study.  
2.6.3 Discursive institutionalism 
Taking ideas and discourse seriously and placing them in institutional contexts, following 
the lines of a version of the older new institutionalism, led to the birth of the newest 
version of new institutionalism: discursive institutionalism (DI). DI follows the Ôlogic of 
communicationÕ and emphasises the role of ideas and discourse in constructing a 
behaviour and/or a political action. Ideas that are categorised into two types, such as 
cognitive and normative, are seen as the substantive content of discourse:  
[D]iscourse serves not just to represent ideas but also to exchange them through 
interactive processes of (a) coordination among policy actors in policy and 
program construction and (b) communication between political actors and the 
public in the presentation, deliberation, and legitimation of those ideas, against a 
background of overarching philosophies. (Schmidt, 2008: p.321)  
Ideas and discourse thus matter in the construction and reconstruction of norms, values, 
interests and preferences, as well as in the dynamics of changes in history and culture, 
and therefore, in the construction of behaviour and/or political action. As noted by 
Schmidt (2008: p.321), for DI, Ô[i]nstitutional context also mattersÑboth the formal 
institutional context (simple polities tend to have a more elaborate communicative 
discourse, compound polities a more elaborate coordinative discourse) and the more 
specific meaning contextÕ. It uses background information that stems from one of the 
versions of the older new institutionalism with which they are engaged, and thus, it is 
complementary to older versions of new institutionalism in that it has Ômuch in common 
with SIÕ (Schmidt, 2008: p.304-305, 2010). 
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Discursive institutionalism also has aspects that contrast with older versions of new 
institutionalism in terms of its ÔlogicÕ and its explanation of institutions and institutional 
change, as well as norms and interests (Schmidt, 2008: p.304-305). In DI, Ôaction in 
institutions is not seen as the product of agentsÕ rationally calculated, path-dependent, or 
norm-appropriate rule-followingÕ.28 Institutions are defined dynamically as Ôstructures 
and constructs of meaning internal to agents whose Òbackground ideational abilitiesÓ 
enable them to create (and maintain) institutions while their Òforeground discursive 
abilitiesÓ enable them to communicate critically about them, to change (or maintain) 
themÕ (Schmidt, 2010: p.1). As such, in contrast to older versions of new institutionalism 
in which institutional change is static (for details, see the section above), institutional 
change in DI Ôis dynamic and explainable across time through agentsÕ ideas and 
discourseÕ (Schmidt, 2008: p.321). In contrast to SI, in which norms are defined as static 
structures (see above), norms in DI are defined as dynamic, intersubjective constructs. DI 
defines interests as ideas, and thus, interests are subjective, which contrasts with RI, in 
which interests are objective and material (Schmidt, 2008: p. 321; see also 2006a, 2006b, 
2010).  
Ideas and discourse may have a causal influence on the construction and reconstruction 
of norms and interests,29 however, as noted by Lynggaard (2012, p. 20) Ôdiscourse 
traditions are not always and not exactly concerned with causal explanationÕ. Thus DI 
would not be fruitful in dealing with the causality issue in our study. DIÕs assumption that 
Ôeverything is related to ideas and discourse, with no neutral incentive structures and no 
objective and material interestsÕ (Schmidt, 2008: p.321) considers the presence of 
primarily material objectives in EU-associated state relations, which is seen as an 
extremely idealist promise. The literature review on Europeanisation clearly reveals the 
presence of neutral incentive structures, and objective and material interests, as well as 
their influence on the construction and reconstruction of discourse. As argued above, DI 
uses background information that stems from one of the versions of the older new 
institutionalism with which they are engaged. ÔWe cannot have our cake and eat it tooÕ.  
                                                              
28 As previously argued, older versions of new institutionalism define institutions as Ôstatic external rule-
following structures of incentives, path-dependencies, and cultural framingÕ(Schmidt, 2010: p.1). 
29 The issue of whether the ideas and discourse construct and reconstruct interests and norms, or the 
interests and norms construct and reconstruct ideas and discourse, presents a Ôchicken-eggÕ problem. 
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It is true that a theoretical framework Ôis always selectiveÕ (Smith & Baylis, 2005: p.3), 
and no single methodological approach would be able to sufficiently explain the vast, and 
complicated political realty (Schmidt, 2008). ÔEach gets at a different piece of reality, at 
different levels of abstraction, with different kinds of generalisations, and different 
objects and logics of explanationÕ (Schmidt, 2008: p.321; see also Bulmer, 2007: p.47; 
Goetz & Mayer-Shaling, 2008: p.19; Schmidt, 2010: p.304-305, 2011: p.65, 83; Smith & 
Baylis, 2005: p.3). However, as argued in the first chapter and detailed above, the logic of 
rational and historical institutionalist approaches seems to be more helpful than the logic 
of SI and DI to identify the explanatory variables and factors that mediate change for the 
purposes of our study. EUisation, embedded in the rational and historical versions of new 
institutionalism, thus constitutes the analytical toolkit used to examine the hypothesis in 
this study. The application of the selected theoretical framework to the study will be 
further explained in following chapter, which is the data analysis section. 





















































































Source: adapted from Vivien A. Schmidt (2011, p.83)  
2.7 Concluding remarks 
The purpose of this chapter was to introduce Europeanisation and its applicability to the 
field of foreign policy as a conceptual framework for analysing the changes in TFP as a 
result of EU candidature. In this regard, we first delimited the definition of EUisation for 
our research, and then referred to the mechanism of domestic EUisation. Here, misfit is 
considered to be a precondition for the EUisation of member and candidate states, but the 
consensus seems to be that there is also a need for capable mediating actors and 
institutions in the EUisation process. To identify the applicability of EUisation to the 
foreign policy realm, we conducted a literature review of the EUisation of member and 
candidate state foreign policy. We ultimately realised that CSDP does not always include 
EU conditionality and adaptation pressure, even if there is a misfit gap between domestic 
and EU levels in this realm. EUisation itself thus suffers from the lack of a certain 
methodology in identifying the mediating factors and variables for change in the foreign 
policy realm. We therefore used the explanatory instruments of historical and rational 
institutionalism in analysing the transformation of TFP towards TurkeyÕs non-EU 
neighbours and the influence of the EU.  
The integration of Europeanisation with rationalist and historical versions of new 
institutionalism brings in six mediating factors to explain the EUisation of associated 
state policy, polity and politics as a result of EU membership and/or candidature: misfit 
and EU adaptation pressure (Europeanisation), critical junctures and path dependency 
(historical institutionalism) and veto points and formal institutions (rational 
institutionalism). In the EUisation process, Europeanisation as an explanatory variable 
emphasises the misfit gap between domestic and EU levels and EU adaptation pressure; 
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rational choice institutionalists emphasise the empowerment of new actors against the 
veto player in political decision making and the role of actorsÕ cost/benefit calculation; 
and historical institutionalists pay attention to the importance of path dependency, critical 
junctures and punched equilibrium, thereby changing institutions, institutional structure 
and policy-making.  
In order to reveal the direct influence of the EU on the liberalisation of TurkeyÕs 
authoritarian political regime, several issues will be assessed in Chapter IV, including (1) 
the impact of the misfit gap between Turkish and EU levels in terms of polity, politics 
and policy related to the EU adaptation pressure; (2) the importance of critical junctures 
in EU-Turkey relations in punctuating the equilibrium at Turkish level and the path of 
liberalisation of the Turkish political system; (3) the empowerment of the pro-EU actors 
and institutions against the veto players in political decision-making to carry out the 
necessary political and economic reforms and policy changes at the Turkish level through 
the technical and economic supports and harmonisation reforms conducted by the EU; (4) 
a cost/benefit analysis of Turkish actors in compliance with EUÕs directives; (5) the 
increasing change in TurkeyÕs political, economic and social dynamics generated by 
TurkeyÕs compliance with the EU acquis communautaire; and (6) to reveal the secondary 
influence of the EU on TFP toward selected countries, the unintended consequences  of 




Research Design, Methodology, Data Collection and Analysis 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the research design and the methods used to collect, process and 
analyse data as well as to evaluate the hypotheses and evidence-building process. It first 
critically assesses the existing research design models used in studying the domestic 
impact of the EU. After determining that the existing research design models for studying 
the domestic impact of the EU are useful, but not comprehensive in fully explaining the 
secondary influence of the EU on TFP toward its non-EU neighbours, it introduces a new 
research design model. The data collection, processing and analysis processes are then 
introduced. In this context, the qualitative research method and the case study and 
interview analysis that are used in this thesis to answer the research question are 
explained. The chapter introduces these methods and an account of how they will 
specifically help to substantiate our hypothesis and answer the research questions. 
Finally, it assesses the evidence-building in the study. It introduces counterfactual 
scenario and triangulation approaches and an account of how they will be helpful in 
demonstrating the credibility and validity of analysis and interpretations in our study.  
3.2 Research design 
The nature of Europeanisation, its mechanisms, and the influence of the EU on member 
and non-member states have increasingly become a subject of discussion within 
academic literature. The issue of research design in EUisation study has been relatively 
the subject of few studies, however. Haverland (2005) focuses on the case selection issue 
and the demonstration of the causal importance of the EU for domestic change. As will 
be explained below in the counterfactual scenario section, Haverland proposes 
counterfactual reasoning, which we adapted, and a comparison of EU member states with 
non-members to overcome the challenges to the demonstration of the causal importance 
of the EU in domestic developments. Exadaktylos and Radaelli (2009) look at causal 
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analysis in Europeanisation studies and focus on the methods and research design choices 
made by the most cited Europeanisation articles. Exadaktylos and Radaelli (2012) deal 
with the problem of causality in EUisation and focus on the logical structure and 
procedures for understanding causality in the EUisation. They took stock of the research 
agenda in the EUisation field and tried to tease out the appropriate research design to 
understand how the EU is having transformative effects on domestic change. As noted by 
Exadaktylos and Radaelli (2009, 2012) and as seen in our literature review on EUisation 
in the previous chapter, the causal analysis in EUisation studies is organised around the 
BrzelÕs and RisseÕs (2003) concept of goodness of fit and new institutionalist 
propositions. RadaelliÕs (2003) top-down and bottom-up research designs are primarily 
employed for empirical study (see also Caporaso, 2007; Exadaktylos & Radaelli 2009, 
2012; Radaelli & Pasquier, 2007). It is also important to note that, no matter which 
strategy (top-down or bottom-up) is chosen, exploring changes over the years through 
case study is the most widely employed approach to EUisation studies (Exadaktylos and 
Radaelli, 2009, 2012, p. 10; Haverland, 2008, p. 66; 2007). However, as seen in our 
literature review (see Howel, 2004, Radaelli, 1997) and noted by Exadaktylos and 
Radaelli (2009, 2012), some studies were interested in the relationship between top-down 
and bottom-up approaches. Accordingly, with respect to their overall design, the existing 
research in the EUisation field can be categorized into three types (see Exadaktylos and 
Radaelli, 2012, p. 9).  
Radaelli summarises types of research designs in EUisation as the Y = f (X) relationship. 
X indicates the cause (i.e. the EU input, directives), Y indicates the effect (i.e. variation at 
domestic level), and f indicates the relationship between X and Y (Radaelli, 2012, p. 9). 
The first type of EUisation research adapts a top-down research design model and 
focuses on X (the supposed cause: the EU input) as its starting point, and examines the 
level of fit/misfit between the EU and domestic levels in terms of practices in policies, 
politics, or polity. It then analyses the absence or presence of change at the domestic level 
(Heritier et al., 2001; Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse, 2001; Brzel, 1999; Caporaso, 2007). 
In this research model, empirical analysis starts with the EU input (the supposed cause), 
and through engaging in a search for effects of causes (Exadaktylos & Radaelli, 2009) 
traces the impact of the EU input (the supposed cause) all the way down to the domestic 
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level. On the other hand, instead of starting from the supposed cause (the EU input), the 
second type of EUisation research focuses on Y (supposed effect-domestic change) as its 
starting point to avoid Òpre-judgment of top-down research design that the EU inputs 
caused domestic change and adapts a bottom-up research modelÓ (Radaelli, 2003, 2006; 
Quaglia & Radaelli, 2007; Bulmer & Radaelli, 2005; Radaelli & Franchino, 2004; Bull & 
Baudner, 2004; Radaelli & Pasquier, 2007; Exadaktylos & Radaelli, 2009, 2012). 
EUisation studies that adapt to this type of research design start their analyses from sets 
of institutions, rules, ideas, actors, and policies at the domestic level at a given time (t1). 
These studies then trace these sets over the years until a determined time (t2) and identify 
alterations and the possible causes of the alterations. They identify the critical junctures at 
which a major alteration takes place and whether the cause of these changes was national 
or came at an international level, as do the EU inputs. Such studies thus search for the 
causes of effects (Exadaktylos & Radaelli 2009). The third type of EUisation research 
focuses on f, which is the relationship between the cause (X) and the effect (Y). Such 
EUisation studies adapt this research design model, identifying both the EU institutions, 
rules, ideas, frameworks, policies, and inputs in the policy field that are subject to study 
(X), and domestic change in this policy field (Y). This first stage of analysis lays the 
groundwork for the second analytical stage, the examination of the interaction between X 
and Y (f).   
The research models presented above are designed to assess the primary direct and/or 
indirect influence of the EU on domestic change or the relationship between the EU 
input and domestic change. Our study also assesses not just the influence of the EU on 
domestic change, but the secondary influence of the EU on domestic changes (see 
Sections 1.2; 1.3 in Chapter I and 2.4.3 in Chapter II) - the influence of the changes in a 
domestic field/s generated by the EU on the changes in another field30. In other word, we 
                                                              
30 As previously argued (see Chapter I and II), our study assesses the influence of the EU on TFP towards 
its non-EU neighbours, despite the absence of EU conditionality, adaptation pressure, and persuasion in the 
field of foreign policy. It argues that, although the primary objective of EU conditionality in the fields of 
democracy and the rule of law, as well as in the economic realm, is not to change TFP towards its non-EU 
neighbours, it has indirectly and unintentionally caused changes in institutions, interests, priorities, and 
demands in foreign policy making. Thus, it has changed TFP towards TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours by (a) 
changing the institutions, institutional structures, and institutional power relations; (b) empowering new 
actors and institutions against the traditional actors and institutions in political decision making; (c) 
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focus on the domestic change which is generated by the EUisation in another field/s. 
This requires an examination of the alterations in a domestic field/s (F1), and the role of 
the EU, then the changes in another field (F2) and the role of the changes in F1 
generated by the EU in the alteration in F2. In other words, there is a need for two stages 
of empirical analysis: first, the change in F1 and the influence of the EU on alterations; 
and then, the change in F2 and the influence of changes in F1 generated by the EU on 
alterations in F2. Thus, we use the above-argued research design model in EUisation, but 
we formulate it differently, which can be summarised as (F2)w = (F1=X). X indicates 
the cause (EU input), F1 indicates the primary effect (domestic change in a field/s), F2 
indicates the secondary effect (the change in another field), and W indicates the 
relationship between F1 and F2. 
We divided our empirical analysis into two stages. As will be detailed below in the data 
processing analysis section (Section 3.3.5 in Chapter III), we started our analysis from 
the sets of institutions, rules, ideas, actors, and policies in the fields of democracy and 
the rule of law, and in the economic realm (F1) at the Turkish level before 1999 (t1), the 
announcement of Turkey as a EU candidate (see Sections 4.3.1; 4.3.2; 4.3.3 in Chapter 
IV). We then traced them over the years until the 2014 (during the TurkeyÕs EU 
accession process), time (t2), and we tried to identify the alterations to them and the 
influence of the EU on the alterations (see Sections 4.4.1; 4.4.2; 4.4.3; 4.4.4 and 4.4.5 in 
IV). This laid the groundwork for the second analytical stage, the examination of the 
secondary influence of the EU on domestic change (for this study, TFP towards TurkeyÕs 
non-EU neighbours). In the second stage, we started our analysis from the sets of rules, 
ideas, actors, and policies in TFP towards selected non-EU neighbours of Turkey (F2) 
before t1 (see Sections 5.2.1; 5.2.2; 5.4.1. 5.4.2 in Chapter V). We then traced them over 
the years until t2, and we tried to identify the alterations to them (see Sections 5.3.1; 
5.3.2; 5.5.1; 5.5.2 and 5.5.3) and then the influence of the alterations in F1 on the 
alterations in this field (F2) (see Sections 5.6.1; 5.6.2 and 5.6.3 in Chapter V). 
Accordingly, the relationship between the changes in F1 (changes in the fields of 
democracy and the rule of law as well as in the economic realm) generated by X (the EU 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
bringing about political and economic stability and growth; and (d) transferring domestic religious and 
minority affairs into the realm of normal politics. 
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input) and the changes in F2 (changes in TFP towards TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours) are 
analysed.  
3.3 Qualitative research, data collection and analysis 
It is crucial to understand that all the data initially acquired was used to: (1) demonstrate 
that a practical transformation of Turkish political system and TFP has indeed been 
taking place in TurkeyÕs EU accession process; and (2) apply Europeanisation, rational, 
and historical institutionalism instruments of analysis)Ñnamely, the ÔmisfitÕ gap between 
the Turkish and EU levels, the EU adaptation pressure (Europeanisation), the 
empowerment of new actors against the veto players, the strategic interest calculation 
(Ôlogic of consequentialityÕ) and Ôpath dependencyÕ Ôcritical juncturesÕ in EU-Turkey 
relations, Ôpunched equilibriumÕ and their Ôunintended consequencesÕ (historical 
institutionalism). 
2.3.1 Qualitative research 
As argued in Chapter I, the qualitative method was used to collect, process and analyse 
data. The qualitative method is an means of enquiry employed in different disciplines in 
the social sciences (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Locke, 2001) to explore issues, understand 
phenomena and answer questions using a distinct methodological tradition of inquiry 
(Ritchie & Spencer, 1994). It is often used to meet different objectives, such as 
Ôidentifying the form and nature of what existsÕ and Ôexamining the reasons for, or causes 
of, what existsÕ31 (Ritchie & Spencer, 1994). It Ôis particularly good at answering the 
ÒwhyÓ, ÒwhatÓ or ÒhowÓ questionsÕ (Lacey & Luff, 2007) that the current study deals 
with. It allows research to reach real-life contexts, human experiences, practices and 
opinions (Henwood & Pidgeon, 1993, p. 16; Marsh & Stoker, 2002, p. 207) through 
interview and observation techniques as well as analysing words, pictures, videos and 
modern and historical information. As such it can contribute to understanding the 
complex behaviour, needs, systems, and cultures, their changes and the reasons for, 





to examine different aspects of the phenomenon under study (Ritchie & Spencer, 1994). 
This research aims to assess the TFP towards its non-EU neighbours and the changes 
made to it throughout TurkeyÕs accession process to the EU as well as the reasons for 
and/or causes of the changes in TFP. Thus, most of the previously defined objectivesÑif 
not allÑare required for this study, which is why the qualitative approach was chosen. 





Goals Sample questions 
Contextual Identifying the form and 
nature of what exists 
 
What are the dimensions of attitudes or 
perceptions that are held?  
What is the nature of people's experiences?  
What needs does the population of the  study 
have?  
What elements operate within a system? 
Diagnostic Examining the reasons for, 
or causes of, what exists 
What factors underlie particular attitudes or 
perceptions?  
Why are decisions or actions taken, or not 
taken? 
Why do particular needs arise?  
Why are services or programs and not been 
used? 
Evaluative Appraising the effectiveness  How are objectives achieved?  
  79 
of what  exists What affects the successful delivery of 
programme services?  
How do experiences affect subsequent 
behaviours? 
What barriers exist to systems operating? 
Strategic Identifying new theories, 
policies, plans or actions 
What types of services are required to meet 
needs? 
What actions are needed to make programs 
or services are more effective?   
How can systems be improved?   
What strategies are required to overcome the 
newly defined the problems? 
Adapted from "Qualitative data analysis for applied policy research" by Jane Ritchie and 
Liz Spencer in A. Bryman and R. G. Burgess (eds.) ÒAnalysing qualitative dataÓ, 1994, 
p.173-194. 
As previously discussed in terms of data collection and analysis, qualitative research 
methods emphasise Ôwords rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of 
dataÕ (2001: 506). This has led to the criticism of qualitative methods for not always 
having hard and reliable data.32 To overcome the potential shortcomings of the qualitative 
method, quantitative data such as tables, graphs and figures are also used (especially to 
illustrate the extent to which the Turkish political system and TFP has shifted). Indeed, 
the central method used to collect, process and analyse data to answer the research 
questions of the study is qualitative in nature.   
Qualitative research includes a variety of techniques, such as observation, interview 
(individual in-depth interviews, structured and non-structured interviews), case study, 





methods. The current study uses case study, interview, academic journals and 
documentary analysis methods to collect, process and analyse data. 
3.3.2 Methods of case selection  
Case studyÑthe most widely employed approach in EUisation research (Haverland, 
2007)Ñis an empirical enquiry investigating decisions, problems, policies, projects, 
institutions, systems, phenomena, persons, etc., within their real contexts. ÔThe case that 
is the subject of the inquiry will be an instance of a class of phenomena that provides an 
analytical frameÑan objectÑwithin which the study is conducted and which the case 
illuminates and explicatesÕ (Thomas, 2011, p. 521). Case study offers reliable variables 
and a detailed historical and theoretical account of specific contexts to enhance concept 
validity (Lijphart, 1971; Haverland, 2007), and Ôa more detailed and in-depth analysis of 
a specific process of EuropeanisationÕ (Savino, 2008, p.10), both of which are needed for 
this research. 
In Case study cases can be single and/or multiple, and it and/or they can be chosen 
randomly and/or intentionally depending on the aim of the study. Random case selection 
would negatively affect the substantive relevance of the project (King, et al., 1994: 125; 
Haverland, 2005: 2), if, for instance, an EUisation study like ours Ôdoes not include any 
of the most ÒimportantÓ EU member states ... or important EU policy fields like monetary 
integration random selection may seriously bias conclusionsÕ (Haverland, 2005, p. 2). 
Thus, the intentional selection of cases would be more beneficial in texting the hypothesis 
for this study and in explaining the question of whether the EU has left a very visible 
influence on TFP towards TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours. 
There are several types of case study approaches. A typical case is one that Ôexemplifies 
what is considered to be a typical set of values, given some general understanding of a 
phenomenonÕ  (Gerring, 2007, p.91; Gerring & Seawright, 2008, p.8; 2007). The 
researcher first identifies an outcome (Y) and a causal hypothesis (X), specific X/Y 
hypothesis. After the examination of possible examples, the researcher finds a case/s that 
matches their question of interest and searches for a causal relationship. The evidence 
found in the case is tested against the propositions of the given theory either to validate 
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whether the causal proposition of the given theory is true or false, or to reframe it as a 
finding of the case study (Gerring 2004, 2007; Gerring & Seawright, 2008, King, 
Keohane, & Verba 1994; Rohlfing 2008; Sekhon 2004). If the study involves a single 
independent variable, and the casual relationship between X and Y is strong, it would be 
easy to identify a typical case. As detailed above (see Chapters I and II), we identified 
specific X/Y hypothesis that need to be validated whether the causal proposition of our 
study is true or false. A typical case study method would be employed to test our 
hypothesis, however, our study explores the indirect impact of X (the EU put) on Y 
(changing TFP towards TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours), and thus the identification of the 
causal relationship between X and Y requires an in-depth examination and the 
elimination of other factors. As will be explained below, TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours 
have different characteristics in terms of their geo-political situations, populations, 
political regimes, regional and global relations and relations with the EU, and thus it is 
difficult to identify a typical case with respect to scores for all these dimensions. 
A second method of case study is the extreme case approach. In this approach a case is 
selected Ôbecause of its extreme value on the independent (X) or dependent (Y) variable of 
interestÕ (Gerring & Seawright, 2008, p.12). Through chosen an extreme case among the 
cases researcher maximises the Ôvariance on the dimension of interestÕ.  It is, therefore, 
not a suitable way of analysing the possible causes of Y or possible effects of X, and thus 
a specific X/Y hypothesis (Gerring, 2007, p. 102-105, Gerring & Seawright, 2008, p.10-
12). Accordingly, a study like ours has some notion of what factors affect the outcome 
and explores the cause/effect hypothesis should not employ this method (Gerring, 2007, 
p. 102-105, Gerring & Seawright, 2008, p.10-12; see also Brady & Collier 2004; Collier 
& Mahoney 1996).  
A third type of case study is the influential case approach. The aim of an influential case 
study is to check the validity of large cross-case theory through probing the question 
Ôwhat about Case A?Õ The researcher selects a case/s that seems, at first glance, to 
invalidate a given theory, or at least cast doubt upon it (Gerring, 2007, p. 108; Gerring & 
Seawright, 2008, p.12), but, at the end the researcher can find confirmation of a given 
theory. Thus, like the typical case, it tests the validity of a given theory, but without 
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having a case/s that represents a broader sets of cases.  
A fourth type of case study  involves most-similar and most-different cases, which bear a 
resemblance to J. S. Mill's systems of logic (1843), "method of agreement" and "method 
of difference" (Przeworski & Teune, 1970). The researcher employs the most similar 
method to select a minimum of two cases that are very similar in many variables, with the 
exception of one dimension, the variable of theoretical interests (X1) and Y (the 
outcome), the phenomenon to be examined (Gerring, 2007, p. 108; Gerring and 
Seawright, 2008, p.12). Through comparing very similar cases that only differs in X1 (the 
variable of theoretical interests) and Y (outcome) the researcher tries to find out why the 
outcome is different between the cases (Anckar, 2008, p. 389-401). ÒIt may be presumed 
from this pattern of covariation across cases that the presence or absence of X1 is what 
causes variation on YÓ (Gerring and Seawright, 2008, p.12).  This method would be very 
helpful in analysing reasons for, and causes of, differences in the policies of different 
countries policies where the countries are similar, with the exception of X1.  In a study 
like ours, which analyses the influence of the EUisation of a countryÕs domestic politics 
on its foreign policy, it is not possible to talk about the absence of one dimension, thus 
the applicability of this method. The most-different case method is the reverse of the 
most-similar method. Very different two cases, with the exception of the causal variable 
of interest (X1) and the outcome (Y), are selected (for details see Gerring, 2007, p.98; 
Patton, 2002, p. 234) 
The fifth method is the deviant case approach. Like the extreme case approach the 
deviant case approach selects a case/s on the basis of its/their being exceptional and the 
untypical among cases. Accordingly, the method used for deviant and extreme case 
selection is opposite to that of typical case selection. ÔThe deviant case method selects 
cases that, by reference to some general cross-case relationshipÕ, demonstrate a surprising 
value. They are ÔdeviantÕ in that they are poorly explained by the multivariate model É 
and Ôcases are judged relative to some general model of causal relationsÕ (Gerring & 
Seawright, 2008, p.12; Gerring, 2007, p. 105-107). It thus contrasts with the extreme case 
approach, and can be employed to analyse the X/Y hypothesis. The researcher chose a 
case/s of non-X and show that Ôthey not lead non-YÕ. The purpose of a deviant case 
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analysis is usually to cast light on the exceptional and the untypical explanation. In other 
words Ôto probe for new Ð but as yet unspecified Ð explanationsÕ (Gerring, 2007, p. 106). 
After examination of possible cases a deviant case/s in which the analytical interest of the 
researcher lies is found and the causal relationship is examined to determine whether the 
given hypothesis of study is true or false. 
As noted previously, Europeanization scholars (Aggestam, 2004; Jacoby, 2004; Kajnč, 
2011; Kaminska, 2007; Manners and Whitman, 2000; Nuttall, 1997; Pomorska, 2007, 
2011; Smith, 2000, 2003; Tonra, 2001; Wong, 2007; Wong and Hill, 2011) who are 
engaged in the influence of the EU on the membersÕ and non-member statesÕ foreign 
policies primarily argue that, due to the nature of the CSDP, the influence of the EU on 
member and candidate statesÕ foreign policy, a horizontal pattern of learning and 
socialization occurs. On the other hand, students (Akcam, 2001; Belge, 2004; Bilgic and 
Karatzas, 2004; Brewin, 2000; Diez and Rumelili, 2004; Eryilmaz, 2007; Heper, 2005; 
Rumelili, 2005, 2007; Karaosmanoglu and Tashan, 2004; Kutlay, 2009; Kirisci, 2006; 
Oguzlu, 2004; Tocci, 2005; Terzi, 2005, 2008; 2010; Tekin, 2005; Tekeli, 2000) engaged 
in the study of the influence of TurkeyÕs EU candidature on its foreign policy primarily 
argue that as a result of EU conditionality, adaptation pressure and asymmetric power 
relations during the accession process, the influence of the EU on the polity, politics and 
policies of Turkey, even on its foreign policy, is to a large extent a vertical, Ôtop downÕ 
process. Other scholars (Altinisik, 2004; Altinisik & Tr, 2006; Altinisik and Kirisci, 
2011; Aras, 2001; Aras and Polat, 2007, 2008; Aydõn & Aras, 2005; Aykan, 1999a; 
Calabrese, 1998; arkoglu & Mine, 2001; Dincer, 2007; Efegil and Stone, 2003; 
Hinnebusch, 2002; Karacasulu and Karakir, 2011; Kirisci, 2006; Kohen, 1998, 2005; 
Muslih, 1996; Olson, 2006, 2004, 2002a, 2002b, 2000, 1997; Taspinar, 2008; Trkmen, 
2002) engaged in study of Turkish foreign policy primarily argue that changes in TFP 
towards its neighbours over the last decade have been a result of the changes in regional 
and global relations with neighbouring countries as well as of TurkeyÕs changing regional 
and global politics. However, this study has argued that the influence of the EU on 
TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours is neither a horizontal pattern of 
learning and socialisation nor the result of EU conditionality and adaptation pressure in 
the field of foreign policy, nor can it be explained just by the changes in the regional and 
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global relations of neighbouring countries and/or those of Turkey as a result of changing 
regional and global politics. The domestic changes generated by the liberalisation and 
modernisation of TurkeyÕs authoritarian political regime by means of the harmonisation 
reforms undertaken to adapt to the EU acquis communautaire have become the main 
driving force behind the changes in TFP towards its non-EU neighbours. Accordingly, 
this study hypotheses an exceptional and untypical explanation for the transformation of 
Turkish foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours and the EUÕs role in this. 
As noted previously (see Chapter I & II), the influence of the EU on TFP towards 
TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours which are not subject to the EU conditionality, adaptation 
pressure and persuasion in the field of foreign policy (see the EU Yearly Progress 
Reports on Turkey; CIV1; CIV4; CIV7; CIV11; DIP4; DIP5), has not been the subject of 
discussion within academic literature. Our study introduces a new mechanism for 
analysing the indirect domestic impact of the EU that we call the Ôsecondary indirect 
mechanismÕ (for details see Section 2.4.3), in the absence of its conditionality, adaptation 
pressure and persuasion in a field(s). Accordingly, like a deviant case analysis, the 
purpose of our study is to Ôprobe for new Ð but as yet unspecified Ð explanationsÕ, 
secondary indirect mechanisms for analysing the domestic impact of the EU. As will be 
seen below, identification of the set of background factors in accordance with the 
analytical requirements of the study and selecting deviant cases in accordance with these 
identified factors among the cases provides us with the opportunity to choose cases in 
which our analytical interests lies and search for causal relationship to test the hypothesis 
of our study in a more specific manner. As noted by students of case study (Gerring, 
2007; Gerring and Seawright, 2008; Gereffi & Wyman, 1990; Haggard, 1990; 
Prezeworaki, 1991) the technique of a case study should be chosen on the basis of the 
objectives of the case study, its appropriateness, and the analytical requirements of the 
study (Gerring, 2007; Gerring & Seawright, 2008; Gereffi & Wyman, 1990; Haggard, 
1990; Prezeworaki, 1991). Accordingly, the deviant case selection method seems 
beneficial on the basis of the analytical requirements of our study.  
In the determination of the deviant nature of a case, the question should be Òrelative to 
what general set of background factors is Case A deviant?Õ (Gerring, 2007, p.106). In this 
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regard, specifically, we looked for TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours where a) TFP towards it 
is not subject to EU conditionality and adaptation pressure and persuasion, b) the EU 
does not have advance relations with the country, c) the countryÕs political regimes are 
not subject to change during the time that it is subject to our study, d) the countryÕs 
regional and global relations are not subject to (big) changes, e) Turkey has/used to have 
problematic relations with them (actually Turkey used to have problematic relations with 
almost all its neighbours except Azerbaijan and Georgia). These set of factors are 
identified to test the hypothesis of the study in a more specific manner through 
eliminating, as much as possible, the role of: 1) the regional and global factors in changes 
in TFP towards a selected country as well as its policy towards Turkey, 2) the changing 
domestic dynamics of TurkeyÕs neighbours that would create opportunity for changes in 
Turkish foreign policy towards it/them, 3) the EU conditionality and adaptation pressure 
on changes in Turkish foreign policy. 
TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours located in the Caucasus - Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan 
- are part of EUÕs neighbourhood policy. Thus the EU has increasingly developed its 
relations with them over the last decade. TFP towards Armenia is, to some extent, also 
subject to EU conditionality and adaptation pressure (see the 2003, 2004, 2007, 2008, 
2010 EU progression reports on Turkey). Turkey and Azerbaijan are one nation and two 
states. Since the establishment of Azerbaijan in 1991 the one nation/two states 
understanding is the main dimension determining TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards 
Azerbajan, as well as AzerbaijanÕs foreign policy towards Turkey. TurkeyÕs other non-
EU neighbours are located to the east and southeast of Turkey: Iran, Iraq and Syria. Iraq 
underwent a regime change in 2003, and accordingly its domestic as well as foreign 
policy has undergone a deep transformation. Its regional and global relations are subject 
to great change. TurkeyÕs other two eastern neighbours, Syria and Iran, are not subject to 
regime change. Their foreign policy and both regional and global relations, are also not 
subject to (great) change during the period of this study. During the 1990s and 
previously, these two countries had problematic relations with the countries in the region 
as well as with western countries in the 2000s. The EU does not have advanced relations 
with these countries, although the Syria is part of the EUÕs neighbourhood policy. 
Accordingly, Iran and Syria are deviant cases among TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours. Due 
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to the above-argued characteristics, they seem to better serve the analytical requirements 
of our study to specifically analyse the changes in TFP towards TurkeyÕs non-EU 
neighbours rising from the changes in TurkeyÕs domestic politics during the EU 
accession process; thus, to specifically test the identified hypothesis of our study. We 
choose, therefore, TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards Iran and Syria as cases in order; a) to 
demonstrate the changes in TFP towards its non-EU neighbours during the EU accession 
process, b) to shed light on the reasons for and/or causes of changes in TFP in the 
absence of EU conditionality and adaptation pressure and persuasion in the field of 
foreign policy, and c) to maximise confidence in the findings (i.e., evidence-building) by 
benefiting from a variety of sources (for more details about the evidence building, see the 
following section).  
In this regard, to get an overview of TurkeyÕs foreign policy toward Iran and Syria, the 
literature on Turkey-Iran and Turkey-Syria relations was first read and analysed. Primary 
data includes 1) NGO and the Turkish governmentÕs databases, official reports and 
political and economic agreements between Turkey and Iran and Turkey and Syria, 2) 
interviews with informants on Turkish foreign policy towards Iran and Syria (for details 
of interviews see Section 3.3.4 below). Secondary sources include: 1) books and 
publications from seminars and conferences related to Turkish foreign policy in general 
and Turkish foreign policy towards Iran and Syria specifically, in both print and 
electronic form, 2) articles related to Turkish foreign policy towards Iran and Syria from 
academic journals in both print and electronic form. 
After familiarisation with the material, we defined several sub-categories under the theme 
of Turkish foreign policy towards Iran and Syria, such as: TFP towards Iran and Syria 
before TurkeyÕs EU accession process, TFP towards Iran and Syria during TurkeyÕs EU 
accession process and changes in TFP towards them33. We then re-read the collected data 
and searched the new data for material identifying the reasons for/causes of TFP towards 
them, both before TurkeyÕs EU accession process and during the EU accession process. 
The findings were filed under the theme heading Ôreasons for/causes of TFP towards Iran 
and SyriaÕ. Finally, we analysed the relationship between themes using the analytical 
                                                              
33Accordingly the time frame for our study embraces the 1990s and the period of TurkeyÕs EU candidature. 
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toolkits of selected theories to test whether the hypothesis of the study is true or false (for 
details of identified themes, data processing and analysing see following Section 3.3.5). 
The role of the changes at Turkish domestic level generated by the EU conditionality and 
adaptation pressure in transformation of Turkish foreign policy towards them were thus 
analysed. In this context, the relationship between changes in rules, ideas, actors, 
interests, priorities and demands in the formulation of TFP, and the empowerment of new 
actors in the Turkish political system and foreign policy-making, increasing political and 
economic stability, and the growth and transformation of domestic religious and minority 
affairs into the realm of normal politics, are analysed. In the final stage we employed 
triangulation and the creation of counterfactual scenario methods to ensure the validity of 
our data analysis (for details of data collection, processing and analysis and evidence-
building in the study see Sections 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 2.3.5, 3.4, 3.4.1, and 3.4.2 below).  
3.3.3 Data collection and analysis  
The literature was read and analysed to get an overview of Europeanisation, EUÐTurkey 
relations, the Turkish political system and TFP. When Europeanisation, EUÐTurkey 
relations and the transformation of the Turkish political system and foreign policy, and 
the background, were understood, the research questions and hypotheses were 
formulated, and the theoretical framework of the study and the research design were 
determined. The research questions, research design and theoretical framework guided 
the data-collection procedures as well as the degree and limitations of the data 
investigation. The sources used in this research can be classified into five types: (1) 
government (for this study Turkish), EU and NGO sources of primary data (including 
systematic databases, official reports and legal documents such as political and economic 
agreement papers between Turkey and selected countries, the European Council 
Presidency Conclusions, the Negotiation Framework Document, the Accession 
Partnership, the Commission Progress Reports, harmonisation reforms used to fill the 
existing misfit gap between the Turkish and EU levels, and interviews in both print and 
electronic form); (2) interviews with NGOs and Turkish Foreign Ministry officials as 
primary sources (explained in detail below); (3) books and publications from seminars, 
conferences, and other scientific gatherings, in both print and electronic form as 
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secondary sources (comprising both theoretical scholarship and more technocratic 
accounts of the EU); (4) academic journals in four key disciplines (EUÐTurkey relations 
specific studies, TFP, Europeanisation, New Institutionalism) in both print and electronic 
form; and (5) journalistic accounts and information from the internet. Data continued to 
be retrieved until 2014. The interviews took place between September 2010 and February 
2011.  
To easily access the right documents as needed, data was listed, read, reviewed and kept 
available for the process of study by filing hard or electronic copies organised mostly by 
topic (Europeanisation, rational and historical institutionalism, the Turkish political 
system and foreign policy, and EUÐTurkey relations, etc.). The data was filed in 
numerous formats (e.g., PDF, CD-ROM, HTML files and on the internet). The main 
criteria using in filing the data were the textÕs content and where and/or for which subject 
it could be used. Notes from interviews and document analyses were also listed, reviewed 
and stored by topic, and kept accessible for later use. 
3.3.4 Semi-structured interviews with selected individuals 
The interview is a particular method for collecting detailed information about a topic by 
searching informant experiences, knowledge and attitudes in a specific context 
(McNamara, 1999; Marsh & Stoker, 2002, p. 197; Yin, 1989). By providing new 
information and evidence, interviews contribute to a better understanding of the studied 
phenomenon and contribute to evidence building in a study by providing a cross-
reference with other materials (Marsh & Stoker, 2002, p. 197; Yin, 1989). The 
investigation of the experiences, knowledge and attitudes of informants in the Turkish 
political system, Turkish foreign policy and TurkeyÐEU relations is important to obtain 
new information and evidence about the emerging changes in Turkish domestic and 
foreign policies over the last decade. In this way, as noted by Yin (1989, p. 90), 
interviews are also essential sources for case studies and evidence-building efforts. 
Interviews were therefore conducted with informants in the Turkish political system, and 
about Turkish foreign policy and TurkeyÐEU relations in order to benefit from their 
experiences and knowledge in trying to explain the hypotheses and evidence building in 
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our study. In this regard, The two major groups, 1) officials of Turkish Foreign Ministry 
to Turkish Embassy Brussels and Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ankara, and 2) officials of 
NGOs (particularly from civil and economic society organisations in Brussels, Istanbul 
and Ankara) was selected as interviewees.  
These two populations were selected because: 1) the selected NGOs are TurkeyÕs top 
NGOs (see TodayÕs Zaman, March, 18, 2009; Tusev, 2009), in terms of the number of 
their members, representatives in Turkey and abroad, budgets and activities, including 
publications, media, etc.; 2) they have been taking an increasingly active role in EUÐ
Turkey relations and the formulation of TurkeyÕs domestic and foreign policy over the 
last decade; and 3) foreign ministry officials in Ankara are at the centre of the 
formulation and implementation of TFP, and in Brussels are at the centre or EUÐTurkey 
relations. Learning more about the meaning of events according to these stakeholders, as 
well as their positions, activities, views and perceptions of EUÐTurkey relations and TFP 
towards selected neighbouring countries would contribute to a better understanding and 
explanation of: a) TFP towards selected TurkeyÕs neighbours and changes over the last 
decade; b) their role in, and the reasons for their support of transformations of the Turkish 
political system in accordance with EU calls and TFP towards TurkeyÕs neighbours in 
general, and Iran and Syria specifically; and c) the impact of the changes to Turkish 
domestic politics throughout TurkeyÕs accession process to the EU, on its foreign policy 
and specifically its foreign policy towards Iran and Syria.   
Potential interviewees were first telephoned, and then a letter including information about 
the researcher, the purpose of the interview and research, and the intended use of the 
results were sent to the interviewees. The interview questions were sent to the 
interviewees who agreed to participate. The themes of interview questions were chosen 
based on the literature review, research questions and hypotheses, and the information, 
gleaned from the secondary and other primary sources before the interviews, about TFP 
towards TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours, changes in TFP towards its non-EU neighbours 
over the last decade, and the impact of EU. These themes included: a) the Turkish 
political system and its transformation in the EU accession process; b) TurkeyÕs foreign 
policy towards its non-EU neighbours; c) the formulation and implementation of that 
  90 
foreign policy; d) the main actors and institutions in foreign policy making; e) the 
transformation of TFP towards its non-EU neighbours over the last decade; f) changes in 
mechanism, actors and interests, and preferences in foreign policy-making over the last 
decade; g) reasons for and/or causes of changes; and h) the overall impacts of TurkeyÕs 
accession process to the EU in the emerging changes in the Turkish political system, 
foreign policy-making and outcomes. Finally, semi-structured interviews were conducted 
between September 2010 and February 2011 in Brussels, Istanbul and Ankara, following 
a purposefully designed structure and defined questions (questions will be discussed 
below).  
Table 4: Number of Interviewees in Different Institutes 
 Brussels Istanbul Ankara Total 
Foreign Ministry Officials 3 - 4 7 
Members of NGOs 4 4 5 13 
Total 7 4 9 20 
 
A total of 20 interviews were conducted with 20 interviewees (see Table 3). Interviews 
consisted of three sets of questions, about: (1) TFP towards TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours 
(i.e., Iraq and Syria) before TurkeyÕs accession process to the EU; (2) the changes in TFP 
towards identified neighbours during the TurkeyÕs EU accession process; and (3) the 
reasons for and/or causes of the changes in TFP towards these neighbours over the last 
decade. One of the main aims of the study was to understand and explain the role of the 
EU in the transformation of TFP towards TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours in the EU 
accession process. In the third set of questions, we therefore focused more on the possible 
impacts of: (a) critical junctures in EU-Turkey relations; (b) EU conditionality in the rule 
of law and the economic realm; and (c) unintended consequences of the liberalisation of 
  91 
the Turkish political system on the transformation of TFP in TurkeyÕs accession process 
to the EU.  
The interviews generally started by asking about TFP towards the selected neighbours 
during the 1990s and before. In this stage, we also questioned the reasons for, and/or 
causes of TurkeyÕs problematic relationships with its neighbours during the 1990s and 
before. We then moved to the changes in TFP towards these countries during the 
TurkeyÕs EU accession process and the reasons for, and/causes of the changes in TFP 
towards them. In enquiring about the reasons for, and causes of, the changes in TFP 
towards TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours, we first focused on the impact of EU 
conditionality in the field of democracy and the rule of law, as well as in the economic 
realm, in terms of: (a) the changes in institutions, institutional structures, institutional 
power relations and the process and mechanism of political decision-making; (b) the 
empowerment of new actors against the veto players in political decision making; (c) 
increasing political and economic stability and growth; (d) increasing respect and 
protection of religious and minority rights and the transformation of domestic issues into 
the realm of normal politics; and (e) the changing interest, priorities and demands in 
foreign policy-making. Next, we moved on to the impacts of these domestic changes on 
the emerging changes in TFP towards select non-EU neighbours of Turkey over the last 
decade. Herein the focus was on the relationship between the above-mentioned changes 
in TurkeyÕs domestic politics and the changes in interests, priorities and demands in 
TurkeyÕs foreign policy-making towards selected countries. As such, we tried to benefit 
from the interview method when explaining the research questions, verifying the 
hypotheses and building the evidence in the study (the evidence building will be 
explained below). During the interviews, however, topics were addressed depending on 
the intervieweesÕ individual backgrounds and as the themes emerged in the discussions. 
Thus, the order of questions varied and additional questions relating to topics were 
introduced so as to gain more detailed information and easier and more flexible 
interviews. 
In general, the interviews took from 40 to 70 minutes. Most of the interviews, especially 
those with members of NGOs, were recorded, with the permission of the interviewee, to 
  92 
increase the reliability and validity of the data collected. The interviews not conducted in 
English (most were conducted in Turkish) were translated into English by the researcher; 
all interviews were stored for later use and analysis.   
3.3.5 Processing and analysing data 
As noted by Ritchie and Spencer (1994) and Lacey and Luff (2007) there are some 
common processes and stages for analysis of qualitative data: 
á Familiarisation with the data through review, reading, listening etc. 
á Transcription of tape recorded material 
á Organisation and indexing of data for easy retrieval and identification 
á Anonymising of sensitive data 
á Coding (may be called indexing) 
á Identification of themes 
á Re-coding 
á Development of provisional categories 
á Exploration of relationships between categories 
á Refinement of themes and categories 
á Development of theory and incorporation of pre-existing knowledge 
á Testing of theory against the data 





Depending on what we want to get from the collected data, the order of and/or number of 
stages involved might change in the qualitative data analysis (Lacey & Luff, 2007). The 
data was all collected by the researcher, thus, the familiarisation process started with the 
data collection process, and was continued through the later stages of transcription and 
the organisation of data, and identification of themes through the reading and re-reading 
of data, listening to tapes and making memos and summaries. As previously mentioned, 
most of the interviews were conducted in Turkish and recorded, with the intervieweeÕs 
permission. The second stage was thus the transcription of the interviews into a word-
processing package and their translation into English. In order to incorporate non-verbal 
communication, the taped data was listened to again while re-reading the transcribed 
data. After the transcription, we organised the collected data into sections according to 
their context. We assigned each interviewee a code (pseudonyms). For instance, the 
interviews conducted with the Foreign Ministry officials were coded as DIP (1, 2, 3É) 
and the interviews with members of NGOs were coded as CIV (1, 2, 3É).  
After familiarisation with the material, we defined several categories, including  
Europeanisation, New Institutionism, EU criteria, the Turkish political system, the misfit 
gap between Turkish and EU levels, EUÐTurkey relations, the liberalisation of Turkish 
political system, and TFP towards its non-EU neighbours (Iran and Syria). We then 
searched the data for material identifying the concepts and explanatory instruments in 
analysing the domestic impact of the EU, changes in the Turkish political system and 
TFP towards TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours during the EU accession process, and the 
possible causes of changes. 
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The data collection, processing and analysis process are divided into four main stages. In 
the first stage, a literature review of EUisation is employed to identify the concepts and 
mechanisms for analysing the domestic impact of the EU. The identified concepts and 
mechanisms such as Ômisfit gapÕ, ÔEU adaptation pressureÕ and, Ôdirect, indirect, and 
secondary EUisation mechanismsÕ are filed under the Europeanisation theme heading. By 
exploring the existing literature on the new institutionalist theory and its versions, 
analytical tools are identified and filed under the appropriate theme heading such as: 
empowerment of new actors and institutions, cost/benefit calculation of rule compliance 
(RI), path dependency, critical junctures, punctuated equilibrium and unexpected 
consequences (HI).  
In the second stage, we searched the data for material identifying the misfit gap between 
Turkish and EU levels in the field of democracy, rule of law and economic realm. In this 
regard, the EUÕs criteria in the fields of democracy, rule of law and economic realm were 
identified by exploring Article 49 of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on the European 
Union (TEU)), the 1993 Presidency Conclusions of the European Council 
(the Copenhagen criteria), and the treaties of Amsterdam and Lisbon. The EU criteria 
identified in these fields were filed under the European political system theme heading. 
Policies and practices in the field of democracy, rule of law and economic realm at a 
Turkish level before the EU accession process were identified by exploring the primary 
and secondary data and filed under the Turkish political system before the EU accession 
theme. By doing so the misfit gap between Turkish and EU levels in these fields, such as 
the lack of independence of the judiciary, of civilian control over the military, of freedom 
of press, expression, association and assembly, of respect for, and protection of minority 
rights and of the functioning free market economy were identified and filed under the 
misfit gap between Turkish and EU levels theme. EU-Turkey relations, more specifically 
the Presidency Conclusions (the 1997 Luxembourg, 1999 Helsinki), Partnership 
Document of Turkey and the European Commission yearly progress reports on Turkey, 
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and other primary and secondary data were explored to discover whether the identified 
misfit gap between the Turkish and EU levels generated (high-level) EU adaptation 
pressure. The identified EU conditionality and adaptation pressure in these identified 
fields were filed under the EU-Turkey relations theme. The harmonisation reforms 
undertaken to meet the EU calls in the field of democracy, rule of law and economic 
realm were explored to identify the changes in these fields at Turkish level during 
TurkeyÕs EU accession process, and the identified changes filed under the liberalisation 
of Turkish political system theme.  
 
The changes at Turkish level during the EU accession process are measured in terms of 
changing institutions, institutional structure and institutional power relations, the 
empowerment of civil actors against the military-bureaucratic elite, increasing political 
and economic stability and growth, and increasing respect for, and protection of, religious 
and minority rights, using the taxonomy advanced by Radaelli (2003, p. 37). He proposed 
a classification for measuring the changes in public policy generated by EU membership 
or candidature at domestic level: transformation, absorption, inertia and retrenchment. 
Transformation refers to the fundamental changes in existing policy outcomes; absorption 
is a domestic adaptation to EU polity and policy without drastic alteration of existing 
domestic structures or policy; inertia means a lack of alteration and retrenchment is the 
ÔreverseÕ of EUisation, being Ôless EuropeanisedÕ (Radaelli, 2003, p. 38). 
 
In the third stage, we searched the data for material identifying the changes in TFP 
towards selected TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours, namely Iran and Syria, during TurkeyÕs 
EU accession process. In this regards, TFP towards the selected countries before the EU 
accession process, the 1999, and then TFP towards them during TurkeyÕs EU accession 
process are identified by exploring primary and secondary data, and more specifically by 
exploring the systematic databases and official reports of the Turkish government, EU 
and NGOs, political and economic agreement papers between Turkey and selected 
countries, and academic journals on Turkish foreign policy. As argued above in case 
selection section, the identified changes in TFP are filed under the TFP theme heading. 
The changes in TFP during the EU accession process are measured in terms of 
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strengthening bilateral relations, the liberalisation of trade and the movement of people, 
relying on soft power instruments for the solution of bilateral problems and promoting 
good governance and peace to create a more stable and secure neighbourhood. Finally, 
the collected data was re-read, and new data was searched to find material to identify the 
causes of changes in TFP. The identified causes, such as changes in rules, ideas, actors, 
interests, priorities and demands, were categorised under the causes of changes theme. 
 
In the fourth stage, the analytical process began by examining the relationship between 
themes using the analytical toolkits of selected theories. Actually the analytical process 
began after lifting data from the original contexts and reorganising the information 
according to the thematic cases, even during the course of data collection, by thinking 
about what was being read and seen. The relationship between EU adaptation pressure 
arising from the misfit gap between Turkish and EU levels and the reforms undertaken by 
the Turkish government during the EU accession process in the field of democracy, rule 
of law and economic realm, were analysed. The role of the EUÕs technical and economic 
supports and Turkish actorsÕ cost/benefit calculation in compliance with EU calls and the 
quality and peace of EU-Turkey relations in undertaken reforms at Turkish level were 
thus assessed. The pro-EU stance of the ruling party (the AK Party), civil and economic 
societyÕs stance on the incorporation of EU rules and regulations, the implementation of 
reforms, and the Eurosceptic stance of the militaryÐbureaucratic elites were assessed. 
Whether, and if so, how, the announcement of Turkey as a candidate has punctuated the 
equilibrium at the Turkish level, and has been a turning point for the liberalisation of 
TurkeyÕs political regime and brought about the hypothesised changes at Turkey level 
through the EU conditionality and adaptation pressure was analysed. Finally, the 
unintended consequences of EU conditionality and adaptation pressure in the field of 
democracy, the rule of law and the economic realm on TFP toward selected TurkeyÕs 
non-EU neighbours was analysed by assessing the relationship between the changes in 
Turkish domestic politics during the EU accession process and changes in rules, ideas, 
actors, interests, priorities and demands in the formulation, and thus the transformation, 
of TFP.  
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It is important to note here that we looked backed through the data and explored it further 
to identify any references that we might have missed. The key issues, concepts and 
themes were re-identified, regrouped, and replaced based on the output of the gathered 
and analysed data. This upgrading processÑin terms of themes, data collections, research 
questions and hypothesesÑwas continued throughout the research process, especially as 
we gathered new information and evidence about the phenomenon studied and developed 
our methodology and theory based on the gathered data. Thus, the data collection and 
analysis processes were dynamic and open to change. To avoid losing data when the 
analysis stages began, several copies of both the electronic and hard data were 
maintained. Consequently, the ideas generated from the data were first examined to 
reveal the changes in TurkeyÕs domestic politics and foreign policy towards its non-EU 
neighbours, then they were incorporated into the theoretical ideas in our analysis in order 
to answer the research question and to test the hypothesis of the study (for research 
question and hypothesis see Section 1.2 in Chapter I). 
The final stage was the demonstration of the validity of our data analysis through 
triangulation and the creation of counterfactual scenario methods.  
3.4 Ensuring the reliability and validity of the study 
Demonstrating the credibility and validity of data analysis is important in all research, 
especially considering the common criticism of qualitative research that Ôqualitative 
results are anecdotalÉ.(and) qualitative analysis is an interpretative process, the 
preconceptions, assumptions and ÒworldviewÓ of the researcher are likely to influence the 
process and any emerging theory, despite use of rigorous approachesÕ (Lacey & Luff, 
2007:26-27). In demonstrating the reliability of analysis, there is a need for: 
 ÔÉdescribing the approach to and procedures for data analysis; justifying why these are 
appropriate within the context of your study; clearly documenting the process of 
generating themes, concepts or theories from the data audit trail; [and] referring to 
external evidence, including previous qualitative and quantitative studies, to test the 
conclusions from your analysis as appropriateÕ (Lacey and Luff, 2007, p. 26). 
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We thus clarified the approach to, and procedures for, data analysis, why these were 
appropriate within the context of our study, and the process of generating themes and 
concepts. Previous studies in the field of EUisation were examined through the detailed 
literature review in the previous chapter (Chapter II) to clarify the appropriateness of our 
analysis.  
3.4.1 Triangulation 
In demonstrating the validity of the interpretation, there is a need to prove that the 
findings of the study represent a fair and accurate account of the collected data (Lacey & 
Luff, 2007, p. 27). A viable approach for the current study seems to be triangulationÑthe 
confirmation of findings Ôfrom at least one other source and usually also via another 
method of data collectionÕ (Riitta-Maija Hmlinen, 2008, p. 44). We need precise and 
systematic references to primary (interviews, reports, spaces, documents) and secondary 
data indicating that TFP towards TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours has transformed from 
merely security-oriented disengagement to a politically and economically oriented 
engagement over the last decade, and that EU conditionality in the fields of democracy 
the rule of law, and in the economic realm, has unintentionally become the main driving 
force behind the transformation. More than one source of evidence, and method, is used 
to gain a full perspective of the phenomenon under study. The primary and secondary 
sources previously discussed were used in triangulation. 















The information and/or evidence gleaned from data were cross-referenced from 
interviews, documents and secondary sources, and within the data types to demonstrate 
the credibility and validity of the data analysis. None of the data or evidence that emerged 
from a single source was given priority over the data and evidence arising from any other 
source. As such, the changes in TFP towards select of TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours in the 
EU accession process, the causes of the changes in TFP and the role of TurkeyÕs EU 
candidature  (i.e., the influence of the critical junctures in EU-Turkey relations, the misfit 
gap between the Turkish and EU levels, EU conditionality, EU adaptation pressure, the 
empowerment of new actors, logic of consequences, logic of path dependency, the 
punched equilibrium and unintended consequences) on TFP towards Iran and Syria were 
checked with at least one other source to validate the findings and interpretations. 
 3.4.2 Creating counterfactual scenarios 
The other method used to demonstrate the validity of the findings of this study was the 
creation of counterfactual scenarios. As mentioned before this study takes EU pressures, 
incentives, ideas, norms, rules, values and the outcomes of European integration 
throughout the EU as independent variables, and changes in domestic institutions, 
institutional structures, institutional power relations, foreign policy-making mechanisms, 
the interests and preferences of actors as intermediate variables, and changes in TFP 
outcomes as dependent variables. This implies that if the EU variable had been absent, 
the particular changes in Turkish political system and foreign policy would not have 
occurred, however methodologically, it is difficult to distinguish the impact of the EU 
from other exogenous and indigenous factors in the study of domestic EUisation (see 
Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003; Falkner, 2003; Olsen, 2002; Radaelli, 2000; Vink, 2003; 
Anderson, 2003; Major, 2005), and it is relatively more difficult in the study of indirect 
and unintended effects of the EU (Haverland, 2005, p. 2) as foreign policy, where 
European policy in many cases does not require certain regulatory changes at domestic 
level. As revealed in SchmidtÕs (2002) study of the impact of the EU on policy 
developments in seven economic sectors in Germany, the UK and France34, and in Levi-
                                                              
34 Only in seven out of twenty-one cases was the EU the dominant source for adaptation pressure.  
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FaurÕs (2004) study of telecommunication and energy reforms in 28 countries35, the 
changes at domestic level, even in the areas where strong EU effects are expected, are 
actually driven by other factors. 
Ethridge (1990, p.14) argues that to demonstrate likely causation we must show that: 
a) the changes in the independent variable precede the predicted changes in the dependent 
variable; 
b) the changes in the dependent variable are related in a non-random way to, or are 
associated with, the changes in the independent variable; and 
c) no other independent variables are responsible for the observed changes in the 
dependent variable. 
To establish the causal importance of the EU in analysing changes at a domestic level, 
Haverland (2005, p. 3) suggests increasing the variation of the independent variables in 
two ways: 
1. By including real cases with a zero value as the ÔEU variableÕ: a comparison 
of EU member states with non-members, policy sectors where EU 
competencies exist with policy sectors and where EU competencies are 
lacking, administrative sub-units dealing with EU affairs and sub-units not 
involved with the EU, etc.  
2. By mentally constructing the situation in which the EU variable would be 
absent; in other words, creating a counterfactual scenario.  
We employed the second option, particularly recommended in situations of causal 
complexity, to establish the causal importance of the EU in our study. The strategy of 
creating a counterfactual scenario to increase the understanding of the importance of EU 
in the study of EUisation is particularly advocated (see Haverland, 2005, p. 4; Anderson, 
                                                              
35 He concluded that Ôalthough the Europeanisation of the telecoms and electricity industries led to some 
liberalization, it is highly plausible that the major features of the liberalization would have been diffused to 
most member states even if the Commission and other agents of Europeanisation had not existedÕ (Levi-
Faur, 2004, p. 25).  
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2003; Schmitter, 1999). 36  As such, we developed the counterfactual scenario to 
substantiate our hypothesis that the EU was the main driving force behind the changes in 
TFP over the last decade37. In other words, we developed the counterfactual scenario to 
substantiate our claim that in the absence of EU conditionality in the fields of democracy, 
in the rule of law, and in the economic state, there would have been no change in 
institutions, institutional structure, institutional power relations, political and economic 
instability, and respect for and protection of the religious and minority rights at Turkish 
level. In the absence of these changes at Turkish level there would been no change in the 
interests, actors, demands and priorities in the formulation of Turkish foreign policy 
towards its non-EU neighbours in general, and towards Iran and Syria specifically. 
Accordingly there would have been no change in TFP towards Iran and Syria over the 
last decade. For instance, we hypothesise that the absence of the EU would have a direct 
and/or indirect and intended and/unintended effect on TFP towards its non-EU neighbour, 
but that other potential explanatory variables such as the political, institutional or 
economic condition of Turkey and the impact of situations in the Middle East, Caucus or 
Turkey Ð US relations, remain unchanged. 
It has been argued that the creation of a good counterfactual scenario requires criteria 
such as clarity, and historical and theoretical consistency (see, for instance, Ned Lebow, 
2000; and Tetlock and Belkin, 1996). Clarity requires specifying and delimiting the 
independent and dependent variables; that is, we need to explicitly show Òwhich variables 
are changed in our mental thought experiment and which remain unchangedÓ (Haverland, 
2005, p. 5). This is why we specified in the counterfactual scenario that the traditionally 
security-oriented Turkish foreign policy would not have changed (a change in the 
dependent variable) without the European Union and its conditionality (a change in the 
                                                              
36 They have proposed employing counterfactual reasoning to establish the causal importance of the EU in 
the study of EUisation. For the general logic of counterfactual reasoning, see Fearon (1991), Ned Lebow 
(2000), and Tetlock and Belkin (1996).  
37An important merit of the counterfactual scenarios is that the researcher can, to a large extent, plausibly 
control other potentially important variables. A counterfactual scenario is a thought experiment in the 
methodological meaning of the word and allows for the manipulation of the variable of interest while 
controlling other variables (Haverland, 2005, p. 4). For instance, if we are interested in the impact of EU 
conditionality on the rule of law in Turkey, we hypothesise the absence of this conditionality, but other 
potential explanatory variables such as the political, institutional or economic condition of Turkey remain 
unchanged. 
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independent variable). In other words, we explored whether the lack of the European 
Union, its conditionality, and its adaptation pressure (hypothetical change of the 
independent variable) would have altered the degree of change in Turkish foreign policy 
in the selected cases.  
Historical consistency requires specifying and delimiting the changes to historical reality. 
Specifically, in developing counterfactuals, we should make as few changes to the 
historical facts as possible. We therefore explored what would have happened in the 
absence of EU pressure or, alternatively, if Turkey was not an a EU candidate, rather than 
going further and exploring what would have happened in the absence of the European 
Union etc. For instance, we argued that due to the internal and external perception of 
threat in the military-bureaucratic camp, they were the main actors in the formulation of 
Turkish foreign policy, they securitised and externalised religious and minority domestic 
affairs, and followed a security-oriented disengagement neighbourhood policy. Without 
EU pressure and TurkeyÕs candidature, civil and economic society, political parties and 
the government would be less credible and powerful, which would have substantial 
consequences for the shaping of Turkish foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours, 
specifically towards Iran and Syria.  
Theoretical consistency requires a reliable theoretical generalisation to be established 
between the hypothesised independent and dependent variables in the scenario. 
Developing theoretically informed counterfactual scenarios increases the quality and 
understanding of the plausibility of a scenario (Ned Lebow, 2000, p. 583). In this study, 
the counterfactual scenarios were based on rational and historical institutionalism. It is 
argued that (for example) in the absence of the announcement of Turkey as an EU 
candidate in 1999 (a critical juncture in EU-Turkey relations), it would not be possible to 
talk about EU conditionality and adaptation pressure, and technical and economic 
support. Pro-EU actors would therefore not have adequate inducement to undertake the 
harmonisation reforms, and as such the changes in institutions, institutional structures and 
institutional power relations would not be possible. The military-bureaucratic elites did 
not allow different actors and institutions to participate in the formulation of the foreign 
policy, and as such, there was no shift in the foreign policy concerns, interests, 
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preferences, perceptions, or practices of the policymakers. By developing a 
counterfactual scenario, we tried to control the alternative explanations of the changes in 
Turkish foreign policy towards selected countries.38 
It is also important to note that, in validating our findings, we also benefit from the case 
study method, which provides an opportunity to look for various sources of information 
and evidence, as well as multiple measures of the same issue (Yin, 1994; Suoranta, 
1998).  
3.5 Conclusion 
This research focuses on the transformation of TFP towards TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours 
during the process of its accession to the EU and the influence of the TurkeyÕs EU 
candidature. The principal task of the study is to respond to three questions:  
(1) Has there been any change in TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards its non-EU 
neighbours since it achieved candidate status in 1999?  
(2) If so, to what extent and in what direction has TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards 
its non-EU neighbours changed during the countryÕs EU candidature?  
(3) How has TurkeyÕs candidature to the EU played a role in the transformation of 
its foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours?  
The hypotheses suggest that: since Turkey first achieved candidate status in 1999, its 
foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours has undergone a deep transformation from 
merely security-orientated disengagement to politically and economically orientated 
engagement. EU conditionality and adaptation pressure in the fields of democracy, the 
rule of law and in the economic realm, aimed at the convergence and alignment of 
TurkeyÕs authoritarian political regime to the EU acquis communautaire, have produced 
unintended outcomes in TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours in 
addition to the intended outcomes in TurkeyÕs domestic politics. This has come about 
through: (a) changing the institutions, institutional structures and institutional power 
                                                              
38 Haverland (2005, p. 6) argues that Òa counterfactual analysis has the advantage that alternative 
explanations can be ÔmentallyÕ controlled for.Ó 
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relations; (b) empowering the government and civil society against the militaryÐ
bureaucratic elites in political decision making; (c) accomplishing political and economic 
stability and growth; (d) increasing respect for, and the protection of, religious and 
minority rights, and transferring domestic religious and minority issues into the realm of 
normal politics; and thus (e) changing the institutions, interests, preferences and demands 
that are involved in foreign policy-making towards TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours. 
In this regard, the notions of ÔchangeÕ, ÔimpactÕ and ÔadaptationÕ are the focus of this 
study. Accordingly, the research tasks were divided into three groups: 1)ÔchangeÕ in the 
Turkish political system and the ÔadaptationÕ of the Turkish political system to EU 
acquis; 2) change in TFP towards TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours, and the direction of that 
change; and 3) the ÔimpactÕ of the EU on the Turkish political system and foreign policy 
towards its non-EU neighbours. The impact of TurkeyÕs EU candidature on its foreign 
policy towards its non-EU neighbours is assessed by analysing the relationship between 
the EUisation of the Turkish political system throughout the harmonisation reforms 
undertaken to meet the EU calls, and the transformation of TurkeyÕs foreign policy 
towards selected TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours. The research question related to ÔchangeÕ 
in the Turkish political system and foreign policy thus sought to discover variations in the 
Turkish political system and foreign policy during the process of TurkeyÕs accession to 
the EU and the direction of change. Questions about the influence of the EU on the 
Turkish political system focused on discovering the influence of EU conditionality in the 
fields of democracy and the rule of law, and in the economic realm, on the Turkish 
political system (see Chapter IV). The question of the influence of TurkeyÕs EU 
candidature on TFP towards its non-EU neighbours focused on the relationship between 
the outcomes of the liberalisation and modernisation of the Turkish political system by 
the EU conditionality and adaptation pressure and the changes in TFP towards selected 
countries during the countryÕs EU accession process.  
The ideas and information generated in the study data were categorised according to key 
issues, concepts and themes that were identified and analysed using Europeanisation and 
the rational choice and historical versions of the New Institutionalist Theory. 
Consequently, this study focuses on various concepts to explain the transformation of 
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TFP towards TurkeyÕs neighbours during the EU accession process, and the influence of 
the EU on this, including: the Ômisfit gapÕ between Turkey and EU in examined fields 
and ÔEU adaptation pressureÕ (Europeanisation), Ôpath dependencyÕ, Ôcritical juncturesÕ in 
EU-Turkey relations and their Ôunintended consequencesÕ (historical institutionalism), the 
Ôempowerment of new actors and institutionsÕ against Ôveto playersÕ and the cost/benefit 
calculation of rule compliance (rational institutionalism). Triangulation, counterfactual 
scenarios and case study approaches were employed to ensure the validity of the findings 
so that the study would represent a fair and accurate account of the collected data. Using 
a variety of methods and techniques to collect and evaluate the data, the research 
questions were systematically answered and the hypotheses of the study were tested and 
found to be satisfactorily substantiated.  
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Chapter IV 
EUisation of the Turkish Political System through Harmonisation 
Reforms 
4.1 Introduction  
As explained previously, this study argues that changes in Turkish foreign policy towards 
its non-EU neighbours have been mainly caused by EU-fostered domestic changes. 
Before exploring whether or not, andÑif soÑhow, in what direction and to what extent 
the alleged EU-fostered domestic changes have played a role in the transformation of 
Turkish foreign policy towards TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours during the countryÕs EU 
accession process, there is a need to demonstrate and verify that: (a) the alleged changes 
in TurkeyÕs domestic politics have occurred since the country achieved candidate status 
in 1999; and (b) these changes have occurred mainly because of the EU, its conditionality 
and adaptation pressure in the field of democracy, rule of law and the economic realm. 
This chapter therefore investigates the sets of policies, institutions, ideas and actors in 
TurkeyÕs political system and the changes to them during the countryÕs EU accession 
process. It empirically examines how, and to what extent, the harmonisation reforms 
undertaken by the Turkish government to adapt the countryÕs political and economic 
systems and legislation to the EU acquis communautaire have brought about the 
hypothesised changes to TurkeyÕs domestic politics. It first explores the level of fit/misfit 
between the EU and Turkish levels in the field of democracy, rule of law and the 
economic realm. After briefly identifying the EU accession criteria in these fields, it 
engaged in historical research, placing particular importance on the origins of the sets of 
institutions, rules, ideas, actors, and policies in these fields at the Turkish level before 
1999 (t1), to ascertain the misfit gap between the Turkish and EU levels in the examined 
fields. It then explores the absence or presence of change throughout TurkeyÕs EU 
candidature (t2). By doing so, it assesses how and to what extent the changes made have 
been generated by TurkeyÕs EU accession process by using the previously identified 
explanatory instruments of EUisation and rational and historical institutionalism. 
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   4.2 A brief summary of the EU accession criteria 
The EU accession criteria requires that any country seeking EU membership must meet 
the political, economic and legislative criteria defined by Article 49 of the 1992 Treaty on 
the European Union39 and the 1993 Presidency Conclusions of the European Council, 
known as the Copenhagen criteria, which were strengthened by the 1995 Madrid 
European Council. Political criteria require the alignment of any candidate country with 
EU norms in democracy, rule of law, human rights and respect for, and protection of, 
minority rights. According to EU political criteria for functioning democratic governance, 
executive authority may only be exercised in accordance with documented laws. There 
should be independence of the judiciary; civilian control over the military; all citizens 
and segments of society should be able to freely maintain their religious and cultural 
practices, participate in the political decision-making, have access to an independent 
judiciary and have freedom of press and expression, on an equal basis without any 
limitation or discrimination. This requires free elections, the establishment and 
functioning of political parties and NGOs without any hindrance from the state, and 
again, citizens must have access to a free press, independent judiciary and political 
decision-making, and there must be respect for human rights. According to the economic 
criteria, candidate countries must have a functioning free market economy and the ability 
to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the union. Legislative 
alignment requires the endorsement of the legislation of candidate countries in 
accordance with the body of European law, such as EU Criminal Law and EU 
Competition Law.40  
4.3 The sets of policies, institutions, ideas and actors in TurkeyÕs political 
system before the 1999 
The Turkish Republic was founded by the military-bureaucratic elites41 upon the remains 
of the Ottoman Empire on a strong monocultural, nationalist and Jacobean state ideology 
                                                              
39 The Treaty on the European Union (TEU) known as the Maastricht Treaty which has been amended by 
the treaties of Amsterdam and Lisbon.   
40 The acquis was divided into 35 chapters for the talks with Turkey in preparing Turkey for each 
admission. 
41 Under the leadership of the Turkish national movement of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. 
  109 
(Kemalism). Kemalism42 includes six basic principles: republicanism, populism, laicism, 
revolutionism, nationalism and statism. As the founders of state, the military-bureaucratic 
elites see themselves as the owners of the state, and the guardians of the principles of the 
Kemalist regime and the unitary structure of state against the internal and external actors 
who are considered enemies of the Kemalist regime and the unitary structure of the state 
(Karaosmanoglu, 2000; Nathalie, 2001; Kirisci, 2004; Aras, 2009; CIV4, October 25, 
2010; CIV12, January 6, 2011). Thus, as detailed below, to ensure the survival of the 
Kemalist values of the regime, and the unitary structure of the state, the military 
expanded the scope of its task and dominated the state, its institutions and policies 
(Karaosmanoglu, 2000; Nathalie, 2001; Kirisci, 2004; Aras, 2009; CIV4, October 25, 
2010; CIV12, January 6, 2011). The human rights, participation of NGOs in political 
decision-making, functioning democratic governance, independent judiciary, functioning 
free market economy and the role of political parties and parliament in the Turkish 
political system, society and the formulation of state policies were restricted by military-
bureaucratic elites through the constitution, some institutions and even by force. Thus, 
the autonomous role of the military in the Turkish political system, civilÐmilitary 
relations and changes to them that resulted from TurkeyÕs EU accession process, will be 
central to the argument in the following sections.  
4.3.1 Lack of civilian control over the military 
Between 1923 and 1950 the Republican PeopleÕs Party (RPP) established by the founder 
of Turkish Republic, Kemal Atatrk, led the country as a single party. During this period, 
the retired members of the military held key positions in the state institutions and NGOs43 
and consistently held 20 per cent of the seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly 
                                                              
42 Kemalism is defined as ÔThe set of realistic ideas and principles concerning the state, the economy, 
intellectual life, and the fundamental social institutions. The basic principles were also laid down by 
Ataturk to ensure the full independence, peace and welfare of the Turkish nation in the present and future, 
to ensure the sovereignty of the nation as the basis of the state, and to raise Turkish culture to the level of 
modern civilization guidance of rational and scientific principles... The adaptation of Ataturkism on an 
individual and nation-wide basis and its protection against current and prospective movements of a deviant 
and conservative nature serve as the guarantee for the development, strength and enlightened future of the 
Turkish stateÕ (Birand, 1991, P.59, cited in Guney and Karatekillioglu, 2005, P. 443). For more information 
about Kemalist ideology and its role in Turkish political life see, Karakartal, 1985; Sunnar, 1974; Jenkins, 
2001; Tocci 2002; Mango 2002. 
43 The retired members of the military continued, to some extent, to hold key positions in the state 
institutions and NGOs until last decade. 
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(TGNA/TBMM) (for details see, Frederick, 1965, p. 181-261). Thus, although the 
military seemed to be at some distance from politics, it totally controlled the state and its 
institutions, and shaped its domestic and foreign policies (for details see, Karakartal, 
1985; Sunnar, 1974; Jenkins, 2001; CIV4 October 25, 2010; CIV12, January 6, 2011).   
After World War II Turkey changed its political system from a one-party system to a 
multi-party system. At the first multi-party election, held in 1950, the RPP stepped down 
after 30 years and the Democratic Party (DP) came to power. As a result the army Ôlost 
both its large general representation and its top-level contingentÕ (Frederick, 1965, p. 
261).  There was a growing feeling in the military that the DP Ôbegan to tamper with the 
cherished programs supported and even, to a large extent, inaugurated by the army... and 
É began to sabotage some of those programsÕ (Jacob, 1974, p. 7). This feeling created 
politicisation of the army and it directly intervened in politics in 1960 with the 1960 
military coup, under the slogan of Òa return to AtatrkismÓ or ÒNeo-KemalismÓ (Jacob, 
1974, p. 7). After the coup, the military committee established a commission to write a 
new constitution in the spirit of Kemalist ideology.  
With the 1960 constitution an ÔundemocraticÕ political and judicial system was created 
with the National Security Council (NSC) and the military jurisdiction. The military junta 
was institutionalised through the NSC and military jurisdiction and legalised the 
influence of the military in every segment of the Turkish political system. According to 
the 1961 constitution, the NSC was organised as a mechanism in the area of national 
security to share its views and opinions with the Council of Ministers in order to inform 
and assist government in the formulation of a national security policy (Sakallioglu, 1988, 
p. 199). In practice however, as seen in amendments made in NSC law in 1973 and 1980, 
it has worked as an executive decision-making body. The NSC has representatives on the 
Higher Audio-Visual Board (Radio and TV) (RTK) and Higher Education Board 
(YOK). 
 On the other hand, through military jurisdiction the army also distanced itself from civil 
jurisdiction. As Sakallioglu rightly argued, with the 1961 Constitution the military junta 
created Ôa double-headed political system: the civilian council of ministers coexisted with 
the national security council on the executive level, and the military system of justice 
  111 
continued to operate independently alongside the civilian justice systemÕ (Sakallioglu, 
1988, p. 158). The military expanded its jurisdiction over civilians by codification of laws 
related to internal security, anti-terrorism, and the maintenance of public and political 
order by securitising the Kurdish, Islamic and minority affairs (Cizre, 2004, p. 108; 
CIV4, October 25, 2010; CIV12, January 6, 2011). As such, the army created a political 
system which included neither executive nor legislative civilian control and/or influence 
over the military. Even through the NSC, and a broad definition of national security and 
State Security Courts (SSCs), the military further increased its executive and legislative 
control and influence over the government and NGOs. In this way, they tried to 
institutionalise and legalise tighter military control over the civil authority and the state's 
domestic and foreign affairs.44 As such, a political system was created with the 1960 
constitution which did not include civilian control over the military, an independent 
judiciary or participation of people in the political decision-making, which are 
indispensable segments of functioning democratic governance according to the EU 
acquis. 
The double-headed political system and the power of the military in the Turkish political 
system was further strengthened with the 1971 military intervention. The functions of 
NSC were extended from informing to making recommendations for the amendments, 
which were made to the NSCÕs charter in 1973. As argued by Preston Hughes, this 
change Ôstrengthened its [NSCÕs] role and made it a more effective instrument in national 
policymakingÕ and allowed it to Ôpromote more decisive governmental action when 
situations warranted itÕ (cited in Michaud-Emin, 2007, p. 28). As such, military influence 
on political decisions and its intervention in the political, economic and social life of the 
country continued increasingly during the 1970s.  The military again directly intervened 
                                                              
44It is worth noting here that owing to the legacy of the Young Turks and the Kemalist ideology the military has been 
in favour of modernisation and Westernisation. This means it is in favour of democracy. In other words, in theory it 
accepts the supremacy of civil authority and the democratic control of civil authority over the military. It is not the 
subject of this study, but it is worth understanding the meaning of democracy for the Turkish military. As rightly 
argued by Hipper and Guney (2000, p. 636) its understanding of democracy can be explained through Giovanni 
SaroriÕs Ôrational democracyÕ. As Guney and Karatekillioglu (2005, p. 443) put it, the Turkish militaryÕs definition of 
democracy Ôis much closer to the maintenance of order than democracyÕ. In other words, although because of the strong 
Kemalist legacy the military accepts the rule of law it has not hesitated to intervene in political life when it perceives 
that civil authority is violating the Kemalist characteristic of the state political regime.  
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in Turkish political life in 1980, in the name of ending the internal chaos and re-
establishing security in the country.  After the 1980 coup, a new constitution replaced the 
constitution of 1961, prepared by a commission appointed again by the military junta.  
The double-headed political system also continued to increasingly maintain the control 
and influence of the military over political, social and economic life.  
The role of the NSC was further strengthened in the new constitution by an increase in 
the number of senior commanders in the NSC at the expense of its civilian members, by 
the fact that the Ôgovernment must give priority to the NSC recommendationsÕ and by the 
broad definition of national security: Ôprotection and maintenance of the stateÕs 
constitutional order, national presence, integrity, its political, social, cultural and 
economic interests on an international level and contractual law against any kind of 
internal and foreign threatÕ (The Act of the National Security Council and the National 
Security Secretariat dated 9 December, 1983, No. 2945).  The secretary-general of the 
NSC appointed by the military was empowered with a similar guiding power that was 
invariably held by the prime minister. He oversaw the foreign and domestic intelligence 
services and was required to Ôdirect the activities of the ministries and the state 
bureaucracy as a wholeÕ (Seufert/Kubaseck, 2006).  
As the EU Commission Report on Turkey (2000) stated, the NSC and the secretary-
general of the NSC were not accountable to Parliament or to the government.  The NSC 
operated mostly as a decision-making body with the power to obstruct any policy. Due to 
the broad definition of Ônational securityÕ, its task covered all subjects of state policy, 
including domestic, foreign, security, education, broadcasting etc.  The government was 
obligated to consider the statements and recommendations of the NSC in the formulation 
of any policy, which strictly limited the governmentÕs power in formulating any policy. 
As Jenkins (2001) argues, owing to this authoritarian decision-making structure, 
governments have rarely made a decision in domestic and foreign policy in is conflict 
with NSC recommendations and opinions. 
The separate military jurisdiction and setting of military judges in civil SSCs dealt with 
alleged Ôcrimes against the indivisible integrity of the state, with its territory and nation, 
the free democratic order, or against the Republic, whose characteristics are defined in 
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the Constitution, and offences directly involving the internal and external security of the 
stateÕ (Article 143 of the 1982 Constitution)45. The army also had its own intelligence 
services, and autonomous budget, and by law, it was not subject to civilian control. It 
operated its own businesses that were free from tax and qualified for government 
subsidies. In other words, the army had a privileged position in influencing and 
interfering with the work of the civil authority, judiciary and administrative bureaucracy 
in the Turkish political system (Ozdemir, 2006; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV6, 
November 4, 2010; Istanbul; CIV12, January 4, 2011, Ankara). 
The autonomous role of the army in the Turkish political system, its security concerns 
rising from internal and external affairs and its interventions in political life brought 
about the transformation of domestic religious and minority issues from normal politics 
and imposed limitations on human rights, the establishment and functioning of political 
parties and NGOs, and their participation in political-decision-making.  
4.3.2 Lack of respect for and protection of religious and minority rights 
The founder of the Turkish republic, Kemal Ataturk, attempted to create a homogeneous 
nation state in order to secure the unitary structure of the state and people's loyalty to it46  
(Karaosmanoglu, 2000, p. 200-213; Tocci, 2001). Ataturk attempted to build the state on 
civic nationalism and citizenship, but, although theoretically the Turkish political regime 
adopted civic nationalism, in practice distinct ethnic elements of society were fragmented 
in the Republic.  In other words, the Kemalist Turkish political regime Ôattempted to 
assimilate diverse ethnicities into an ethnically Turkish nationÕ (Tocci, 2001, p. 4).  
In order to create political homogeneity within the Turkish Republic, secularism became 
the most important pillar of Kemalist state ideology. The Turkish political regime, on the 
one hand, attempted to keep religion out of state decisions, and on the other hand, 
through the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi (DIB)), attempted 
to keep religion under state control and reduce its role in public and private life. 
                                                              
45 As will be seen the following section, the penalties for these crimes, called crimes against the state, were 
heavy and not compatible with EU criminal law. 
46 In Ottoman society, people predominantly identified themselves with their religion and family ties, so the 
concept of statehood and nationhood, which are the prerequisites for building a strong nation state, were 
not strong enough. 
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Turkification and hard secularisation (laicism) thus became the two main policies of the 
Kemalist state regime.  
In this regard, the military, arguably the most Kemalist institution of the Republic, 
perceived political Islam47 and different ethnic groups (minorities), including the Kurds,48 
as the main threats to the Kemalist state regime and unitary structure of the state. 
Anything related to a domestic minority, and Kurdish and Islamic affairs, was transferred 
out of normal politics49 and accepted as taboo, and a task for the military, (Ozcan, 1994; 
Kirisci, 2006; Aras, 2009; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV10, December 10, 
2010, Ankara). For decades, under the name of the survival of the state regime and the 
unitary structure of the state, both minorities and religious groups and movements were 
subjected to repression and persecution (Kirisci, 2006; Aras, 2009; Cengiz, 2004; CIV10, 
December 10, 2010, Ankara). The establishment and functioning of non-Muslim 
associations was restricted. For instance, non-Muslims were banned from choosing their 
own religious leaders, they were not allowed to obtain, sell and or donate real estate, and 
their real estate properties were confiscated (for more information see Cengiz, 2004). 
With the Wealth Tax Act (1944) and events of 6-7 September (1955), the goods of non-
Muslim businessmen were plundered, and they were, to a large extent, liquidated from 
TurkeyÕs economic life (Aktar, 2000; Kuyucu, 2005; Cengiz, 2004)50. Schoolbooks were 
filled with discriminatory and nationalist statements.  The name of the places that were 
not Turkish were changed into Turkish.51 (For more details of Turkification policies 
against non-Muslim minorities see Kurban and Hatemi, 2009; Aktar, 2000; Kuyucu, 
2005; Cengiz, 2004). 
                                                              
47 For example, from 1995 to 2000 745 serving officers were dismissed from the military predominantly for 
suspected Islamist sympathies (see Jenkins, 2000, p. 28). 
48 We specifically mentioned the Kurdish group separately because non-Muslim groups in general are 
defined as a minority in the founder treaty of the Turkish Republic, Treaty of Lausanne (1923). 
49As will be seen in the following Chapter V, the securitisation and transformation of domestic issues out of 
normal politics has caused political and diplomatic crises between Turkey and its neighbours. Thus their 
transformation into the realm of normal politics is important for developing good neighbourhood relations. 
50 For more information about the Wealth Tax Act, its application and results, see Aktar (2000), and for 
details about the 6-7 September events and their results see Kuyucu (2005). 
51 As a result of this repression and persecution minorities have left the country. According to TurkeyÕs first 
census, held in 1927, the population of Turkey was 13,648,270. According to this census, the Greek 
population was 108 000; Armenian population was 140 000 and the Jewish population was 42 000. 
Although the population of Turkey increased to 74,724,269 by 2012, the population of minorities 
considerably decreased: the population of Greek is about 2-3000, of Jews 25000, and of Armenians 50-60 
000. 
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Muslim minorities also took their share of repression and persecution. Dersim Alawites 
(Alevies) have a separate identity and were subjected to a military massacre (1938). 
There were massacres of Alawites in Maras (1978), Corum (1980) and Sivas (1993). 
Through a mandatory religious course based on Sunni Islamic doctrine, the Alawites 
were forced to learn Sunni Islam. In the south-east region, which is mainly populated by 
Kurds, villages were forcibly evacuated and burned, and hundreds of thousands of people 
were subjected to forced migration and murder. Through the state of emergency and the 
Anti-Terror Law, such as Articles 7 and 8, freedom of expression, the press, associations 
and assembly, and even travel was restricted. The use of the Kurdish language in 
broadcasting, the press, the public sphere and education (both public and private 
education) was banned.  
In addition to the non-Muslim minorities and/or non-Sunni minorities, Sunni Muslim 
religious groups and individual people were also subjected to repression and persecution. 
The wearing of head scarves in public areas such as universities and at official 
ceremonies was banned. Many students wearing the headscarf were banished from 
schools after the 1997 military intervention. With the 1997 military intervention,  people, 
bureaucrats, politicians, members of NGOs and the press who wore headscarves were 
banned from attending formal balls and ceremonies, even from attending their childrenÕs 
university graduation ceremonies . Religious schools such as Quran schools, and 
Religious Vocational Schools were closed down. Graduates of the Religious Vocational 
School (Imam Hatip Lisesi (IHL)), were denied entry into university and military 
schools. The growing Anatolian business community generated by OzalÕs liberal 
economic policies Ô[was] defined as a green economy (Muslim capital) and [was] treated 
differentlyÕ (CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; Alan, 2012) and following the 28 
February 1997 military intervention was to be eliminated from Turkish economic life52.  
The participation of politicians and NGOs in the discussion about these issues was not 
welcomed by the military (Aras, 2009; CIV4, October 25, 2010) and thus for decades the 
political and economic activities and leaders of Islamist, Kurdish and minority groups 
                                                              
52 For more information about the applications of 28 military interventions to eliminate the Muslim capital 
see the interview with CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels and Alan, 2012 as well as the analysis of Turkish 
journalists, Bayramoglu; Candar, 2002; Barlas and many others, during the 2001 economic crisis.  
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were harassed and prosecuted. Between the 1960 coup and 1980 coup, six political 
parties, and after the 1980 coup 19 political parties, were closed down. Throughout the 
1980s and 1990s, the Islamist movementÕs National Salvation Party (MSP) and its 
successors, the Welfare Party (RP) and Virtue Party (SP), who supported the expansion 
of religious and cultural rights, were closed down for threatening the secular principle of 
the Kemalist state system. In last two decades, four out of the eight political parties, the 
PeopleÕs Labour Party (HEP), Democracy Party (DEP), PeopleÕs Democracy Party 
(HADEP) and in January 2009 the Democratic Society Party (DTP), who supported the 
expansion of the cultural and political rights of Kurds, were closed down for threatening 
the territorial integrity of the state. Another three parties, the Freedom and Equality Party 
(OZEP), Freedom and Democracy Party (OZDEP) and Democratic People Party 
(DEHAP) abrogated themselves before awaiting the result of the closure cases against 
them.53   
4.3.3 Limitations on establishment and functioning of NGOs 
The activities of NGOs and their political engagement were perceived as a threat to the 
established political system and viewed with the greatest suspicion by the military-
bureaucratic elites (CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels). In order to minimise the effects of 
NGOs on the state system, policies and society, the establishment and functioning of 
NGOs was also restricted by the authoritarian state regime (Goksel and Gunes, 2005; 
CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels).   During the 1980s and 1990s, due to the escalation of 
Kurdish and Islamic political issues, NGOs and their activities were also further 
pressured and limited to protect the unitary and secular structure of the state in the name 
of repressive measures. Public demonstrations and marches were restricted and the 
activities of NGOs, including voluntary associations, foundations, student organisations 
and religious groups, were further severely restricted. All types of political activity by all 
entities other than officially recognised political parties, were banned, and interaction 
between political parties and institutions such as trade unions, voluntary associations, 
religious and professional organisations and student groups were prohibited (Megen, 
                                                              
53 It is also worth noting that the ten existing  electoral thresholds considerably restrict and curtail political 
participation. 
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2004, p, 13; CIV10, December 10, 2010, Ankara; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels). As 
regularly recorded by domestic and international human rights organisations, many 
books, periodicals and publishing companies were suspended and politicians, writers, 
Journalists and members of NGOs were repressed and imprisoned due to their expression 
of non-violent opinions against state institutions, including such issues as the political 
role of the military in the state system, the armyÕs reactions to Kurdish, Islamic and 
minority affairs, and the basic principles of Kemalism.54  As mentioned above, the 
growing Anatolian business community was also repressed and persecuted. Their 
political and economic life, and even schools and universities, were under the repression 
and persecution of the authoritarian state regime. Any criticism that came from NGOs, 
including the universities, against the principles of the Kemalist revolution, political 
regime, institution of the state, territorial integrity and unity of the state, was restricted 
and regularly prosecuted using Articles 7 and 8 of the Anti-Terrorist Law and Articles 
158, 159, 311 and 312 of the Constitution. There was a de facto ban on NGOs and their 
activities (Ozturk, 2009, p. 16; CIV10, December 10, 2010; Ankara; CIV7, November 3, 
2010, Istanbul). As a result, before the EU accession process, there was no real civil 
society and no participation of NGOs in political decision-making. There was no real rule 
of law in the country (Larrabee & Lesser, 2003; Clarke, 2000; Gencer, 2001; CIV4, 
October 25, 2010, Brussels). Obtaining permission to establish an association without 
having cooperation from the authoritarian state regime and its bureaucracy was almost 
impossible (CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels). People were afraid to get involved in 
political affairs, or to organise under the umbrella of associations to protect their interests 
(Magen, 2004; Vardar 2005, P. CIV6, November 4, 2010, Istanbul; CIV7, November 3, 
2010, Istanbul; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels). This is why Ôcivil societyÕ simply 
meant a small group of people in Istanbul or some other big city who were in cooperation 
                                                              
54 The RTK has temporarily banned the broadcasting of a number of radio and television stations. Ten 
radio/TV stations were banned and closed for between 1 and 365 days as a result of their unacceptable 
comments, as per the law on political events in August 2001. On the basis of Article 26 of the RTK, 
stations were prohibited from broadcasting in Turkey from the BBC and Deutsche Welle on 26 September 
2001 (see Progress Report 2001 on Turkey, p. 25). A number of publishing companies have been 
suspended and their periodicals and books seized. The Interior Minster declared, in his reply to a 
parliamentary question, that 1309 books and periodicals had been confiscated in 2001; and according to the 
Association of Turkish EditorsÕ report, 40 books from 39 writers were banned between January and May 
2002. 
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with the authoritarian state regime, its institutions and autocratic state elites (CIV4, 
October 25, 2010, Brussels). 
All in all, the research engaged in to ascertain the origins of the sets of institutions, rules, 
ideas, actors, and policies in the field of democracy and the rule of law at the Turkish 
level, and the misfit gap between the Turkish and EU levels in the examined fields before 
the announcement of Turkey as an EU candidate in the1999 reveals a number of things. 
The military acted as a high-ranking institution in the Turkish political system (Ozturk, 
2009, p. 20 see and Heper and Keyman, 1998; Gencer, 2001; Diamond, 2002; Frank, 
2002). Under the name of protection from external and internal threats, the Kemalist state 
system legalised and legitimised the influence and interventions of the military in 
political, economic and social life through the constitution and institutions like the NSC 
(Ozdemir, 2006; Gencer, 2001; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV12, January 6, 
2011, Ankara). The military established power over the political system and political, 
economic, cultural and religious affairs, the activities of NGOs and political parties and 
even parliament (Karaosmanoglu, 2000; Nathalie, 2001; Kirisci, 2004; Aras, 2009; 
CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara; CIV6, November 4, 2010, Istanbul; CIV7, November 3, 
2010, Istanbul). They also defined the stateÕs security, interests and policies and the 
parliament, politicians and people had to adapt to these, otherwise they would be 
harassed and prosecuted (CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels). Consequently, there has 
been a high level misfit gap between the Turkey and the EU in terms of civil-military 
relations, respect for and protection of, religious and minority rights, the participation of 
NGOs in political decision-making, functioning democratic governance, an independent 
judiciary, a functioning free market economy and legislation in criminal law and 
competition law. 
4.4 EUisation of TurkeyÕs domestic politics during the EU accession 
process 
The following section will explore the institutions, civil-military relations, respect for, 
and protection of religious and minority rights, functioning democratic governance, 
independent judiciary and functioning free market economy and political and economic 
stability and growth in Turkey during the countryÕs accession to the EU process, and it 
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will analyse change in them and the causes of these alterations. It seeks to answer, first, 
how, when and to what extent the change is present, and why. As will be described in  
following sections, considerable reforms have been undertaken in these fields in 
accordance with calls from the EU. As a result, to different degrees in different fields, 
there has been considerable change and adaptation to the EU acquis.  
As previously argued, causal analysis in our study is organised around the propositions of 
Europeanisation and rational and historical versions of new institutionalism. Accordingly, 
it focuses on whether the above identified misfit gap between Turkish and EU levels has 
caused EU adaptation pressure and brought about changes in the identified fields at the 
Turkish level (Europeanisation); the importance of critical junctures in EU-Turkey 
relations in punctuating the equilibrium at Turkish level and in starting along the path of 
the liberalisation of the Turkish political system through harmonisation reforms 
(historical institutionalism); and the empowerment of new actors and institutions against 
the traditional state actors and institutions in the political decision-making through the 
EUÕs technical and economic supports, harmonisation reforms and the cost/benefit 
calculation of Turkish actors in rule compliance and policy change (rational 
institutionalism).  
4.4.1 Empowerment of government in political decision-making 
As expected and proposed by the theoretical framework of the study, the high level misfit 
gap between Turkey and EU in the examined fields caused high levels EU adaptation 
pressure on Turkey. Throughout the 1997 Luxembourg and 1999 Helsinki summit 
Presidency Conclusions, the 2001 Accession Partnership Document of Turkey and the 
European Commission yearly progress reports on Turkey, the EU set the condition that 
Turkey must meet the political, economic and legislative criteria of the European Union, 
defined by the 1993 Presidency Conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council, to 
progress towards EU membership. The major role played by the army in political life and 
the lack of civilian control over the army is one of the main subjects of EU criticism and 
adaptation pressure (see 1998 EC Progress Report on Turkey, p. 14; 2000 EC Progress 
Report on Turkey, p. 14; 2001 EC Progress Report on Turkey, p. 97, and Mftler Ba, 
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2005, p. 17:3; Tocci, 2005, p. 73-83; zbudun; 2007, p. 179-193; Patton, 2007, p. 342-
355; Satana, 2011, p. 279-292; Heper, 2005, p. 33-44; Heper, 2011, p. 241-252; and 
Bilgi, 2009, p. 803-824). The EU has not only constantly criticised the ÔautonomousÕ 
role of the military in the Turkish political system through the NSC and SSCs, but also 
persistently asked for reforms in these realms to ensure that the army does not intervene 
in political life and that civilian authorities exercise full control over the military, its 
expenditure, and the formulation and implementation of domestic and foreign policies in 
accordance with the practice of EU Member States (see 2001 Accession Partnership 
Document, p. 19; 2003 Accession Partnership Document, p. 44, and Toktas and Kurt, 
2008; Heper, 2005, p. 33-44; Karaosmanoğlu, 2011, p. 253-264) .  
As expected, proposed by the theoretical framework of study and noted by students55 of 
Turkish studies, EU adaptation pressure on Turkey over the ÔautonomousÕ role of the 
military in the Turkish political system through the NSC resulted in the changing role and 
composition and function of the NSC. With the amendment made to Article 118 in 2001 
the number of civilian members of the NSC increased from five to nine and the number 
of military members remained at five. The role of the NSC was limited to 
recommendations, in that instead of giving priority to the recommendations of the NSC 
the government would be required to simply evaluate them. The NSC representatives on 
the Supervisory Board of Cinema, Video and Music were removed.56 The 2001 European 
Commission Progression Report claimed, however, that this constitutional change would 
increase de facto civilian control over the military but needed to be monitored since, 
while the report was being prepared, the NSC was recommending action on a number of 
foreign policy issues, such as the Cyprus issue, ESDP and domestic policy issues such as 
measures to combat anti-secular activism, the extension of the compulsory age limit in 
primary education, the state of emergency in various provinces, privatisation of state 
companies, socio-economic developments and even constitutional reform packages 
(Guney and Karatekillioglu, 2005, p. 443).  
                                                              
55 Such as Guzel,  (2009); Aydinli, (2009, p. 590-594) Toktas & Kurt, 2008; Heper, 2005, P. 33-44; 
Karaosmanoğlu, 2011, P. 253-264; Satana, 2011, P. 279-292; Heper, 2011, P. 241-252; Bilgi, 2009, P. 
803-824 
56 NSC representatives on the RTK and the YOK, however, stayed. As a result of the EUÕs enduring 
criticism (see the 2001, 2002 and 2003 EU Progression Reports on Turkey), the NSC representatives on the 
RTK and YOK were later removed in 2004.  
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To limit the influence of the military over the government and the Turkish political 
system, ÔrevolutionaryÕ changes were made in the Ôseventh reform packageÕ on 23 July 
2003 related to the duties, functions and composition of the NSC57 to adapt the civil-
military relations to the EU norms, involving: 
¥ The extended executive and supervisory power of the Secretary General of the 
NSC. In particular, the provision empowering him to follow up, on behalf of the 
President and the Prime Minister, the implementation of any recommendation 
made by the NSC has been abrogated. 
¥ The ultimate access of the NSC to any civilian agency has also been abrogated.  
¥ The post of Secretary General will no longer be reserved exclusively for a 
military person.  
¥ The frequency of the NSC meetings has been modified, so that it will meet every 
two months instead of once a month. 
¥ The government is no longer obligated to consider the statements and 
recommendations of the NSC in the formulation of any policy 
As such, the Ôseventh reform packageÕ changed the functions, duties and composition of 
the NSC and deinstitutionalised and illegalised the coercive influence of the military in 
political decision-making. The NSC is no longer an executive decision-making body with 
the power to obstruct the decisions and policies of civil actors (see 2004, 2005 EC 
Progress Reports on Turkey; Heper, 2011, p. 241-252; Bilgi, 2009, p. 803-824; CIV4, 
October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV7, November 3, 2010, CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). 
The military thus lost its executive control and influence over the government, media, 
NGOs and political life (Karaosmanoğlu, 2011, p. 253-264 Satana, 2011, p. 279-292; 
Heper, 2011, p. 241-252; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV7, November 3, 2010; 
CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara)  
                                                              
57 The Financial Times (31 July, 2003) called these changes in the Turkish political system a Ôquiet 
revolutionÕ and a triumph for the EU. 
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In addition, with the amendments to Article 160 of the Constitution and the Law on 
Public Financial Management and Control (PFMC), the seventh reform package 
introduced increasing parliamentary control over, and transparency in, defence and 
military expenditure. With these amendments, defence and military expenditure began to 
be announced and the Court of Auditors is authorised to audit the accounts and 
transactions of all types of organisations including state properties owned by the armed 
forces (2003 EC Progress Report on Turkey). Furthermore, in accordance with calls from 
the EU (see 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 EC Progression Reports on Turkey) the ratio of 
military expenditure to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has been reduced 
considerably in the last decade. As noted by the EC progress report on Turkey (2004, p. 
23) on the history of the Republic of Turkey, ÔEducation spending is for the first time 
higher than defence spendingÕ in the 2004 budget (Progress Report on Turkey, 2004, p. 
23); and according to the 2011 budget, the Ministry of Education budget (34 billion TL) 
is more than twice the budget of the Ministry of National Defence (17 billion TL). The 
ratio of military expenditure to the GDP was 10.5% of the GDP in 1997 and down to 5.6 
% in 2008 and 2.4% in 2010 (TGNA/TBMM Negotiations on the Budget of National 
Defence Minister, October 10, 2010, Ankara).  
On the other hand, as will be explained in the following section, as a result of EU calls 
and adaptation pressure, the SSCs were closed in 2004 and members of military engaging 
in crime can be tried in civil courts following an amendment to legislation (Act 5918) in 
200958. As such, the influence of the military over the judiciary is also deinstitutionalised 
and illegalised. Consequently, civil executive and judiciary control over the military was 
institutionalised and legalised, and Ôa double-headed political system ended (see 2008, 
2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 EC Progress Reports on Turkey; Karaosmanoğlu, 2011, p. 
253-264 Satana, 2011, p. 279-292; Heper, 2011, p. 241-252; Bilgi, 2009, p. 803-824; 
CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV7, November 3, 2010, Ankara; CIV9, December 
7, 2010 Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). The 2010 constitutional reforms 
opened a path for judicial investigations into previous coups. For the first time in the 
                                                              
58 As such, many retired and active duty military personnel, including former army commanders, who had 
allegedly engaged in as-yet unsolved murders during the 1990s, especially in the south-east of Turkey, and 
attempting to remove or prevent the functioning of the government through force and violence are being 
tried in civil court.  
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Republican history the generals and members of army who participated in the coups of 
1980 and 199759, engaged in the coup plan, the ÔSledgehammerÕ,60 in 2003-2005 and/or 
the deep-state criminal network, the Ergenekon, were tried in the civil court and 
sentenced. As noted by the 2012 EC Progression Reports on Turkey (see page 11) and 
Aydinli (2011, p, 227-239) these investigations also contributed greatly to the 
consolidation of civil-military relations in Turkey by decreasing the peopleÕs confidence 
in the military around 15 per cent, while the peopleÕs confidence in government has 
increased about two-fold in the last decade (For details see ÒTrkiye Değerler Atlasõ 
2012" - Turkey's Values Atlas 2012). In addition to losing its legal power in political 
decision-making mechanisms and the judiciary, the militaryÕs interventions in politics 
and its influence and control over the government and judiciary also lost its legitimacy in 
the eyes of Turkish people.  
 
The harmonisation reforms undertaken in 2003 and 2004 have also introduced a number 
of changes to the prosecution of political parties and the restriction on political 
participation. The amendment to Article 67 removed the restriction on voting in elections 
and referenda.61 The amendment to the Political Parties Law, and Articles 100 and 102, 
with the second and fourth reform packages made it difficult to close down political 
parties in 2003.62  
                                                              
59 ÔThe  Judicial investigations into the 1980 coup and the 28 February ÔPostmodern CoupÕ of 1997 were 
initiated. Eight political parties, including the AKP, CHP and the National Movement Party (MHP), as well 
as the Council of Ministers, many non-governmental organisations and nearly 340 individuals requested to 
become co-plaintiffs in the 1980 coup caseÕ (2012 Progress Report on Turkey, p. 13). As such,  generals 
such as the former Chief of Staff, Evren, the former commander of the land forces, Cetinkaya who 
participated in the coup in 1980 and are alive today, are being tried in civil court after thirty years. The 
leader of the 1997 military coup, Cevik Bir, the former commander of the First Army, and many other 
generals and members of the army who engaged in the coup in 1997 were tried and sentenced fifteen years 
later. 
60 The court made its decision about Ôthe ÔSledgehammerÕ trial in September 21, 2012, and 323 retired and 
active duty military personnel, including three former army commanders, were sentenced to 13 to 20 years 
imprisonment Ôon charges of attempting to remove or prevent the functioning of the government through 
force and violenceÕ during the 2003- 2005 period. 
61According to the previous 67 Article, all conscripts serving in the armed services, students in military 
schools, and detainees and convicts in prisons were unable to vote.   
62According to the new Article 100, a closure case can only be opened for Ôreasons stipulated in the 
Constitution in line with Article 68 and with amendment to the Political Party Law of a three-fifths 
majorityÕ. An amendment to Article 104 provides alternative sanctions instead of closing the party. These 
amendments restrict the closing of political parties in the Turkish political system.  For example, in 2005, 
the Court of Cassation rejected closure cases against seven political parties and the closure case against the 
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Consequently, the equilibrium in TurkeyÕs institutional structure and civil-military 
relations has been punctuated by a critical juncture in EU-Turkey relations, the 
announcement of Turkey as an EU candidate in 1999. The path of the liberalisation of 
TurkeyÕs authoritarian political regime began with the harmonisation reforms generated 
by increasing EU adaptation pressure on Turkey. As detailed above, the reforms 
concerning the ÔautonomousÕ role of the military, the SSCs, the NSC in the Turkish 
political system, the prosecution of political parties and the restrictions on political 
participation have considerably liberalised the institutions, institutional structures and 
institutional power relations at Turkish level. As expected, this resulted in the waning 
power of the military in influencing political, economic and social life in Turkey and a 
shift in the balance of civil-military relations towards civilians. As noted by the EC 
Progression Reports on Turkey (see 2004, p.23, 2012, p.11, see also 2009, 2010, 2011) 
many of our interviews (CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV7, November 3, 2010, 
Ankara; CIV9, December 7, 2010 Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara) and students 
engaged in Turkish studies (Aydinli, 2011, p, 227-239; Karaosmanoğlu, 2011, p. 253-264 
Satana, 2011, p. 279-292; Heper, 2011, p. 241-252; Bilgi, 2009, p. 803-824) agree that 
civilian control over the military unexpectedly increased over the last decade, especially 
after 2007. Today, unlike the past, the civil authority Ð the Prime Minister and President Ð 
have the final say at the Supreme Military Council (YAS) and the NSC63. The military 
influence and control over the judiciary through the SSCs has ended, as has the civil 
judiciaryÕs control over the military, established with the amendment to the act of 5918 in 
2009 and the 2010 constitutional reforms. As will be explained below, during the 
changing the functions, duties and composition of the NSC, YOK, RTK, SSCs, and cuts 
in the defence budget the military-bureaucratic elites acted as veto players. However, 
thanks to the EU, its conditionality, and technical and financial support, reforms were put 
into practice.  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
ruling AK Party opened by the public prosecutor of the Court of Appeals in 2008, which was rejected by 
the Constitutional Court on the basis of the Ôthree-fifths majorityÕ rule. 
63 As is correctly believed, as a symbol of the changing balance of power between the civil and military in 
the Turkish political system, the Chief of General Staff no longer sites beside the Prime Minister at the 
YAS meetings (See Appendix A.).  
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Considering the increasing attacks of the PKK against Turkish military forces, the 
increasing power and influence of religious and Kurdish movements in Turkish society 
and political life, the increasing instability and clashes in the region in this period, the 
absence of the announcement of Turkey as an EU candidate in 1999 and EU 
conditionality in the rule of law and civilian control over the military, the influence and 
control of the military-bureaucratic camp over TurkeyÕs domestic politics would have 
continued in the last decade, due to their internal and external perceptions of threat, as 
was the case in the 1990s and in previous decades. Thus, the Government would have 
been much less credible in making reforms in accordance with the calls from the EU, 
which would have had substantial consequences for the liberalisation of TurkeyÕs 
authoritarian political regime. The reforms at Turkish level previously described would 
not have been undertaken to adapt EU acquis communautaire, and thus, there would not 
have been a change in the NSCÕs composition, function or duties, the political decision-
making mechanism or institutional power relations. Parliamentary control over military 
expenditure and budgetary transparency related to military and defence expenditure 
would not have emerged. Instead the restriction on political participation and the 
activities of political parties would have continued. The empowerment of the government 
against the militaryÐbureaucratic elites in the Turkish political system and the 
formulation and implementation of domestic and foreign policy would not have occurred. 
The direct and indirect control and pressure of the militaryÐbureaucratic elites on 
government, its policies and political issues would have continued. The civil authorityÑ
namely, the prime minister and presidentÑwould not have the final say at the YAS and 
the NSC, where TurkeyÕs domestic and foreign policies are formulated. In the absence of 
the announcement of Turkey as an EU candidate in 1999 and the EU conditionality and 
adaptation pressure, the equilibrium at the Turkish level would not have been punctuated 
and a path toward the liberalisation of institutions, institutional structures and institutional 
power relations would not have been initiated. Military influence and control over the 
government would have continued, as was the case in previous decades.  
Despite improvements, constraints remain with regard to the accountability and 
transparency of security forces. Although parliamentary oversight of the defence budget 
was established, Ôthe defence budget was disclosed to the public in a highly aggregated 
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manner with significant off budget military expenditure not detailedÕ (2012 EC 
Progression Report on Turkey, p. 11). Instead of the Minister of Defence, the Chief of the 
General Staff continues to be responsible to the Prime Minister. Military operations are 
also not yet subject to sufficient civilian oversight. There is need for an amendment to the 
Law on Provincial Administrations, used as the legal basis for military operations, in 
accordance with the EU call to increase civilian oversight of military operations, in 
particular the gendarmerie operations (for details see 2012 EC Progression Report  on 
Turkey, p. 11). Furthermore, at least in theory if not in practice, the Internal Service Law 
for the Turkish armed forces Ð which defines the duties of the military Ð Ôleaves the 
military significant potential scope for intervention in politicsÕ (2012 EC Progression 
Report on Turkey, p. 11), and has not been changed yet. The 10% national threshold for 
obtaining seats in parliament remains to be an obstacle for political participation in 
general, and specifically for the Kurdish political movement. 
Overall, as proposed by the theoretical framework of the study, Europeanisation and 
historical and rational institutionalism, the critical juncture in EU-Turkey relations, and 
the announcement of Turkey as an EU candidate in 1999, punctuated the equilibrium at 
the Turkish level and started Turkey along the path of liberalisation through the 
harmonisation reforms generated by EU adaptation pressure, which resulted in the 
democratisation of civil-military relations and the empowerment of government in the 
Turkish political system and political decision-making. However, despite considerable 
improvements in the accountability and transparency of the security forces, the Internal 
Service Law for the Turkish armed forces, and the Chief of the General StaffÕs being 
responsible to the Minister of Defence rather than to the Prime Minister, the misfit gap 
between Turkey and the EU in terms of civil-military relations, to some extent continues. 
In this regard, there is still need for further efforts and reforms to fully adapt to EU 
standards. As noted by many students of Turkish study (Aydin 2011; Altayli 2013; 
Davuroglu, 2014; Erdogan) however, and our interviewees (CIV4, October 2010, 
Brussels; CIV12, January 2011, Ankara), in practice the army no longer intervenes in 
political life and civilian authorities fully exercise control over the military, its 
expenditure, and the formulation and implementation of domestic and foreign policies in 
accordance with EU standards in last years, especially after 2007. 
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 4.4.2 Empowerment of civil society in political decision-making 
The Accession Partnership Document and the EU yearly progression reports on Turkey 
have also constantly criticised the lack of an independent judiciary and respect for human 
rights such as civil, political, social, cultural, religious and economic rights, and 
legislative alignment with the body of European law (for details see, 1998 EC Progress 
Report on Turkey, p. 13-16; 2000 EC Progress Report on Turkey, p. 21). The EU has also 
persistently asked Turkey to fill the misfit gap between Turkish and EU levels in these 
realms (For details see 2001 The Accession Partnership Document, p. 21-22; 2003 The 
Accession Partnership Document, p. 27). As will be briefly explained below, as a result 
of the EU adaptation pressure, Ôharmonisation reformsÕ in the fields of legislation, 
judiciary and human rights were undertaken to fill the misfit gap between Turkish and 
EU levels.  
In parallel with calls from the EU, Turkey ratified Protocols 6 and 13 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and it relaxed the restrictions on freedom of the press, 
association, and expression through the Ôharmonisation law packagesÕ undertaken in 
2002-2005 period64. For instance, with amendments to Articles 1365 and 1466 of the 
Constitution, Articles 159, 169, 301 and 312 of Turkish Criminal Law (TCK), Articles 7 
and 8 of the Anti-terrorism Law (TMK) and the Press Law (RTK) Law) some 
restrictions on the freedom of expression, press association and assembly have been 
deleted. The status of international treaties has also been reinforced within the hierarchy 
of the legal system, and the superiority of international agreements related to fundamental 
rights and freedoms to national legislation have been established (see the third and fourth 
                                                              
64 In accordance with calls from the EU nine Ôharmonisation law packagesÕ have been ratified by TGNA to 
fulfill the misfit gap between the Turkish and EU level.  
65 Article 13 ÔFundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted only on the basis of specific reasons listed 
in the relevant articles of the constitutions without prejudice to the values defined therein and by law. These 
restrictions shall not conflict with the letter and spirit of the Constitution and the requirements of the 
democratic social order and the secular republic and the principle of proportionalityÕ. 
66 Article 14 ÔNone of the rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution shall be exercised with the aim 
of violating the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation, or for activities undertaken 
with the aim of destroying the democratic and secular Republic based on human rights. No provision of this 
constitution shall be interpreted in a manner that grants the state or individuals the right of destroying the 
fundamental rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution, and of staging an activity with the aim of 
restricting rights and freedoms more extensively than is stated in the constitution. Sanctions for persons 
undertaking activities in conflict with these provisions shall be defined by lawÕ. 
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Ôharmonisation law packagesÕ and the amendment to Article 90 of the constitution). The 
SSCs that the military judges67 deal with alleged crimes against territorial and national 
integrity of state and the principles of the republic were removed (see amendment to the 
Article 9 of the Constitution).68 Furthermore, in accordance with EU calls (see 1998, 
1999, 2002 Progression Report on Turkey) the state of emergency in six provinces in the 
south-east (Article 122 of the Constitution) granted extensive powers to the regional 
governor in restricting fundamental rights and freedoms in the name of ensuring security 
removed in 2002. As such, the amendments to a number of articles of the criminal code 
to align Turkish criminal law with that of the EU, and the freedom of expression in line 
with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and the ECHR itself has 
increased open and free debate in Turkish society and the media by decreasing legal 
uncertainties and political and military pressure on the freedom of expression and the 
press (Goksel and Gunes, 2005), thus easing the activities of associations and foundations 
(see CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; zbudun; 2007;  Satana, 2011, p. 279-292). 
As a result of the EU conditionality and adaptation pressure the existing restrictions on 
the establishment and functioning of associations have also, to large extent, been 
removed with the amendment to the Law on Association through the third, fourth and 
seventh Ôharmonisation law packagesÕ and amendment to Articles 11, 12, 21 and 33 of 
the Constitution. The third reform package removed the limitations on civil servants 
establishing associations and removed the bans on their activities for civil defence 
purposes. It also removed the requirement to obtain permission from governors to 
organise meetings or demonstrations. The fourth reform package removed the former 
obligation of associations to send copies of their announcements and publications to the 
relevant authorities before distributing them, and the restrictions on NGO announcements 
and publications. It allowed NGOs the use of any language in their (non-official) 
correspondence. The seventh reform package has removed, first, the restriction on the 
establishment of associations on the basis of ethnicity, race, religion, sect, and region. 
                                                              
67Although some amendments have been made during the 2001-2005 period, the Turkish judicial system 
has been subject to EU criticism and so four judicial reform packages have been ratified by TGNA since 
2009 to fulfill the misfit gap between Turkey and the EU. 
68The special competence courts were established to deal with crimes against the state, which was also 
removed in accordance with calls from the EU in the third judicial reform package in 2012. 
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Second, the requirement to seek prior permission to open branches abroad, join foreign 
bodies or hold meetings with foreign bodies or hold meeting with foreigners. Third, all 
restrictions on student associations. And fifth, the requirement to inform local 
government officials of general assembly meeting (2004 EC Progress Report on Turkey, 
p. 40).  The amendment to Articles 11 and 12 has regulated relations between domestic 
and foreign organisations, lifted restrictions on having relationships with international 
counterparts, increased the freedom to join associations and establish associations, and 
decreased the minimum age for joining organisations and gatherings from 21 to 18 years. 
The amendment has also removed the restrictions on the right of NGOs to hold meetings 
and demonstrations by deleting Article 21 of the constitution. The amendment to Article 
33 of the constitution has reduced the restriction on the right to form an association69. As 
noted by many of our interviewees (CIV1, October 18, 2010, Brussels; CIV4 October 25, 
2010; Brussels; CIV7, November 3, 2010, Istanbul; CIV9, December 7, 2010 Ankara; 
CIV12, January 6, 2011), students of Turkish studies (zbudun; 2007, p. 179-193; 
Gksel and Gneş, 2005, p. 63-68), and outlined in the EC Progress Report on Turkey, 
the aforementioned reforms have played a significant role in Ôreducing the possibility for 
state interference in the activities of associations and facilitating the further development 
of civil society in TurkeyÕ (2005 EC Progress Report on Turkey, p. 27).   
The EUÕs financial and technical support, such as advisory, training, and education, has 
also contributed greatly to the development and empowerment of NGOs in the Turkish 
political system, society and political decision-making, by providing them with financial 
autonomy, professional skill and experience. Since 2002, under the name of the European 
Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the EU has supported civil 
society with an average of EUR 2,700,000 per year in promoting, protecting and 
defending human rights, such as freedom of expression, the protection and respect of 
cultural diversity and the improvement of access to justice under the name of different 
projects. For instance, under the Strengthening Civil Society Dialogue the EU funded 
EUR750,000 and the organisation of 13 EU countries and Turkey worked together on 
youth, minority rights and business communities in 17 partnership projects. Under the 
                                                              
69 As a result of these reforms Ôthe legal framework for freedom assembly is broadly in line with the 
European standardsÕ (2007 EC Progress Report on Turkey, p. 16). 
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Europa-Bridges of Knowledge, the EU funded EUR2, 000,000 and NGOs and 
universities worked together in 27 projects to enhance expertise on EU legislation in 
Turkey.  During 2007-2009 under the Promoting Civil Society Dialogue between the EU 
and Turkey programme, 119 joint projects in fields of Towns and Municipalities, 
Professional Organisations, Universities and Youth Initiatives have been undertaken. 330 
organisations were involved in this programme which was funded by the EU with 
EUR21,500,000. The EU and the Turkish Chambers of Commerce and Trade Unions 
Confederation have also brought together workers from Turkey and the European Union 
to increase integration between the EU and Turkish business communities through the 
Shared Culture of Work Programme (EUR 3,190,000) and the EU-Turkey Chambers 
Forum (EUR 4,250,000). To further develop integration between Turkey and the EU in 
different areas, two new civil society dialogue programmes were launched in 2010. These 
are the Promoting Civil Society Dialogue between the EU and Turkey II programme 
(EUR6,200,000), which promotes initiatives in culture and the arts, and fisheries and 
agriculture, and the Parliamentary Exchange and Dialogue programme (EUR2,250,000), 
which promotes dialogue between politicians, NGOs and political parties in the EU and 
Turkey. Through the European Union Visitors Programme (EUVP) and the People to 
People Programme (P2P) conducted under the name of the Technical Assistance and 
Information Exchange Instrument (TAIEX), the EU has supported short-term technical 
assistance and advice, technical training and peer assistance to Turkish civil society. This 
programme allowed individuals and NGOs to visit EU institutions and meet with EU 
officials and their counterparts in Europe in such cities as Brussels, Strasbourg and 
Luxembourg (For further details of the EUÕs support of Turkish civil society see Civil 
Society Facility 2011-2013 Country Fiche: Turkey). 
The numbers, financial autonomy, professional skills and experience of civil society has 
therefore increased tremendously over the last decade as a result of the harmonisation 
reforms and the EUÕs technical and economic supports (CIV4, October 25, 2010, 
Brussels; CIV7, November 3, 2010, Istanbul; zbudun; 2007, p. 179-193; Gksel and 
Gneş, 2005, p. 63-68). Today there are over 80,000 associations, and 4,000 foundations 
with a total of about ten million members, which is more than the population of many 
members of the EU.  Their increasing publications have contributed to the changes in the 
  131 
image of civil society in the eyes of the people and in the public mind70.  Thus, as noted 
in our interviews (CIV1, October 18, 2010, Brussels; CIV4 October 25, 2010; Brussels; 
CIV7, November 3, 2010, Istanbul; CIV9, December 7, 2010 Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 
2011, Ankara; DIP4, January 4, 2011, Ankara; DIP5, January 6, 2011, Ankara and DIP6, 
January 5, 2011, Ankara) and proposed by rational institutionalists (see section 2.6.2 in 
Chapter II), Turkish civil society has gained power in the EU accession process as a 
result of the redistribution of power, research and authority through harmonisation 
reforms and the EUÕs technical and economic support71.  
As noted above, the PKK increased its attacks against Turkish military forces during this 
process, especially after 2003, religious and Kurdish movements gained power and 
influence over TurkeyÕs social and political life and the instability and clashes in the 
region increased in this period. As argued in the first section of this chapter, since the 
establishment of the Republic of the Turkey, the military-bureaucratic elites have seen 
these developments as the main threat to the territorial integrity and the Kemalist political 
regime of the country and thus increased the restrictions on freedom of association, 
assembly and expression, the judiciary and the civil society. Considering these internal 
and external developments in the absence of the announcement of Turkey as an EU 
candidate, and EU conditionality regarding the rule of law and the removal of restrictions 
on fundamental rights and freedoms, the ratification of Protocols 6 and 13 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, and superiority of international agreements 
related to fundamental rights and freedoms of the national legislation would not have 
been established. Articles 9, 11, 12, 21, 33, and 301 of the Constitution (for details about 
the articles, see the above section) would not have been amended. The state of emergency 
in six provinces in the south-east (Article 122 of the Constitution) would have continued. 
The second, third, and seventh reform packages would not have been enacted by TGNA. 
                                                              
70 ÔIn the 1990s, the image of think tanks and civil society organisations in Turkish society were largely as 
emissaries of the West. In particular, the military and Kemalist elite who had controlled the state system 
and formulated state policies viewed the members of think tanks and civil society as spies for the EU or for 
America; thus, they restricted their activities and did not enter into any relations with themÕ (Interview with 
CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). 
71As elaborated  in the fallowing chapter,  the empowered Turkish civil society has developed its own 
agenda and participated in foreign policy making (see Chapter V).  
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The legal uncertainties and the political and military pressure on the freedom of 
expression, association, assembly and the press, and restrictions on the establishment and 
functioning of associations and foundations would have continued as in previous decades. 
The SSCs and the military judges would have continued to deal with alleged crimes 
against the territorial and national integrity of the state and the principles of the republic. 
Article 301 (for details, see above) would have been used to restrict freedom of 
expression and freedom of the press for journalists, writers and publishing companies. 
The associations would not have received financial support from other associations and 
organisations. Turkey, therefore, would have continued to suffer from the lack of a rule 
of law and fundamental rights and freedoms. It would not have become possible to talk 
about the increasing freedom of expression, association, assembly and the press, or the 
development of civil society in Turkey in the absence of EU conditionality in the rule of 
law and the removal of restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms. Furthermore, in 
the absence of the EUÕs financial and technical support (e.g., advisory, training, 
education), Turkish civil society would not have developed financial autonomy, 
professional skills or experience, meaning they would not have had the power and 
opportunity to make their voice heard in political decision making, at least not at the level 
that it is today.  
However, freedom of association, assembly and expression, and independency of 
judiciary, is not fully at EU standards yet. Restrictions on the freedom of expression and 
freedom of the media continue to some extent, in practice. ÔThe legal framework, 
especially as regards organised crime and terrorism, and its interpretation by the courts, 
leads to abusesÉ Frequent website bans are a cause for serious concern and there is a 
need to revise the law on the internetÕ (2012 Progress Report on Turkey, p. 22). Even the 
number of journalists, media workers and distributers who were imprisoned went up 
again during the 2010-2013 period.72 In regard to freedom of assembly the excessive 
administrative restrictions such as Ôsubstantial prior notification requirements for 
demonstrations, and sometimes the confinement of demonstrations to designated sites 
                                                              
72 According to the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) there were 57 journalists 
in prison in April 2011 which increased to 95 in April 2012.  Twenty have since been released, 10 of them 
as a result of the third judicial reform package in July 5, 2012.   
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and datesÕ continue to restrict the holding of demonstrations and meetings (2012 EC 
Progress Report on Turkey, p. 23).  NGOs and human rights defenders who exercise their 
rights to demonstrate, hold protest meetings, assemble and publish freely are still subject 
to prosecution and fines on charges of terrorist propaganda, disobeying orders under the 
Law on Misdemeanours and violating Law No 2911 on demonstrations (2012 EC 
Progress Report on Turkey, p. 23). Although legislation on freedom of association is, to a 
large extent,73 in line with the EU acquis communautaire, Ôthe constitutional right to 
freedom of assembly and association appears to be interpreted at times in an overly 
restrictive mannerÕ (2012 Progress Report on Turkey, p. 23). The NGOs and their 
activities, to some extent, continue to be restricted through administrative obstacles and 
continue to be subject to harassment, fines and closure proceedings.74 NGOs also still 
face difficulties in fundraising, ÔThe collection of domestic and international funds was 
difficult and bureaucratic procedures cumbersomeÕ (2012 EC Progress Report on Turkey, 
p. 23). Furthermore, as regards the independence of the judiciary, although the control of 
the military over the civil courts disappeared with the removal of SSCs, the duality 
between the civilian and military court systems continues.75 The subjective interpretation 
of the Anti-Terror Law continues to be a problem in the Turkish criminal justice system.  
There is a need to increasingly deliver training in EU applications and human rights for 
judges and prosecutors, in order to reduce the subjective interpretation of the Anti-Terror 
Law (see 2012 EC Progress Report on Turkey, p.11-15). The training of public officials, 
judges, public prosecutors and police officers has been continued by the Department of 
Human Rights, for the promotion and enforcement of human rights, however, as seen 
during the Gezi Park demonstrations there is still need for the further training of public 
                                                              
73 The misfit gap between the Turkish and EU levels is still on-going with regard to legislation on political 
parties and trade unions (see 2012 Progress Report on Turkey, p. 23). 
74 ÔThe Diyarbakir Sarmaşik Association, the Orhan Dogan Support Houses for Education, the Dersim 
Faith and Culture Academy Association, and the cases of the executive members of the Socialist 
Democracy Party and the Social Freedom Platform, the Istanbul branch of the Human Rights Association, 
the Research and Development Association for Kurdish Language (Kurdi Der) İzmir Branch, the Board of 
Health Professionals and the Turkish Medical Association are alleged examples of the government 
interfering disproportionately with freedom of associationÕ (2012 Progress Report on Turkey, p. 23). 
75 ÔMilitary judges and prosecutorsÕ independence were limited by the continued authority of military 
commanders over them. The legal provisions on the composition and powers of the Supreme Military 
Council need to be reformed, particularly the legal basis for promotions, to ensure appropriate civilian 
controlÕ (2012 Progress Report on Turkey, p. 12). 
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officials, judges, public prosecutors, and especially police officers, as well as reforms76 
Ôto strengthen human rights structures and the number of criminal proceedings brought 
against human rights defenders is a matter of concernÕ (2012 EC Progress Report on 
Turkey, p. 20). It is also important to note that as part of the settlement process of 
Kurdish and PKK issues through Ôthe peace processÕ started in 2013, the above 
restrictions on freedom of association, assembly and expression, and the judiciary were 
increasingly removed through harmonisation law packages (for details see the first, 
second, third and fourth judiciary harmonisation law packages and the amendments to the 
Anti-Terror law undertaken in the 2013-2014 period). 
Overall, as a result of the Ôharmonisation reformsÕ which considerably removed 
restrictions on freedom of expression, assembly and association, and the EUÕs technical 
and financial support, civil society has increasingly developed and gained power in 
political decision-making in the EU accession process, 77  however, there is still a 
significant misfit gap between the EU and Turkish levels in these realms, especially in 
terms of freedom of expression and assembly which to some extent continue to restrict 
civil society from making their voice heard in the political decision-making process. 
Reforms in these fields have again accelerated since 2013, with increasing effort for the 
settlement of the Kurdish and PKK issues.  
4.4.3 Empowerment of the economic society in political decision-making 
In accordance with the Custom Union acquis, since the 1990s Turkey has increasingly 
liberalised its statist economy to adopt a Custom Union Structure78. It has increasingly 
privatised state firms, adopted the EUÕs competition policies, rules on protection of 
intellectual and industrial property rights, commercial policy (such as antidumping) and 
most of the preferential trade agreements concluded by the EU, and strengthened internal 
                                                              
76 Although Turkey ratified the Protocols to the ECHR, Protocols 4, 7 and 12 of the ECHR s has not yet 
been ratified. Thus there is still need for important reforms. 
77 Many of our interviewees emphasised the importance of harmonisation reforms and EU technical and 
financial support in development of civil society and increasing participation of civil society in political 
decision-making (see, interview with CIV4 October 25, 2010; Brussels; CIV7, November 3, 2010, Istanbul; 
CIV9, December 7, 2010 Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara. 
78Turkey became a member of the Custom Union in 1996. Interestingly it is the only country that was a 
member of the Custom Union before becoming an EU member.  
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conformity assessment and market surveillance structures (for details of reforms see 
Ozcan, 1998;Togan and Hoekman, 2005). The economic reforms undertaken to adapt to 
the Custom Union acquis, to some extent, liberalised the economy and curtailed the 
dominant role of the state in the economy.79 Until the early 2000s, however, the dominant 
role of the state in the economy, economic instability and restrictions on economic rights 
and trade unions, continued (see 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 EC Progress Report on Turkey; 
Ozcan, 1998; Togan and Hoekman, 2005; CIV1, October 18, 2010, Brussels; CIV2, 
October 26, 2010, Brussels; CIV9, December 7, 2010 Ankara). The EU has therefore also 
constantly criticised the lack of economic stability, the statist economic system and 
restrictions on economic rights and trade unions (for details see, 1998 EC Progress 
Report on Turkey, p. 19; 2000 EC Progress Report on Turkey, p. 28). Accordingly, the 
EU has also persistently asked for reforms in these realms through the Accession 
Partnership Document and the EU yearly progression reports on Turkey (for details see, 
2000 EC Progress Report on Turkey, p. 70).  
In parallel with the EU calls, under the name of the National Program, Turkey has 
undertaken structural and fiscal economic reforms in different sectors. For instance, in the 
manufacturing sector Turkey adopted new approaches and directives to adopt the CE 
conformity marking (for details see, EC2004), and institutions such as the Turkish 
Standards Institute (TSE) and the Turkish Accreditation Agency (TRKAK) were 
strengthened for full implementation of the EU acquis in the manufacturing sector. 
Challenges arising from physical integration to the harmonisation of infrastructure, 
logistics networks, vehicles, border crossings and customs facilities have been removed, 
and significant progress has been made in air, maritime and road transport in accordance 
with the EUÕs common transport policy (EC 2007, p. 48-49). In accordance with the 
Europe Action Plan signed by Turkey in 2001, Turkey ended the monopoly on fixed lines 
by privatising some of its fixed telephone services and new legislation and measures 
regarding the banking sector, such as the privatisation of state banks, independence of the 
central bank and privatisation of the financing of the central and/or public sector banks to 
                                                              
79It is important to note that the diminution of the dominant role of the state in economy was started by the 
liberal economic policies of Turgut Ozal. Ozal came came to power after the 1980 military coup and 
applied for full EU membership in 1987. 
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the government deficit, have been undertaken to improve TurkeyÕs banking and financing 
sectors to EU standards (for details of reforms in these sectors see Pazarbasõoglu, 2005). 
Similar to that pursued by the EU in the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP), state 
enterprises in the agricultural sector have been privatised, and high intervention prices 
and protection from the world market have been replaced by lower direct payments to 
farmers based on their holdings of land and animals and less protection such as low 
tariffs. Along with the EU model (see EC Chapter 7) new energy laws were passed in 
2001 to take over regulatory functions from the Ministry of Natural Resources, eliminate 
the need for additional state-guaranteed power purchase agreements, transfer the task of 
supplying and distributing energy and the associated market risks to the private sector 
and minimise the costs through competitive pressures on producers and distributors (see 
Chapters 7 and 8 of 2001 and 2002 EC Progression Report on Turkey). In accordance 
with these regulations the privatisation of almost all assets in the distribution of energy 
was completed in 2011and the regulatory and supervisory regime for the energy sector 
have been adapted to EU standards (Chapters 7 and 8 0f 2011 EC Progression Report on 
Turkey).  
Through these harmonisation reforms, Turkey has adapted, to a large extent, to the body 
of the EUÕs legislation, institutional framework and policies of the economy in different 
sectors, and to a large extent abandoned the stateÕs monopolistic position over the 
economy.  As noted by our interviewees (see CIV1, October 18, 2010, Brussels; CIV4, 
October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV9, January 7, 2011, Ankara) and students of Turkish 
studies (Ghosh, 2007; Bilici, 2010; Togan and Hoekman, 2005; Hadjit and Moxon-
Browne, 2005) these harmonisation reforms have liberalised the statist economic system, 
increased the enjoyment of liberal rules80 in the economy, benefited Turkey in receiving 
FDI, and brought about a fiscal and monetary discipline, political and economic stability 
and sustainable growth in the Turkish economy, as well as boosted bilateral trade 
                                                              
80It is important to note that the financial crises of 2000 and 2001 paved the way for fiscal austerity, 
privatisation and banking sector reforms under the name of the World Bank, and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) rescue packages, which were also supported by the EU,  have also played a key role 
in the liberalisation and growth of the Turkish economy. 
  137 
between the EU and Turkey81 (CIV1, October 18, 2010, Brussels; CIV4 October 25, 
2010; Brussels; CIV7, November 3, 2010, Istanbul; CIV9, December 7, 2010 Ankara; 
CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). Consequently, after several decades, the Turkish 
economy has experienced single digit levels of interest and inflation rates82 and more 
than doubled its GNP.  The GDP in Turkey increased $843 billion in 2013, from $196.3 
billion in 2002, and the Turkish economy became the sixth biggest economy in Europe 
and sixteenth biggest economy among the thirty Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries, in which was twenty-sixth in 2002. GDP per capita 
also increased more than threefold in the last decade, reaching $11,066 in 2013 from 
3,492 in 2002. With an 8.5% growth rate in 2011, Turkey became the third fastest 
growing country among the G20 countries after China and Argentina. The average 
growth rate was 6.5 per cent in last the 10 years and according to OECD estimation, with 
the annual average growth rate of 6.7 per cent in the period of 2011-2017 Turkey is 
expected to be the fastest growing economy among the OECD countries. 
On the other hand, as noted by some of our interviewees (CIV2, October 22, 2010, 
Brussels; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels), the adaptation to the rule of the free market 
economy and rule of law, on the basis of EU norms and standards, has increased the 
business climate for development of the private sector, and freed the growing Anatolian 
middle class from state pressure and from needing to get permission from the state to 
establish associations and do business with neighbouring countries83. As such, the 
growing Anatolian middle class has increasingly come together under the umbrella of 
different foundations - such as the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and 
                                                              
81 Bilateral trade between the EU and Turkey was worth 120 billion Euros in 2011,ÕTurkey is the EUÕs 
sixth biggest trading partner while the EU is TurkeyÕs biggest. A bit less than half of TurkeyÕs total trade is 
with the EU and almost 75% of foreign direct investment flows in Turkey, with a strong high-technology 
component, comes from the EUÕ (2012 AC Progress Report on Turkey, p. 5). 
82 From the end of 1995 to the end of 1999 the annual inflation (consumer prices) and interest rates rose 
from 80% to 100%  and after the 2000 and 2001 economic crises they  rose over 100%. 
83According to the previous business association law Ôif the business association organised a business trip 
to (abroad) Uganda, Bulgaria or the United States, the association had to get permission from the governor 
of the city in which the association was located, and, after coming back, the association had to write a 
detailed report of the events of the trip with supporting proof. Failure to comply with these requirements 
would prevent the association from ever taking another business trip. In addition, until 1977, no one could 
get a passport to fly out of the country at least not more than once. If you could get a passport for a second 
trip, which was almost impossible, any further trips required approval of the cabinet of ministers. Turkey 
was a very closed societyÕ (interview with CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels).  
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Industrialists - Turkiye is Adamlari ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu (TUSKON), the 
Third Sector Foundation of Turkey - Turkiye Ucuncu Sector Vakfi (TUSEV), the Turkish 
Economic and Social Studies Foundation - Trkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etdler Vakfõ 
(TESEV), the Union of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Commodity Exchange of 
Turkey - Turkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birligi (TOBB), the Economic Development 
Foundation - Iktisadi Kalkin Vakfi - (IKV), the Association of Independent Industrialists 
and Businessmen - Mustakil Sanayici ve Isadamlari Dernegi- (MUSIAD), the Turkish 
Industrialists and Business Association - Turk Sanayicileri ve Isadamlari Dernegi 
(TUSIAD), etc., everywhere in Turkey, and also abroad to protect their interests (CIV2, 
October 22, 2010, Brussels; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels). Accordingly, as will be 
detailed in the following chapter, they increasingly began to make their voices heard in 
the formulation of the TFP for the development of an engagement-oriented foreign 
policy, solution of problems through peaceful means and the liberalisation of trade and 
movement of people among TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours84 (CIV12, January 6, 2011, 
Ankara; CIV2, October 22, 2010, Brussels; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; DIP4, 
January 4, 2011, Ankara; DIP5, January 6, 2011, Ankara; DIP6, January 5, 2011, 
Ankara). 
 
In this regard, considering the increasing power and influence of Muslim and Kurdish 
capital in Turkish social, economic and political life under the umbrella of different 
foundations, such as TUSKON, TBB and MUSIAD, in the last decade, the failure to 
become an EU candidate in 1999 and EU conditionality in the adaptation to the rule of 
the free market economy and rule of law, the growing Anatolian business community 
would have been eliminated from Turkish economic life by the military-bureaucratic 
camp, as was the case in the 1990s and in previous decades. Turkey would not have 
undertaken the above-mentioned structural and fiscal economic reforms in different 
sectors to further liberalise the statist economic system and increased the enjoyment of 
liberal rules in the economy. As such, it would not have become possible to talk about a 
fiscal and monetary discipline. The Turkish economy would have continued to 
                                                              
84 For details of how they played a role in formulation of TFP see Chapter V 
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experience high-level interest and inflation rates as was the case in previous decades. The 
statist economic system and stateÕs monopolistic position over the economy would have 
continued, meaning that it would not have become possible to talk about the need to 
create a business climate to develop the private sector, or stability and sustainable growth 
in the Turkish economy. As a result, Turkey would not have received as much FDI, and 
the economy would not have experienced as much growth or been organised under the 
umbrella of different foundations to protect their interests and make their voices heard in 
the formulation of state policies, including the TFP. Accordingly, as proposed by 
historical and rational institutionalism, argued above, and noted by many of our 
interviewees (see CIV1, October 18, 2010, Brussels; CIV4 October 25, 2010; Brussels; 
CIV7, November 3, 2010, Istanbul; CIV9, December 7, 2010 Ankara) and students of 
Turkish study (Ghosh, 2007; Harrison, 1996; Bilici, 2010), the turning point in EU-
Turkey relations in 1999 punctuated the equilibrium and started Turkey down the path of 
economic liberalisation through the harmonisation reforms undertaken to adapt to EU 
acquis, which resulted in the accomplishment of economic growth and stability and the 
empowerment of economic society in political decision-making.  
Trade unions, however, and especially their collective actions, are still subject to 
numerous restrictions. The law on collective labour relations, the right of public servants 
to strike, and to form and join trade unions are still not fully in line with EU standards 
(for details see the 2012 EC Progress Report on Turkey, p. 25-27). The amendment to the 
law on strikes in May 2012, which prohibits strikes in the aviation sector, Ôtakes TurkeyÕs 
labour legislation further from EU and International Labour Organization (ILO) 
standardsÕ (2012 Progress Report on Turkey, p. 26). Further efforts are thus needed to 
achieve collective bargaining strikes and lockouts for private sector employees (for 
details see 2012 Progress Report on Turkey, p. 8). 
Overall, the announcement of Turkey as an EU candidate in 1999 also punctuated the 
equilibrium at Turkish level in the economic realm, and started Turkey down the path of 
liberalisation of the Turkish economy through harmonisation reforms. In parallel with 
calls from the EU, Turkey curtailed the dominant role of the state in the economy and has 
increased the enjoyment of liberal rules in the economy. This has brought about 
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economic stability and growth and growing economic society and its empowerment in 
Turkish society, the political system and political decision-making. As noted by our 
interviewees, (CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels and CIV6, November 4, 2010, Istanbul), 
this liberalisation of TurkeyÕs authoritarian political system, progress in the Turkish 
economy, the curtailing of state dominance of the economy, and the empowerment of 
civil society, would have been unthinkable without TurkeyÕs being an EU candidate in 
1999 and the EUÕs conditionality and adaptation pressure in the field of democracy, the 
rule of law and the economic realm. However, the law on collective labour relations, the 
right of the public and private sectors to strike, and the right of public servants to form 
and join trade unions are still not fully in line with EU standards.  
4.4.4 Increasing respect for and protection of religious and minority rights 
As argued previously, the Turkish military-bureaucratic elites perceived religious and 
differing ethnic groups as the main threats to the Kemalist state regime and unitary 
structure of the state. That is why, in the name of the survival of the state regime and the 
unitary structure of the state, religious and minority rights were restricted. Anything 
related to these issues was transferred out of normal politics85 and was accepted as a task 
for the military (Ozcan, 1994; Kirisci, 2006; Aras, 2009; CIV4 October 25, 2010; 
Brussels; CIV7, November 3, 2010, Istanbul; CIV9, November 7, 2010).  
However, with the deinstitutionalisation, illegalisation and delegitimation of military 
control and influence over the government, media, NGOs and political life through the 
harmonisation reforms undertaken to adapt to EU acquis, the empowered civil actors 
were able to transfer domestic religious and minority affairs into the realm of normal 
politics, (CIV6, November 4, 2010, Istanbul; CIV4 October 25, 2010; Brussels; CIV7, 
November 3, 2010, Istanbul; CIV9, November 7, 2010, Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, 
                                                              
85 These domestic affairs were not only transferred the out of normal politics, but they were also 
externalised, thus causing political and diplomatic crises between Turkey and its neighbours (see Chapters 
IV and V). The transformation of these issues into normal politics as a result of democratisation of the 
political regime has also ended the externalisation of these domestic issues, and  thus the diplomatic and 
political crises between Turkey and its neighbouring countries arising from the securitisation and 
externalisation of these domestic issues (for details see Chapters IV and V). This is why the transformation 
of these issues into the realm of normal politics is significant for Turkey in developing cooperative political 
and economic relations with neighbouring countries in 2000s (for details see Chapters IV and V). 
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Ankara). In this regard, in contrast to the previous decade, the religious and minority 
affairs and options for their settlement began to be discussed widely and openly in the 
Turkish media, and the academic and political environment (see 2012 EC Progress 
Report on Turkey, p. 27; Keyman and Onis, 2007; Celik and Rumelili, 2006; Guney and 
Karatekillioglu, 2005; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels). Accordingly, as will be 
detailed below, considerable reforms in recognition of certain cultural, political and 
religious rights in accordance with the EU calls, were undertaken.  
First, as noted above, the restrictions on Kurdish people and their movements have been, 
to some extent, eased with the removal of the state of emergency in six provinces in the 
south-east in 2002, and amendments to Articles 7 and 8 of the Anti-Terror Law during 
the 2002-2004 period. The opening of private Kurdish language schools has been 
possible since 2004. In addition, with the seventh and ninth reform packages, the bans on 
teaching, publishing and broadcasting in the Kurdish language  have gradually further 
been removed during 2004-2009. 86  Private radio and television stations began to 
broadcast in Kurdish in 2006.  On the other hand, although the PKK has increased its 
attacks against Turkey during the 2004 Ð 2012, Turkey began the Ôdemocratic opening 
processÕ in 2009, in contrast to previous decades, to solve the Kurdish issue through the 
further broadening of political and cultural rights. In previous decades when the PKK 
increased its attacks against Turkish security forces, under the pressure of military 
Turkish governments further increased their pressure over the Kurds and Kurdish 
movement.87 In this regard, the bans on broadcasting in the Kurdish language  have been 
removed and state television - the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT), TRT 
Şeş, began to broadcast twenty-four hours a day in Kurdish in 2009, which was 
unthinkable a decade before that. With amendments to the Law on the National 
Education, Kurdish Language and Literature departments were established at universities 
                                                              
86 Education in their mother tongue in public schools has not yet been recognised for Kurds. In this sense, 
the misfit gap between Turkey and EU levels is still present. 
87 For instance, during the 1990s when the PKK increased its attacks against Turkey, extra-judicial killings, 
and torture, village burning and forced migration in the south-east, as conducted by the JITEM, increased. 
As will be seen in next chapter, in this process Turkey not only increased its pressure on the Kurdish people 
and their movement but also accused its neighbour of supporting Kurdish movement and/or intervening in 
TurkeyÕs domestic affairs, which caused a diplomatic crises between Turkey and its neighbours, especially 
Iran and Syria. 
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in 2011.88 The Kurdish language was made an elective course at public schools in 201289 
and the restrictions on the use of the Kurdish language in defence in courts and the public 
service were also removed in 2013. 
Consequently, as noted by CIV4 (October 25, 2010, Brussels) and CIV6 (November 4, 
2010, Istanbul) the path of liberalisation started by the EU accession process provided 
Turkey with an opportunity to separate the Kurdish and terror issues, and to solve 
Kurdish issues in a democratic way, instead of using hard power instruments. As a result 
of these reforms and the Ôdemocratic opening processesÕ the PKK stopped its attacks 
against Turkey at the beginning of 2013. Thus, the most important challenge for TurkeyÕs 
internal and external security and democratisation and prosperity, the thirty years old war 
between the Turkish military forces and PKK, has come to end.  
There is need for further revision in the constitution regarding the definition of 
citizenship, the use of the mother-tongue (Kurdish) in public education, and 
administrative decentralisation in accordance with the European Charter of Local Self-
Government and Municipalities. In this regard the work on a new constitution, TurkeyÕs 
first civil constitution, which aims to bring solutions to, amongst other things, the 
Kurdish issue, started in early 2012 with the setting up of a Constitution Conciliation 
Committee composed of three members from each of the four political groups in 
parliament. So far a democratic and participatory process has been in place in the work 
on the new constitution 90  (2012 Progress Report on Turkey, p.7). Administrative 
decentralisation in accordance with the European Charter of Local Self-Government and 
                                                              
88 A Department of Eastern Languages and Literatures, including Zaza and Kurmanj Kurdish in Tunceli 
University, The Kurdish Language and Literature Department in Muş Alparslan University were opened, 
and post-graduate education in Zaza and Kurmanj Kurdish in Mardin Artuklu University and 
undergraduate elective Kurdish language course in in Muş Alparslan University began since 2011.  
89 In June 2012, a new curriculum for primary schools was issued  by the Ministry of National Education, 
including the guideline that  if at least 10 pupils apply there is an obligation for a school to add a course on 
living languages such as Kurdish,  Circassian and dialects. 
90 ÔThe Conciliation Committee held public consultations with a broad range of stakeholders between 
November 2011 and April 2012 to receive the views of political parties not represented in parliament, of 
state bodies, professional associations, trade unions and nongovernmental organisationsÉ. Members of the 
committee also took part in public events around Turkey organised by civil society platforms. A website 
was set up to gather written opinions, returning over 25,000 contributions. An abundance of local and 
national civic initiatives also ensured lively debate among citizens and in the mediaÕ (2012 Progress Report 
on Turkey, p.  8). 
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Municipalities91 is not fully, but to some extent, established, with amendments to the Law 
of Municipalities put into practice in 2013 as part of the democratic opening process, 
begun to settle the Kurdish issue. 
Restrictions on Quran courses and religious schools were removed in 2011with an 
amendment to Article 1739 on Education. People who want to teach their religion to their 
children can now freely do so. The secondary school of the Religious Vocational School, 
which was closed after the 1997 military intervention, reopened in 2011 with the 
amendment to the education act and restrictions on and discrimination involving students 
from this school entering university were removed in 201292. Restrictions on wearing 
headscarves in public areas, such as at universities and official ceremonies etc., which 
had been eased since 2004, were officially removed in 2010 with the directive of YOK 
and the governors. Students who wear headscarves could go to universities, and President 
Gul, Prime Minister Erdogan and, the ministers and bureaucrats, and those wives who 
wore headscarves, could attend the balls and formal ceremonies with those wives. For 
instance, for the first time Hayrunnisa Gul, wife of President Abdullah Gul, was able to 
join the celebration of the foundation of the Republic on 29 November 2010, wearing her 
head scarf. As noted by our interviewees (CIV6, November 4, 2010, Istanbul; CIV4; 
October 25, 2010, Brussels), these are clear indicators of the normalisation of politics and 
the transformation of Islamic affairs into the realm of normal politics.  
Concerning the restrictions on Islamic political movements, although the AK Party 
defines itself as a conservative democratic party, its main figures came from the Islamic 
movement and they have been in power since 2002. As noted by students of Turkish 
studies (Keyman, 2012; Akan, 2011; Keyman and Onis, 2007) and our interviewees 
(CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV6, November 4, 2010, Istanbul; CIV12, January 
6, 2011, Ankara), thanks to the EU and conditionality in the rule of law and 
democratisation of civil-military relations, in contrast to the previous decade, a party with 
                                                              
91 The European Charter Of Local Self-Government and Municipalities was signed by Turkey in 1988, but, 
to a large extent, was not implemented until the 2013 (for details of European Charter of Local Self-
Government and Municipalities and the extent to which Turkey has implemented it, see Inanc and nal, 
2007; Cengiz, 2005). 
92Furthermore, new regulations have been prepared by the Ministry of National Education since the 
academic year of 2012-2013, with school textbooks containing information on the Alevi faith. 
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an Islamic background is able to stay in power and implement its own policies, which 
was unthinkable a decade ago.  Consequently, Òas a result of the democratisation process, 
Turkey has been gradually normalising, increasingly trying to resolve issues involving 
political Islam and the Kurds in democratic waysÓ (CIV11, January 4, 2011, Ankara). 
The seventh and ninth reform packages also brought about revisions in Articles 42, and 
134 of the Constitution, and the Law on Association which were bans on the 
establishment and functioning of minority foundations, which were, to a large extent, 
removed in 2004. In accordance with the EU calls (see 2000, 2001, 2002 EC Progression 
Reports on Turkey) a new legislation (Article 4771) which allows the non-Muslim 
minority foundations to obtain, sell and or donate their real estate was accepted in TGNA 
in 2004. With this law restrictions on the non-Muslim foundations regarding the 
renovation of their real estate and the opening of places for worship have been, to a large 
extent, removed. In 2010 the restriction on worship in places which were considered holy 
for non-Muslim minorities was, to a large extent, removed. Accordingly, after nine 
decades, starting from the 2010 Ecumenical, Patriarch Bartholomew has celebrated the 
Divine Liturgy of the Dormition of Theotokos every year in August at the Sumela 
Monastery in the province of Trabzon. After 95 years, a religious service has now also 
been held at the Armenian Holy Cross Church on the Akhdamar Island in Lake Van, 
since 2010.  
The seizure of the real estate of non-Muslim foundations, which was on-going since the 
late 1930s, stopped in 2001, and with the amendment to the Law on Foundation 
Association in 2012, minority foundations began to receive compensation for property 
confiscated earlier.93 To solve the endowments and Patriarchate issues94, in accordance 
with Greek wishes and EU calls,95 Turkey gave citizenship to the members of the 
                                                              
93ÔAccording to official information, 108 community foundations applied by the deadline (27 August 2012) 
for the return of 1,568 properties. By 18 September 2012, the Foundations Council approved the return of 
58 properties, the payment of compensation for eight (8) properties, decided that 53 applications were not 
eligible and continues the processing of the remaining 1,449 applicationsÕ (2012 EC Progress Report on 
Turkey, p. 26). 
94 The endowments and Patriarchate issues are that: The leader of the Istanbul Rum Patriarchate has to be a 
Turkish citizen according to the Treaty of Lausanne. The current leader of the Patriarchate, Bartholomeos, 
is quite old; and so if he dies there would be a problem in the selection of a new leader.  
95Greece wishes the EU had asked Turkey to give citizenship to the members of the Sensinot Assembly to 
solve the endowments and Patriarchate issues.  
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Sensinot Assembly and allowed non-Muslim foundations to choose their own religious 
leaders in 2011. As such, Ôthe endowments and Patriarchate issues, that caused the 
problems between Turkey and Greece in the past are no longer relevantÕ (Turkish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Last but not least, thanks to the EU, there are no longer 
institutions and actors like the NSC and its secretary generals, such as Tuncer Kilic, to 
warn the bureaucracy to create difficulty to the minority foundations. Consequently, the 
path to liberalisation of the Turkish political system, which began with the announcement 
of Turkey as an EU candidate in 1999, and EU conditionality and adaptation pressure in 
the field of democracy, the rule of law and the economic realm, also increased the respect 
for and protection of cultural, religious and minority rights.  
 
In this regard, considering the increasing attacks of the PKK against Turkish military 
forces, the increasing power and influence of religious and Kurdish movements in 
Turkish society and political life, the increasing instability and clashes in the region in 
this period, the absence of EU conditionality and adaptation pressure in the rule of law 
and in civilian control over the militaryÑwhich, as previously argued, resulted in the 
empowerment of the Government and NGOs in political decision makingÑand with 
respect for and protection of religious and minority rights, the transformation of domestic 
religious and minority affairs into the realm of normal politics would not have occurred. 
Thus, the root causes of religious and minority affairs and alternative approaches to hard 
power instruments to solve problems would not have been openly discussed in Turkish 
society, the media and political and academic environments. Consequently, the 
recognition of cultural, political and religious rights in accordance with the EU calls 
would not have occurred. As was the case during the 1990s and in earlier decades, the 
Kurdish religious and minority affairs and rights would have been maintained to ensure 
security among the militaryÐbureaucratic elites. Thus, the reform packages, especially the 
seventh and ninth reform packages, would not have been enacted by TGNA. The bans on 
teaching, publishing and broadcasting in the Kurdish language, wearing headscarves, 
attending religious schools, establishing and operating minority foundations, and 
worshipping in places considered holy for non-Muslim minorities would have continued. 
Domestic religious and minority affairs would have continued to cause political and 
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economic crises and a worsening of the political and economic stability and growth, as 
well as problems in TurkeyÕs relations with its neighbours, as was the case in the 1980s 
and 1990s. 
Although considerable progress has been made in the respect for, and protection of, 
minority rights in accordance with EU calls, minorities and their foundations continue to 
face problems in accessing justice, obtaining work, fundraising, opening places of 
worship, training their clergy and obtaining residence permits for foreign clergy.96  As 
noted by the 2012 Progress Report on Turkey (see page 23-24)) some non-Muslims and 
Alevis have come across job discrimination in the civil service. Despite announcements 
by authorities, there have been several noted issues for the minority communities, 
including: the Syriac Orthodox communityÕs request to open their school to provide 
training for their community and clergy; the Armenian PatriarchateÕs application to open 
a university department for the Armenian language and clergy; the Greek PatriarchateÕs 
request to reopen the Heybeliada (Halki) Greek Orthodox seminary, closed in 1975, and 
the decision to reopen a school in Gkeada (Imvros) that remains pending (Progress 
Report 2012, p. 24).97  Turkey still has not signed the UN International Covenant on civil 
and political rights regarding the rights of minorities, or the UN Covenant on economic, 
social and cultural rights regarding the right to education. Turkey has also not signed the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, or the Charter for 
Regional and Minority Languages. Although discriminatory and nationalist statements in 
schoolbooks have been replaced to a large extent with multiculturalism, tolerance and 
peace, a number of compulsory schoolbooks still include rhetoric against missionaries or 
minorities (2012 Progress Report on Turkey, p. 25). Thus, as noted by last the Progress 
Report on Turkey (see page 25-26), the revision of existing legislation and further efforts 
are needed to ensure full respect for, and protection of language, culture and the 
fundamental rights of minorities in accordance with European standards. 
                                                              
96 ÔThe relevant 2010 Council of Europe Venice Commission recommendations have yet to be 
implementedÕ (2012 EC Progress Report, p. 24). 
97 Despite the opening made in 2009, restrictions on the Alevi community also continue.  Cem houses, 
place of worship for Alevis, have not been officially recognised, and Alevis experienced difficulties in 
establishing Cem houses (2012 Progress Report on Turkey, p. 24-25). Although with the amendment to the 
Law on Foundation (2008) Greek and Armenian foundations began to receive compensation for property 
confiscated by the Directorate General for Foundations, the legislation does not cover properties 
confiscated from Alevi foundations. 
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Overall, the liberal environment, EU adaptational pressure in adopting the Copenhagen 
political criteria, pressure to meet Copenhagen political criteria, and the empowerment of 
new actors in political decision-making generated by the EU accession process has 
offered Turkey the possibility of transferring its religious and minority affairs into the 
realm of normal politics and to make progress in the respect for, and protection of, 
religious and minority rights98(see also Kirisci, 2006; Aras, 2009).  
It is also important to note that the military-bureaucratic elites acted as a veto player 
during the harmonisation reforms. As noted, scholars engaged in Turkish study and our 
interviewees believe the liberal environment and the reforms related to religious and 
minority rights and civil-military relations, promoted by the EU and the accession 
process, would weaken the ability of Turkey to counter Islamic, Kurdish and minority 
groups, and would give the elected actors (e.g. AK Party government and BDP) and 
minority foundations an opportunity to promote separatism and/or Islamism (Heper, 
2005; Oguzlu, 2005; Tocci, 2005; Keyman, 2012; Akan, 2011; Keyman and Onis, 2007; 
CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV6, November 4, 2010, Istanbul; CIV12, January 6, 
2011, Ankara). They thus tried to frustrate the reforms related to the democratisation and 
civilisation of NSC, YOK, RTK, and SSCs, cuts in the defence budget and the reforms 
which they believed would weaken the monocultural, secular and unitary characteristics 
of the stateÕs political regime - such as the removal of the ban on headscarves, religious 
education, using the mother language (Kurdish language) and the establishment and 
functioning of minority foundations. They operated an anti-reform campaign through the 
NSCÕs Toplumla Iliskiler Baskanligi (Public Relations Command) to influence public 
opinion to block the reforms to put pressure on pro-reform actors and institutions. They 
accused pro-reform actors of being traitors, and of being the enemy of Ataturk and the 
Kemalist political regime (for more details see Mercan 2006a, Heper, 2005; Tocci, 2005; 
Keyman and Onis, 2007; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV6, November 4, 2010, 
                                                              
98 As will be seen in the following chapters, the transformation of domestic issues into the realm of normal 
politics also played an important role in the transformation of TFP towards its neighbours by offering 
Turkey the possibility of developing dialogue and cooperative relationships with its neighbours. 
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Istanbul; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). Even in this process senior generals99 accused 
the Chief of Staff, Hilmi Ozkok, of not being aggressive enough against the government 
and reforms which cut the power of the military and expanded religious and cultural 
rights (Haper, 2005).  
However, as detailed above pro-EU actors were empowered through the harmonisation 
reforms and EU technical and economic supports during the EU accession process. The 
role of the military-bureaucratic elites is deinstitutionalized, illegalized and 
delegitimized. Thanks to the EU, its conditionality and its technical and financial support, 
the pro-reform campaign was much stronger. The mainstream media, universities, and 
NGOs supported the government in its reforms by organising conferences, meetings, TV 
programmes, place advertisements in newspapers, and handing out brochures regarding 
the necessity of harmonisation reforms for the solution of TurkeyÕs problems and for 
TurkeyÕs prosperity and peace (CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV6, November 4, 
2010, Istanbul; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). Accordingly, the veto players failed,  
religious and minority affairs were transferred into the realm of normal politics, and 
reforms were undertaken in accordance with the EU calls. 
All in all, as proposed by the theoretical framework of the study, Europeanisation and 
rational and historical new institutionalism, the announcement of Turkey as an EU 
candidate in 1999 - a critical juncture in EU-Turkey relationship - punctuated the 
equilibrium at the Turkish level and started Turkey on the path of liberalisation of its 
political regime and religious and minority polices. EU adaptation pressure to fill the 
misfit gap between Turkey and EU in the field of democracy, rule of law and the 
economic realm have become the main driving forces behind the reforms undertaken at 
Turkish level over the last decade. The reforms undertaken to adapt to EU acquis resulted 
in: a) changing institutions and institutional structure, b) the empowerment of 
government and civil society against the military-bureaucratic elites in the Turkish 
political system and political decision-making, c) increasing economic stability and 
growth, and d) the transformation of domestic religious and minority affairs into the 
                                                              
99 Such as the Secretary General of the MGK General Tuncer Kilinc; General AytacYalman, the 
Commander of the Land Forces; General Cumhur Asparagus, the Commander of Air Force; General Sener 
Eruygur, the Commander of the Gendarmerie; General Cetin Dogan, the Commander of the First Army. 
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realm of normal politics and increasing respect for, and protection of, religious and 
minority rights.  
The following section focuses on the logic that drives the reforms in line with the EU 
acquis over the last decade.  
4.5 Logic of consequentiality and path dependency in TurkeyÕs adaptation 
to EU acquis 
As noted previously, while announcing Turkey as a candidate at the 1999 EC Helsinki 
Summit, the EU clearly noted that Turkey had to adapt to the EU acquis communautaire 
in the field of democracy, rules of law, and the economic realm, and be able to start 
accession negotiations with the EU in order to even get a date for starting the accession 
negotiation and benefitting from EU economic aids (for details, see 1999 EC Helsinki 
Summit Presidency Conclusion; 2001 Accession Partnership Documents; and 1999, 
2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 EC Progress Reports on Turkey). The EU offered economic aids 
for starting the accession negotiations, and being on the EU track for full EU 
membership. Turkey was (and is) doing more than half of its trade with the EU, and 
about 80% of its FDI comes from the EU. Furthermore, as noted by Turkish EU Chief 
Negotiator and EU Affairs Minister, Egemen Bagis (December 18, 2012) and many of 
our interviewees (CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV6, November 4, 2010, Istanbul; 
CIV7, November 3, 2010, Istanbul), Turkey could not complete the democratic and 
economic reforms that were indispensable for ensuring political and economic stability 
and becoming more democratic, prosperous and transparent without the EUÕs technical 
and economic supports and adaptation pressure. As noted by Turkish politicians100 on 
different platforms,101 many of our interviewees102 and Turkish scholars,103 the political 
and economic cost of Turkey abandoning the EU track would have been high in the long 
                                                              
100 Such as the Turkish EU Chief Negotiator and EU Affairs Minister Egemen Bagis as well as President 
Gul, Prime Minister Erdogan, Economic Affairs Minister Babacan, and Foreign Minister Davutoglu.  
101 Such as public meetings at Diyarbekir, Istanbul, and Trabzon, TV programmes (Siyaset Meydani, 32. 
Gun, Iskele Sancak, Egrisi Dogrusu, Sansursuz, and act.), and conferences at Abant. 
102 CIV2, October 26, 2010, Brussels; CIV3, October 22, 2010, Brussels; CIV8, December 3, 2010, 
Ankara; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels. 
103 Bilgic and Karatzas, 2004, p. 5; Emerson and Tocci, 2004; Eryilmaz, 2006; Altinisik and Tur, 2005; 
Aydin and Acikmese, 2007; Kirisci, 2006; Aras, 2009; Togan and Hoekman, 2005; Keyman, 2012; Akan, 
2011; Keyman and Onis, 2007; Togan and Hoekman, 2005. 
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term. As such, to be able to start accession negotiations with the EU and benefit from EU 
economic aids, including undertaking the necessary political and economic reforms for 
political and economic stability and becoming more democratic, prosperous and 
transparent, Turkey became fully involved in the pre-accession strategy in the post-
Helsinki process and announced its own national programme to adapt to the EU acquis 
communautaire in the field of democracy, rule of law, and the economic realm (see 
Emerson and Tocci, 2004; Eryilmaz, 2006; Altinisik and Tur, 2005; Aydin and 
Acikmese, 2007; see also interviews with CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussesl; CIV6, 
November 4, 2010, Istanbul; CIV7, November 3, 2010, Istanbul; CIV9, December 7, 
2010, Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara).  
Turkey adapted to the EU calls and directives Òbecause we are gaining a lot from the EU. 
My country (Turkey) [is becoming] much more democratic, prosperous, more transparent 
and has much more self-confidence than it did have before starting the EU-Turkey 
negotiation process.Ó The reforms undertaken in the fields of democracy, rule of law, and 
the protection of religious and minority rights Òare important developments that would be 
very difficult to do on our ownÓ (Turkish EU Chief Negotiator and EU Affairs Ministers 
Bagis, December 18, 2012, Dublin, the Institute of International and European Affairs).  
In this regard, considering the public scepticism about the future of EUÐTurkey relations, 
the threat perceptions of the Turkish population arising from the PKK issue and the 
efforts of secularists, Kemalists and nationalists to block the reforms, especially related to 
religious and minority rights and to the limitation of the role of the military in the 
political system, the absence of rewards offered by the EU (e.g., economic aid), the 
accession negotiations and EU track for full EU membership and the benefit of economic 
and democratic reforms, the Government would not have had adequate inducement to 
become fully involved in the pre-accession strategy in the post-Helsinki process. As a 
result, it would not have announced its own national programme to adapt to the EU 
acquis communautaire in the field of democracy, rule of law, and economic realm. The 
calculation of the long term benefits of being on the EU track is one of the main driving 
forces behind TurkeyÕs adaptation to the EU acquis communautaire in the field of 
democracy, the rule of law, and the economic realm. 
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In addition, as noted by the Turkish Chief EU Negotiator and EU Affairs Ministers Bagis 
(December 18, 2012) and Eryilmaz (2006), Altinisik and Tur (2005), Aydin and 
Acikmese (2007) and many of our interviewees (see interview with CIV4, October 25, 
2010, Brussels; CIV6, November 4, 2010, Istanbul; CIV7, November 3, 2010, Istanbul; 
CIV9, December 7, 2010, Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara), the reward of 
getting a date for beginning EU accession negotiations provided pro-EU actors and 
institutions with  an opportunity to defend the harmonisation reforms in a more legitimate 
and stronger manner. The pro-EU actors and institutions argued accurately that the 
militaryÕs power over the political system and political decision-making and Turkey`s 
hard stance against religious and minority affairs damaged TurkeyÕs internal and external 
interests including EU-Turkey relations (CIV1 October 18, 2010 Brussels; CIV4, October 
25, 2010, Brussels; CIV6, November 4, 2010, Istanbul). The limitation of the role of the 
military in the political system, liberalising the economic system and increasing the 
respect for and protection of religious and minority rights in accordance with calls from 
the EU, has been crucial for getting on track with the EU accession process and for the 
economic, political and democratic stability, and the development of Turkey (Turkish EU 
chief Negotiator and EU Affairs Ministers Bagis, December 18, 2012; Eryilmaz, 2006; 
CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV6, November 4, 2010, Istanbul; CIV7, November 
3, 2010, Istanbul; CIV9, December 7, 2010, Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). In 
this regard, without the reward of being given a date for starting the EU accession 
negotiations, pro-EU actors and institutions would not have had an opportunity to defend 
the harmonisation reforms in a more legitimate and stronger manner. 
On the other hand, pro-EU actors and institutions know that without being on track for 
the EU accession process, EU adaptation pressure for the liberalisation of the political 
system would lose its impact and its momentum; and if this was the case, further 
limitation of the power of the army over the government, civil society and state policies 
would not be possible without democratisation and the benefit of EU technical and 
financial support (CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV7, November 3, 2010, Istanbul; 
CIV9, December 7, 2010, Ankara). They thus began propaganda both within Turkey and 
EU capitals in order to gain public support. They also needed the EUÕs technical and 
financial support, in order to make changes in TurkeyÕs political, economic and 
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legislative systems, so that they would gain power in political decision-making (CIV6, 
November 4, 2010, Istanbul; CIV7, November 3, 2010, Istanbul; CIV9, December 7, 
2010, Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). As such, the radical transformation of 
TurkeyÕs political, economic and legislative systems, and the respect for human rights 
was subsequently introduced through the harmonisation reforms (CIV4, October 25, 
2010, Brussels; CIV6, November 4, 2010, Istanbul; CIV7, November 3, 2010, Istanbul; 
CIV9, December 7, 2010, Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). As proposed by 
rational institutionalists (Brzel and Risse, 2003), the high quality and the pace of EU-
Turkey relations, the clearer EU accession process during the 1999-2004 period, 
especially during the 2002-2004 period and the cost/benefit calculation of rule 
compliance, in addition to the misfit gap, EU adaptation pressure and the empowerment 
of new actors and institutions, played a very significant role in the reorientation of the 
Turkish political system and its policies towards religious and minority affairs in 
accordance with EU calls.   
Although Turkey started accession negotiations with the EU in October 2005, as 
regularly noted by the Progress Reports on Turkey (see 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 
and 2012 EC Progress Report on Turkey), the reform process and TurkeyÕs effort to meet 
EU acquis are still not at the expected level. As noted by students of Turkish study 
(Eryilmaz, 2006, Aras 2009) and some of our interviewees (CIV4, October 25, 2010, 
Brussels; CIV7, November 3, 2010, Istanbul; CIV8, January 3, 2010, Ankara; CIV9, 
December 7, 2010, Ankara), the ambiguities and uncertainties in EUÐTurkey relations 
and in the negotiation process continue at an increased pace for several reasons: The 
debates within Europe about the future of TurkeyÕs full EU membership have continued. 
Examples include the political discourse of Sarkozy and Merkel in offering Turkey a 
Ôspecial statusÕ instead of Ôfull membershipÕ due to its different religion, history, cultural 
background and geographical location, and the decisions of some countries (e.g., France, 
Austria, the Netherlands) to hold a referendum for the final decision about TurkeyÕs full 
membership (CIV8, January 3, 2010, Anakara). The quality and pace of accession 
negotiations shows that TurkeyÕs accession to the EU is a Ôlong-termÕ process. The 
possibility of suspending the negotiations due to the open-ended nature of negotiations 
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and accession process.104  Although Turkey supported the Annan Plan in accordance with 
calls from the UN and EU, debate over the Cyprus issue and EU pressure on Turkey over 
Cyprus is ongoing.105  
As proposed by the theoretical framework of the study, it is expected that the credibility 
of the EU and its conditionality in EUising TurkeyÕs political, economic, and legislative 
systems would increase in the negotiation process in comparison to the pre-accession 
negotiation process.  As discussed by Bagis (December 18, 2012), Eryilmaz (2007) and 
some of our interviewees (CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV7, November 3, 2010, 
Istanbul; CIV8, December 3, 2010, Ankara), however, this did not become an issue due 
to the factors discussed earlier. These factors have negatively impacted the EUÕs 
conditionality and credibility by increasing suspicion about the future of EU-Turkey 
relations and the benefit of EU membership in Turkish society and the political 
environment, which undermines TurkeyÕs efforts of rule compliance (Bagis, December 
18, 2012; Eryilmaz, 2006; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV7, November 3, 2010, 
Istanbul; CIV8, December 3, 2010, Ankara).  
Although the reform process and TurkeyÕs effort to meet EU acquis are not at the 
expected level after the 2005, the reforms in the field of democracy, rule of law and 
economic realm are ongoing. As detailed above (see Sections 4.4.1; 4.4.2; 4.4.3; 4.4.4) 
and noted by the 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 EC progress reports on Turkey and many 
of our interviewees, in the post-2005 period very important reforms were undertaken 
related to respect for religious and minority rights, the judiciary, rule of law and the 
economic realm. That is, TurkeyÕs adaptation to the EU acquis in the fields that are 
subject to this study is ongoing in the post-2005 period. 
 Accordingly, as proposed by the historical institutionalist explanation of EUisation, the 
announcement of Turkey as an EU candidate in 1999, punctuated the equilibrium at the 
Turkish level and started it down the path of the liberalisation of institutions, institutional 
power relations, the civil-military relations, religious and minority rights, and economic 
                                                              
104 For details, see the 2004 Progression Report on Turkey and the Framework Document of Negotiations. 
105 As is currently the case due to the Cyprus dispute. Although Turkey has completed the criteria for 
opening negotiation chapters, due to CyprusÕs veto, eight chapters have not yet been opened. 
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institutions, rules and policies. It also determined the choice and power of agency and 
long-term development patterns in the fields examined. As argued above, increased 
adaptation to a chosen institution or policy increases the Ôrelative benefitsÕ of maintaining 
established institutions and policy structure. As such, due to the increasing returns of 
adaptation and the increasing costs of switching to an alternative, the institutions and 
policies in the examined field that were established in post-Helsinki period became 
'sticky' and they locked themselves in equilibrium for the post-2005 periods, although the 
ambiguities and uncertainties increased in EUÐTurkey relations in the post-2005 period. 
It is also important to note that a correlation existed between the degree of changes in 
TurkeyÕs polity, politics and policies in accordance with the EU calls and the quality and 
pace of TurkeyÕs relations with the EU. Whenever the quality and pace of EUÐTurkey 
relations have worsened, as seen in the post-Luxemburg period and after 2006, when 
Turkey was excluded from the EU enlargement process and the ambiguities and 
uncertainties in EUÐTurkey relations increased, Turkey has been reluctant and has acted 
slowly to make further changes in its polity, politics and policy in accordance with EU 
demands. Whenever the quality and pace of EU-Turkey relations advanced, as happened 
in 1996 when Turkey was guaranteed membership in the Customs Union, and during the 
1999-2004 period when Turkey was guaranteed candidate status and a date for starting 
accession negotiations, it accelerated the reform process to adapt to EU acquis. This 
illustrates the need for balance between EU conditionality and its rewards to make further 
changes in Turkey in accordance with the EU norms, which could be established by 
removing the ambiguities and uncertainties in EUÐTurkey relations and in the negotiation 
process by providing a time frame for TurkeyÕs ultimate goal of full membership.  
4.6. Conclusion 
This chapter investigated the liberalisation of TurkeyÕs authoritarian regime over the last 
decade and its influence on the countryÕs political, economic and social dynamics, as well 
as the role of the EU and its conditionality on the liberalisation of TurkeyÕs political 
system and in its changing political, economic and social dynamics. The ideas and 
information generated from the research data were categorised according to identified 
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key issues, concepts and themes, and the relationships between them were analysed using 
Europeanisation and the New Institutionalist theory (i.e., rational choice and its historical 
version). Consequently, the chapter focused on different concepts, such as the level of the 
misfit gap between the Turkish and EU levels in the field of democracy, the rule of law 
and the economic realm, and EU adaptation pressure (Europeanisation), the 
empowerment of new actors and institutions against the veto players and the cost/benefit 
calculation of rule compliance (rational institutionalism), critical junctures in EU-Turkey 
relations, punctuated equilibrium and path dependency (historical institutionalism). The 
triangulation and counterfactual scenario approaches were used to substantiate the 
validity of the findings and interpretation of the study. 
This research has revealed that, first, there was (and to some extent still is) a high-level 
misfit gap between Turkish and EU levels in terms of the independence of the judiciary, 
civilian control over the military, respect for and protection of human rights and the 
implementation of the rules of a market economy. Second, the critical juncture in EU-
Turkey relations in 1999 punctuated equilibrium at Turkish level and started it on the 
path of the liberalisation of TurkeyÕs authoritarian political regime. Third, through its 
conditionality, the EU placed high-level adaptation pressure on Turkey to fill the misfit 
gap between Turkey and the EU in the examined fields (see Accession Partnership 
Agreements between EU and Turkey, EUÕs Yearly Progression Reports on Turkey). 
Fourthly, as expected, the EUÕs high-level adaptation pressure on Turkey resulted in a 
significant change in TurkeyÕs polity, politics and policy in accordance with EU calls. 
Thus, EUisation in TurkeyÕs polity, politics and policy is to a large extent a vertical, Ôtop-
downÕ process. Fifthly, in addition to the EU adaptation pressure, the EUÕs technical and 
economic support, the quality and pace of EUÐTurkey relations, and both the logic of 
consequentiality and the logic of path dependency have played a role in TurkeyÕs 
adaptation to the EU acquis communautaire through harmonisation reforms, thereby 
leading to changes in TurkeyÕs political, economic and legislative system. Sixth, these 
changes at the Turkish level, generated by harmonisation reforms undertaken to fill the 
misfit gap between Turkey and EU resulted in changing the institutions, institutional 
structures and institutional power relations; the empowerment of the government and 
civil society against the militaryÐbureaucratic elites in political decision making; 
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increasing political and economic stability and growth; and the transformation of the 
religious and minority domestic affairs into the realm of normal politics, and increasing 
respect for and protection of religious and minority rights. The research also revealed that 
the empowered actors and institutions have played a very active role in TurkeyÕs 
adaptation to calls from the EU, thereby fuelling changes in TurkeyÕs political, economic 
and legislative system.  
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Chapter V 
Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy towards Iran and Syria 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy towards Iran and 
Syria during TurkeyÕs EU accession process and the role of the EU-fostered domestic 
changes identified above (Chapter IV). It explores Turkish foreign policy towards Iran 
and Syria before the TurkeyÕs EU accession process (t1) and then Turkish foreign policy 
towards them during the TurkeyÕs EU accession process (t2). Following identification of 
the changes in Turkish foreign policy towards these countries, it assesses the role of the 
EU-fostered domestic changes in the rising changes in Turkish foreign policy towards 
them. It evaluates how the identified EU-fostered domestic changes have contributed to 
the changing rules, ideas, interests, priorities and demands in the formulation of Turkish 
foreign policy, and thus the identified changes in Turkish foreign policy towards them. 
Accordingly it investigates whether andÑif soÑhow EU conditionality and adaptation 
pressure, aimed at the convergence and alignment of TurkeyÕs authoritarian political 
regime to the EU acquis communautaire, have produced unintended outcomes in 
TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards Iran and Syria in addition to the intended outcomes in 
TurkeyÕs domestic politics.  
5.2 Turkish foreign policy towards Iran before the 2000 
As argued in detail in Chapter IV, the founder elites of the Turkish republic, military-
bureaucratic elites, see two main domestic threats to territorial integrity and/or the 
political regime of the country, namely Islamic and minority/Kurdish affairs. Following 
the 1979 Islamic revolution in Tehran106 Turkey began to see Iran and its political regime 
as a threat to its Kemalist political regime, and the ideological confrontation between the 
two countries gradually increased. Turkey accused Iran (and Syria, related to Kurdish 
                                                              
106With the 1979 Islamic revolution the anti-western Sharia regime replaced the secular western-oriented 
Shah Regime in Tehran. 
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issue) of providing support to Islamic and Kurdish groups in Turkey, and followed a 
security-oriented disengagement foreign policy towards Iran (Aras, 2007; Tol, 2010; 
Olson, 2004; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels).  
As had been the case since the establishment of the Turkish Republic when Turgut OzalÕs 
Motherland Party came to power in 1983 and ran the country as a single party until 1991, 
the influence of military in the formulation and implementation of Turkish domestic and 
foreign policy continued to be strong (Aras, 2007; CIV11, January 4, 2011, Ankara; 
CIV4, October 25, 2010). As a single party government however, Ozal, to some extent, 
was able to formulate his own pragmatic foreign policy approaches (CIV4, October 25, 
2010, Brussels; CIV5, November 4, 2010, Brussels; Efegil and Stone, 2003). Despite 
strong opposition from the military-bureaucratic camp,107 Ozal visited Iran in 1984, and 
afterwards, cooperation between Turkey and Iran increased through border security and 
economic relations108. In this process (1984-1992), TurkeyÕs trade volume with Iran 
increased by about $1.5 billion109. After the death of Ozal, with increasing political and 
economic instability, the influence of the military-bureaucratic camp and their threat 
perception in the formulation and implementation of TFP further increased during the 
1990s. Thus, as will be detailed below, throughout the 1990s Turkey-Iran relations were 
further characterised by ideological confrontations and diplomatic crises due to the 
securitisation and externalisation of domestic affairs, which deeply damaged Turkey-Iran 
political and economic relations during the 1990s.   
When the ErbakanÕs Welfare Party (WP) came to power in 1996, it sought to reduce 
ideological confrontation between Turkey and Iran and improve TurkeyÕs political and 
                                                              
107General Kenan Evren, who was a leader of the 1980 coup and later President, comments on OzalÕs visit 
to Iran in 1984 and clarifies why Turkey had not engaged with its neighbours when the influence of the 
Turkish military increased in the formulation and implementation of TFP: ÒI have told Ozal, from time to 
time, that he should never trust Iran, Libya and Syria, and that the administration of these three countries 
did not view Turkey in a friendly way. But I could not convince him. He always sees the matter from a 
point of view of trade, and tries to establish friendship with Iran and Libya to an unnecessary extentÓ 
(Cetinsaya, 2003, p.128). 
108 To increase commercial relations, the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) was established in 
1985 between Iran, Turkey and Pakistan, and the newly established Turkish Republic joined in 1992. 
109 It is important to note that, as well as the adaptation of the Turkish economy to an export-oriented, 
liberal economic policy under the leadership of Ozal, and OzalÕs willingness to develop economic relations 
with Iran, IranÕs increasing dependence on Turkey for import and export routes due to its limited access to 
the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) also played an important role in TurkeyÕs increasing 
volume of trade with Iran in this process. 
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economic relations with Iran and the Islamic world as a whole. As such, Prime Minister 
Erbakan paid his first official visit to Iran, and later Pakistan, Malaysia and Indonesia. 
His attempts to develop political and economic relations with Iran and the Islamic world 
resulted in increasing economic and security cooperation between Iran and Turkey and 
the establishment of Developing-8 (D-8)110. Instead of strong opposition from the 
military-bureaucratic elites to fill TurkeyÕs increasing energy needs as a consequence of 
the closing of the Yumurtalik pipeline111, the Erbakan government signed a gas-
purchasing agreement with Iran in 1996 (Aykan, 1999b, p. 22-32). The Erbakan 
governmentÕs attempts resulted in increasing cooperation with Iran in TurkeyÕs fight 
against the PKK in 1996 112 , in addition to a deepening economic and political 
cooperation. Those positive developments in Turkey-Iran relations reveal that small 
changes in the dynamics of Turkish domestic politics, even in a short period, brought 
about a decrease in ideological and political tensions, in addition to rapprochement and a 
deepening of economic, political and security cooperation between Iran and Turkey.  
The hegemony enjoyed by the military-bureaucratic elites over domestic and foreign 
policy decision-making, however, deeply damaged prospects for the progressive 
development of political and economic relations between Turkey and Iran (Olsen, 1998; 
Aras, 2007; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). The 
military-bureaucratic elite were dissatisfied with ErbakanÕs attempts to develop TurkeyÕs 
political and economic relations not only with Iran but with the whole Islamic world. As 
such, they increased their pressure on the government by creating an agent113 to force the 
Erbakan government to resign by securitising and externalising Islamic and Kurdish 
affairs, and by accusing the Erbakan government of having a secret plan to establish an 
Islamic regime in Turkey and thus seeking to develop close political and economic 
                                                              
110 The D-8 was established in 1997 under the leadership of Turkey and Iran with eight developing Muslim 
countries to establish political and economic relations with the Middle East and Iran, and to increase the 
credibility and capability of Turkey in the region.   
111  The Yumurtalik Pipeline was closed to adapt to the UN embargo against Saddam HusseinÕs 
administration. 
112 Turkish security forces conducted more than 20 simultaneous anti-PKK operations in cooperation with 
Iranian security forces. In this process, Iranian security forces also handed over 35 PKK militants to the 
Turkish Republic. 
113 Well-known Turkish journalists Fatik Altayli and Mehmet Ali Birand confessed that they and other 
journalists and owners of media groups were briefed by the military elite to create an agent to force the 
Erbakan government to resign. 
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relations with Iran. For instance, when it was announced by the government that the 
Iranian President Rafsanjani would visit Turkey in December 1996, in response to 
ErbakanÕs Iran visit, traditional elites increased their accusations about IranÕs support for 
Islamic groups in Turkey and of the governmentÕs attempts to develop relations with a 
country that was seeking to export is regime to Turkey114. The ongoing ideological 
confrontation between the sides reached its peak with the ÔSincan AffairÕ115. As a result 
of increasing pressure on the government among traditional actors and institutions the 
Iranian ambassador to Ankara, Bagheri, was expelled. Iran responded by expelling the 
Turkish ambassador to Tehran, Osman Koruturk116. Finally the Erbakan-led government 
was compelled to resign by the Turkish Armed Forces who marched a convoy of tanks 
through the main street of Sincan on February 28, 1997 (For more information about the 
Sincan Affair and how it was used to further the securitisation of Islamic affairs by 
traditional elites, see Turkish Daily News, 6 February 1997, Hrriyet, 1,2,3,4 February 
1997, Milliyet, 2,3,4,5,6,7, February 1997). After the army-led ousting of Turkish PM 
Erbakan, the influence of the military-bureaucratic elites increased in Turkish politics. 
Nevertheless, as a result of Foreign Minister Ismail CemÕs constructive rhetoric and 
productive contact with the Iranian Foreign Minister Kharazi, both Tehran and Ankara 
reappointed ambassadors in the last quarter of 1997.  
                                                              
114 During his visit, Rafsanjani did not visit the mausoleum of Ataturk, the founder of Turkish Republic. 
This was turned into a Kemalist-anti-Kemalist ideological confrontation by traditional Turkish elites who 
accused the government of being anti-Kemalist, and of having secret agents to change the regime, thus 
seeking to develop relations with a country that does not respect the founder of the Turkish Republic. In 
this process Islamic and Kurdish affairs were further transferred out of normal politics and externalised, 
which negatively affected Turkey-Iran economic and political relations. 
115 In the Sincan Affair, a ÒJerusalem NightÓ was organised on January 31, 1997 by Bekir Yildiz, a member 
of ErbakanÕs Welfare Party and the mayor of Sincan, a suburb of Ankara. The Iranian ambassador to 
Ankara, Mohammad R. Bagheri, gave a speech that night in which he criticised the Kemalist political 
regimeÕs approach, and practices against Islamic affairs. The military, which was directly involved in this 
process, accused Iran of supporting political Islam, terrorism and trying to export its Islamic regime to 
Turkey. The military blamed the Erbakan government for not being sufficiently aggressive against Iran, 
causing a change in agenda in the country and resulting in an escalation of tension between Turkey and Iran 
that turned into a diplomatic crisis. 
116 General Cevik Bir, who played an active role in the securitisation and externalisation of the Sincan 
Affair, stated that it was seen in Sincan that Iran supported political Islam and terrorism in Turkey. Zara, 
the Iranian consul in Erzurum, criticised General BirÕs declaration; thus he was also expelled by Turkey in 
February 1997 and Iran responded by expelling the Turkish consul in the Iranian province of Urumiye, 
Ufuk Ozsancak (Olsen, 1998, p. 56-57; Cevik, 2003).  
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 The political agenda was further occupied by the securitisation and externalisation of 
domestic Islamic and Kurdish affairs which resulted in the continuance of tension and 
ideological combat, and the further deterioration of political and economic relations 
between Turkey and Iran. In this process the ideological confrontation between the two 
countries continued due to the externalisation and transformation of the headscarf affair - 
one of the major symbols of the power struggle between Islamists and Kemalists in 
Turkey - from politics through the ÔMerve Kavakci affairÕ117 and the ban on the wearing 
of headscarves in universities118. As a result of the headscarf affair, the media and 
traditional elites of both countries again engaged in ideological combat and decried each 
otherÕs political regimes. The creation and externalisation of the Hizbullah affairs,119and 
the accusations of the traditional elites that Iran supported illegal organisations 
committing assassinations in Turkey120 also caused an ideological confrontation and 
diplomatic crisis between Turkey and Iran during the 1990s (for details see Olsen, 2000, 
p. 880-81; Yilmaz, 1997, p. 96-97; Eralp, 1996, p. 106; Ely, 1997).  
In addition to Islamic affairs, the securitisation and externalisation of domestic Kurdish 
affairs by traditional actors and institutions also caused the escalation of tensions between 
Turkey and Iran in this process. The Turkish military as a main actor in the determination 
and implementation of domestic and foreign policies sought to solve the Kurdish issue 
through undemocratic methods. During the 1990s, tens of thousands of assassinations 
                                                              
117 Merve Kavakci, a headscarf-wearing member of the Virtue Party (VT) and a deputy of the Istanbul 
district, entered the Turkish parliamentary building for the MP swearing-in ceremony wearing a headscarf 
(turban)  in April 1999. Traditional elites perceived this as a threat to the Kemalist political regime. Under 
the leadership of Ecevit, some deputies roundly booed and compelled her to leave the parliament chamber. 
As a result, her parliamentary status and Turkish citizenship was taken away by a decision of EcevitÕs 
Council of Ministers. (After the closing of the WP by the Turkish Constitutional Court, the Virtue Party 
was established by some former members of the Welfare Party who were not banned from politics). 
118 As a result of the Turkish Constitutional CourtÕs ban on the wearing of headscarves in universities in 
1989, some Iranian groups organised protest meetings in Tehran to back the people who wear headscarves 
in universities in Turkey. Turkey accused Iran of intervening in its domestic affairs, and Iran responded in 
the same manner. Those reciprocal accusations resulted in the escalation of tensions between the two 
countries, which turned into diplomatic crises, and both Iran and Turkey recalled their ambassadors. 
119 Hizbullah is Òa Kurdish-led professedly Islamist organization that had been created by Turkish security 
and intelligence organizations to attack PKK leadership and assassinate its leaders, as well as other Kurdish 
nationalists, especially in the southeastÓ (Olsen, 2000, p. 381) 
120 It is important to note that whether or not, and why, Iran provided shelter, training or funding to the 
Islamic groups PKK and Hizbullah during the 1990s is not the subject of this study. For those arguments, 
see Pahlavan, 1996, p.71-91; zcan, 1999, p. 49-53; Pirim and rtl, 2000; Tekin, 1997, p. 65-69; Eralp 
and Tr, 1999, p. 69-102; Makovsky, 1999; Olson, 1995, 2000 and 2002. 
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were committed in the southeast of Turkey, and remained unsolved.  The Turkish armed 
forceÕs cross-border operations against PKK camps and militants, and TurkeyÕs 
accusation of IranÕs support for the PKK, was another main cause of the escalation of 
political tensions between Turkey and Iran (Olsen, 2000, 2002; Aras 2007; CIV4, 
October 25, 2010).  
5.2.1 Turkey-Iran economic relations during the 1990s 
Due to the war between Iran and Iraq, and OzalÕs pragmatic foreign policy approaches, 
economic relations between Turkey and Iran increased during the 1980s. TurkeyÕs 
exports to Iran were valued at $84 million in 1980, and they increased to $1,078 billion in 
1985, comprising 19 per cent of TurkeyÕs total exports. TurkeyÕs imports from Iran also 
increased, from $190 million in 1980, to $1.548 billion in 1984. However, in 1987 
TurkeyÕs exports to Iran declined to $440 million due to the cancellation of a barter trade 
agreement between Iran and Turkey that was signed in 1985 (Bolukbasi, 1989:99-101). 
During OzalÕs second term, from 1987 to 1992, TurkeyÕs exports to Iran were valued at 
$470 million. After the Ozal period, from 1992 to 1995, due to the negative impact of the 
further escalation of ideological confrontations and political tensions between Iran and 
Turkey, TurkeyÕs exports to Iran decreased to $265 million. From 1996 to 1997, Turkish 
exports to Iran increased to $300 million.  The increase in Turkey-Iran economic 
relations during the 1996 and 1997 was largely a result of the Erbakan governmentÕs 
engagement-oriented foreign policy approach towards Iran. ErbakanÕs visit to Iran 
reduced tensions between the two countries and resulted in the Turkey-Iranian 
commercial agreement and establishment of the D-8.  As argued above, however, 
traditional state institutions and actors were not satisfied with these developments, and 
further securitised and externalised Kurdish and Islamic affairs and compelled the 
Erbakan government to resign. The securitisation and externalisation of Kavakci, 
Hizbulah and Kurdish affairs in 1998 and 1999 resulted in a decline in TurkeyÕs 
economic relations with Iran. In 1998, TurkeyÕs exports to Iran again decreased to $195 
million from $307 million in 1997. As a result of ongoing political tensions and 
ideological confrontations between the two countries, it declined again to $158 million in 
1999Ñthe lowest level of TurkeyÕs exports to Iran during the 1980s and 1990s.  
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1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Turkish 
Exports 
85 1,079 495 487 455 289 249 
Turkish 
Imports 
1.265 1.265 492 90 365 667 692 
Trade Volume 1.350 2.344 987 577 820 956 941 
Years 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Turkish 
Exports 
268 297 307 194 157 236 360 
Turkish 
Imports 
689 806 646 433 636 816 840 
Trade Volume 957 1.103 953 627 793 1.052 1.200 
Source: State Institute Statistic of the Republic of Turkey. 
http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/Start.do    
5.2.2 Remarks on TurkeyÕs Iran policy before the EU accession process 
As seen above, the dominant role of the military-bureaucratic elites in the formulation 
and implementation of Turkish domestic and foreign policy through the 1990s had a 
direct impact on the ideology-and security-oriented TFP towards Iran. When the military-
bureaucratic elite power further increased in Turkish politics, the agenda in the country 
was occupied by Kurdish and Islamic affairs, and anti-Iranian and anti-Syrian propaganda 
spread because relations with Iran and Syria were considered to be part of those internal 
issues. The ideological confrontations, political tensions and diplomatic crises resulting 
from the Kavakci, assassinations, Hizbullah, Kurdish affairs, the PKK and bombings 
were, to a large extent, generated by the externalisation of domestic Islamic and Kurdish 
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affairs by traditional state actors and institutions. Such actors and institutions saw foreign 
policy as a function of internal politics; for them, Islam was a main domestic treat to the 
Kemalist political regime, and thus Iran under an Islamic regime was also a threat to the 
Kemalist political regime. The traditional Turkish elite threat perception, stemming from 
domestic Islamic affairs and the Iran Islamic regime, was completely imagined (CIV4, 
October 25, 2010, Brussels), because the secular tradition of Turkish society and sectoral 
differences between Turkish and Iranian societies would not allow this outcome in 
Turkey121.  
The escalation of ideological confrontations, political tensions and diplomatic crises 
stemming from the imagined threat perception of the traditional Turkish elite had further 
negative effects on Turkey-Iran economic relations. When tension between the two 
countries further escalated, trade volumes between two countries further declined in the 
1990s.  
5.3 Turkey-Iran relations throughout the TurkeyÕs EU accession process 
Since Turkey achieved EU candidature in 1999, security-oriented disengagement Turkish 
foreign policy towards Iran has undergone a deep transformation. TurkeyÕs new foreign 
policy towards Iran includes efforts to strengthen the bilateral relations and integrations, 
the liberalisation of trade and movement of people, promoting good governance and 
relying on soft-power instruments for the solution of problems with Iran and within the 
region.  
5.3.1 Strengthening bilateral relations and creating a stable neighbourhood 
Strengthening bilateral relations, relying on soft power instruments for the solution of 
bilateral problems and mediation for creating a more stable and secure neighbourhood 
have assumed a greater role in the new TFP towards Iran. In contrast to the traditional 
                                                              
121 ÒThe Iranian Islam revolution is a Shia movement; thus, it could not occur as a model for Sunni Turk 
interpretation of Islam. When we look at history, Turkish Islamic groups and political Islam have never 
risen against the Turkish political system, and they have always complied with the political system, because 
the Sunni interpretation of Islam has always found a way to mainstream their way of life within the Turkish 
political system. As such, the military elite ÒthreatÓ regarding political Islam during the 1980s and 1990s 
was a result of their wish to maintain their power within the Turkish political system and societyÓ (CIV10, 
January 10, 2011, Ankara).  
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actors and institutions, the AK Party government gave priority to the high-level official 
visits between Turkey and Iran to end the decades-long ideological confrontations and to 
improve trust and bilateral political and economic relations between the two countries122. 
In this regard, in his visit to Tehran on the 28th and 29th July 2004 Prime Minister 
Erdogan indicated that Turkey was willing to put aside the deep-rooted and enduring 
ideological confrontations of the 1990s, and insisted on increasing economic relations 
with Iran. As will be explained below, the high-level official visits undertaken between 
the two countries have contributed greatly to the improvement of trust, negotiation and 
bilateral political and economic relations. For instance, during AhmadinejadÕs official 
visit to Ankara in August 2008, five memorandums of understanding on cooperation in 
security, combating organised crime, the economy, and education were signed between 
the two countries.  
Mediation for the solution of issues through dialogue and creating a more stable and 
secure neighbourhood have also assumed a greater role in TFP towards Iran in the last 
decade. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, the father of the AK PartyÕs foreign 
policy approach, has argued that TurkeyÕs historical, cultural and geopolitical background 
requires the country to play an active role in its region. Thus, in the last decade, Turkey 
pursued a proactive and multidimensional foreign policy to make Turkey a main actor 
and an Òhonest-brokerÓ in its region. Under the guidance of Davutoglu, Turkey has 
maintained its close relations with the West and in contrast has developed close political 
and economic relations with the East, especially the Islamic world, in the last decade. As 
                                                              
122 For instance Prime Minister Erdogan visited Tehran in July 28-29, 2004.  Turkish Deputy Foreign 
Minister Ertugrul Apakan visited Tehran in June 2008, and Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki 
visited Ankara in July 2008 and to attend the Friends of Democratic Pakistan Conference in August 2009 
organised by Turkey to discuss stabilising Pakistan and to combat extremism in the region.  In early July 
2008 the Turkish Foreign Minister, Ali Babacan visited Tehran to discuss the Iranian nuclear programme 
and the possibility of further deepening bilateral ties. These visits were followed by Iranian President 
Mahmoud AhmedinejadÕs visit to Turkey in August 2008 at the invitation of TurkeyÕs new President 
Abdullah Gul. Turkish State Secretary Egemen Bagis, responsible for EU-Turkey relations, met with 
Iranian Ambassador to Ankara Bahman Hossinpour in 2010. Iranian Parliament speaker, Ali Larijani, 
visited Ankara to meet with the Turkish President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan in January 
2009 and, Gul attended the summit of the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) organised in Tehran 
in March 2009. Erdogan visited Tehran in October 2009, and Turkey and Iran declared 2009 the ÒIran-
Turkey Culture Year.Ó Since then the two countries began holding cultural relations conferences: for 
example, Marmara University and the Iranian Consulate in Istanbul arranged an Iran-Turkey Cultural 
Relations Conference (IRNA, January 19, 2009). 
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a candidate of the EU and a strategic partner of the United States, and having close 
relations with Iran, Turkey has taken an active role in promoting dialogue and diplomacy 
in solving the Iranian nuclear issue by carrying on shuttle diplomacy between Iran and 
the 5+1 initiative, namely the permanent members of UN Security Council and Germany.  
In this vein, in his visit to Ankara in May 2006, Ali Larijani, Secretary of the Supreme 
National Security Council, asked Turkey to play a mediating role between Iran and the 
West regarding the Iranian nuclear issue (Kohen 2006; Soylemez, 2006; Candar, 2006). 
On his visit to the United States on 6 July 2006, former Turkish Foreign Minister and 
current President Abdullah Gul discussed the issue with US Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice. During his meeting with Rice, based on observations from his 
previous journey to Iran, Gul suggested a release US pressure on Tehran to facilitate the 
adaptation to demand of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (Soylemez, 
2006). Turkey discussed the issue with Ali Larijani, head of nuclear diplomacy in Iran, 
and warned Tehran about the importance of the affair and the seriousness of the 
international community. Turkey warned Iran not to play for time which would cause 
unwanted consequences, as had happened in Iraq. Turkey also discussed the issue with 
Mohamed El Baradei, head of the IAEA and Javier Solana, the EUÕs foreign policy chief. 
With the success of GulÕs diplomacy, Solana visited Tehran to discuss the Iranian nuclear 
issue and its adaptation to the 5+1 report on the Iranian nuclear issue in June 2006 
(Candar, 2006). In the days following Ahmadinejad's visit, nine meetings were held at the 
ministerial level between Turkey and Iran to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue, bilateral 
relations and other issues in December 2008. 
As discussed by Davutoglu and Prime Minister Erdogan, Turkey wishes to avoid the 
existence of nuclear weapons in the region and is thus strongly against Iranian nuclear 
power, while arguing that any state should have the right to benefit from nuclear energy 
for civilian purposes. In May 2010 under the leadership of Turkey, the Tehran 
Declaration, which included the enrichment freeze and exchange of uranium, was signed 
between Iran, Turkey and Brazil but was ultimately failure123. Ankara supports dialogue 
                                                              
123EU foreign ministers first agreed a brief enrichment freeze deal with Iran in 2003. Sides then agreed Òthe 
export of part of Iran's stockpile of low-enriched uraniumÓ in 2009, but both deals failed.   
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and diplomacy instead of sanctions and isolation for solving the Iranian nuclear issue, and 
thus voted against the June 2010 UNSC additional sanctions on Iran (PM Erdogan, 
January 14, 2010). Turkey is maintaining its policy of using mediation for solving issues 
through dialogue and diplomacy. The Iranian and American ambassadors to Ankara met 
with Turkish Deputy PM, Bekir Bozdag, on August 15, 2011, and PM Erdogan visited 
Tehran on March 28, 2012, for discussion on IranÕs nuclear programme, the Syrian 
crackdown on anti-regime protests, and the PKK issue. On April 13, 2012, PM Erdogan 
also met with Saudi ArabiaÕs King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz al Saud for discussions on 
IranÕs nuclear program and the Syrian crackdown on anti-regime protests. After a fifteen 
month break, a new round of nuclear talks started in Istanbul on April 14, 2012, between 
Iran and P5+1 regarding TehranÕs nuclear programme. The two sides made progress in 
the area of exchanging enriched uranium with enriched foreign material, which was 
described as Òconstructive and usefulÓ by Catherine Ashton, the EUÕs foreign policy 
chief. The Turkish and Iranian foreign ministers met in Istanbul on October 2013 and 
agreed to work together to stop increasing sectarian conflict in the region, including in 
Syria. This is important since Iran, with Russia and China, supports the Shia Assad 
regime in Syria, while Turkey and the Western block supports the opposition movement 
Ðthe free Syrian army- in Syria. In this vein, PM Erdogan visited Tehran on January 28-
29, 2014 and a special trade agreement (free trade on chosen goods) was signed between 
two countries (for details of the agreement see Cakiroglu. 2014). As will be seen below, 
as a result of this agreement the volume of TurkeyÕs trade with Iran doubled in 2012. 
Iranian President Hassan Rohani also visited Turkey on June 9, 2014 for three days and 
met with Turkish president Gul and PM Erdogan, and at the end of the June (June 30, 
2014) Turkish PM Erdogan also visited Tehran with his Energy Minister and many 
businessmen. Rohani and Erdogan agreed to further develop the established political 
relations between the two countries and work together to stop extremism and bloodshed 
in the Middle East (Yeni Safak, July 1, 2014).  
5.3.2 Liberalisation of trade and movement of people 
The expansion of economic interdependency between Turkey and Iran, and the 
liberalisation of trade have become one of the main priorities of new TFP towards Iran. 
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Turkey has deepened its cooperation with Iran in supplying its own and EuropeÕs 
expeditiously mounting energy needs. In August 2007, the two countries concluded the 
draft of a deal creating a joint company to construct a pipeline designed as 3,500 
kilometres long to transport up to 40 billion cubic meters (1.4 trillion cubic feet) of 
Iranian natural gas annually to Europe. The two countries also decided on the building of 
three thermal power plants by Turkish companies in Iran. In this vein, in November 2008 
the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding related to gas and oil transit 
and joint energy investments to deliver Iranian gas and oil to Western Europe through 
Turkey and Italy. The two countries signed Ô$1.5 billion in agreements providing for the 
joint construction of three 2,000-megawatt thermal power plants - two in Iran and one in 
Turkey, and several hydroelectric plants in Iran with a total 10,000-megawatt capability. 
Under terms of the agreement, Ankara will import 3 billion to 6 billion kilowatt hours of 
electrical energy annuallyÕ (Gregor, 2008). 
The growth in the energy trade seems likely to continue. From March 2009 to May 2010, 
TurkeyÕs gas imports from Iran increased by 98 per cent (Menafn, May 3, 2010). In 
February 2010, the two countries announced that they would build a pipeline between 
TurkeyÕs northeast port city of Trabzon and the Iranian port city of Bandar Abbas (Fars 
News Agency, February 3, 2010), and a Turkish company signed an agreement with 
Tehran in July 2010 to construct a gas pipeline from Iran to Turkey that would deliver 
gas to Western Europe (Parkinson, 2010). As a result of this growing cooperation 
between the two countries,124 with 10 billion cubic meters of gas a year, Iran has become 
the second-largest gas supplier to Turkey after Russia (Blair & Kalantari, 2009) and 
following the EU, China, Japan and South Korea, Turkey became the 5th largest trading 
partner of Iran (BBC, June 2, 2009). As a result of TurkeyÕs increasing access to Iranian 
energy sources and markets, Turkey has increasingly become a regional economic power 
and an energy hub for Europe (CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels). 
Non-energy trade has also increased between Turkey and Iran in the last decade as an 
outcome of TurkeyÕs high-level economic growth and increasing need for new markets.  
                                                              
124A member of a civil society organisation noted that the increasing economic interdependence between 
the two countries in this new period has also made a considerable contribution to reducing mutual threat 
perceptions and solving problems between the two countries. 
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To increase bilateral trade between the two countries to $20 billion, they signed an 
agreement in March 2009.  According to Turkish and Iranian media reports, the cross-
border trade between the two countries also increased ten-fold in this process, climbing to 
$2.7 billion in 2009. Turkey has exported chemicals, steel, machinery and textiles to Iran 
and imported cathodes, polymers, propylene and consumer goods from Iran (Mehr News, 
January 6, 2010). This increase in cross-border trade makes Turkey the 6th largest trade 
partner of Iran in non-energy trade (Fars News Agency, May 18, 2010). 
In comparison with the 1990s, the border trade with Iran has increased considerably in 
recent years. Many business leaders from border cities such as Van, Hakkari, Urfa 
Diyarbakir have increasingly made investments in Iran, especially in Urmia and Tabriz 
(Yuzbasioglu, 2009; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV9, December 7, 2010, 
Ankara; CIV11, January 4, 2011, Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2010, Ankara). According 
to various reports on a lack of cooperation with Iranian companies, 38 Turkish firms 
made investments in and around Tabriz, the capital of the Iranian East Azerbaijan 
province (Yuzbasioglu, 2009). According to a trade delegation from Van, with the aid of 
newly-approved provincial legislation, economic cooperation between Van and Tabriz 
reached $200 million (Azarbayjan Provincial TV, July 10, 2009). Bilateral trade, largely 
through growing energy needs, between Turkey and Iran, jumped from 1 billion in 2000 
to $4.33 billion in 2005, $10.43 billion in 2008, and $14.5 billion in 2013, increasing 
more than four-fold since 2000,125 and it is expected to rise to $30 billion per year in the 
next five years.  
Beyond energy and cross-border trade, economic cooperation has also deepened between 
the two countries in this process; for example the central bank of Iran approved the 
establishment of a Turkish bank in the Iranian province of Bandar Abbas in February 
2010 (Mehr News Agency, February 28, 2010a). By taking into consideration economic 
society, it can be seen that the Turkish government has increased its political relations 
and asked Iran to open new border points for trade. In March 2010, Iran decided to open 
new border points for trade, including Bazergan, Khoy, Saro, and Maku (Parsine, 
February 9, 2010). The two countries also agreed on the creation of a joint industrial 
                                                              
125IMF, ÒData & Statistics,Ó available at www.imfstatistics.org/DOT/. Last access June 10, 2012. 
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town on the border of the two countries (Mehr News Agency, February 21, 2010b), and 
as a result of the end of ideological confrontation and increasing dialogue, diplomacy and 
economic relations, Turkey is today one of just twelve nations with which Iran has signed 
preferential and free trade agreements.126  
Table 7. External trade Turkey-Iran (2000-2013)  
Years 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Turkish Exports 360 334 534 813 913 
Turkish Import  840 921 1.861 1.962 3.469 
Trade Volume 1.200 1.255 2.395 2.775 4.382  
Years 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Turkish Exports 1.067 1.441 2.030 2.025 3.043 
Turkish Import  5.626 6.615 8.200 3.406 7.645 
Trade Volume 6.693  8.056 10.230 5.431 10.688 
Years 2011 2012 2013 - - 
Turkish Export 3.590 9.923 4.193 - - 
Turkish Import 12.462 11.965 10.393 - - 
Trade Volume 16.052 21.888 14.486 - - 
Source: State Institute Statistic of the Republic of Turkey. 
http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/Start.do 
                                                              
126 The other twelve countries with which Iran signed free trade agreements are Kyrgyzstan, Bosnia and 




All in all, TFP towards Iran has undergone a deep transformation during TurkeyÕs EU 
accession process. Until the beginning of the 2000s, Turkey had very problematic 
relations with Iran. Due to the internal threat perceptions of the military-bureaucratic 
elites rising from Islamic and Kurdish affairs, Turkey followed a security-oriented 
disengagement policy towards Iran. The externalisation and transformation of domestic 
Islamic and Kurdish affairs out of normal politics, which caused the diplomatic crisis 
between Turkey and Iran, made it difficult for the development of political and economic 
relations, and for the resolution of problems between two countries through dialogue and 
diplomacy. In the 2000s, however, TFP towards Iran has undergone a deep 
transformation. By moving away from the security-oriented disengagement policy, 
Turkey has developed unprecedented levels of cooperative relations with Iran in the 
political, economic, and social realms. The bilateral problems between Turkey and Iran 
were, to a large extent, solved through dialogue and diplomacy. Trade and the movement 
of people between the two countries have been liberalised, and the volume of trade and 
movement is at the highest level in its history. Turkey has also played an active role in 
the solution of the Iranian nuclear issue by mediating between Iran and the E3+3 
countries127.  
The following section will examine the transformation of TFP towards Syria in the EU 
accession process by comparing it in the 1990s and 2000s.  
5.4 Turkey-Syria relations before the EU accession process 
For decades, security concerns focused on the Hatay (Alexandretta)128, water access (the 
dispute over sharing the water of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers)129, and the PKK issue 
                                                              
127 The E3+3 countries are the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and the People's 
Republic of China.  
128 Until 2005, the legitimacy of the unification of Hatay with Turkey in 1939 was not accepted by Syria. 
Turkey annexed Hatay in 1939 with the acquiescence of France, which administered the province at that 
time, and the decision of the Hatay Assembly. After Syria became independent in 1948, it maintained a 
territorial claim over the province. It described Hatay as a territory stolen by force and included the 
province in its official map as a part of its territory (Muslih, 1996; CIV11, January 4, 2010, Ankara; CIV12, 
January 6, 2010, Ankara). Because of this, Turkey viewed Syria as a threat against its territorial integrity 
(CIV9, December 7, 2010; CIV11, January 4, 2011; Altunõsõk, 2004; Aydõn & Aras, 2005; Kirisci, 2006 
Trkmen, 2002). 
129 The water issue between Turkey and Syria, and also Turkey and Iraq, arose with the Southeast Anatolia 
Project (Guney Dogu Anadolu Projesi; GAP), which was expected by Turkey to end the downturn of the 
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(which, when linked with the water issue, was a central focus of TFP towards Syria). The 
water of the Euphrates River is the most important natural water source in Syria. GAP 
greatly increased Syrian (and Iraqi) concerns over the future quantity and quality of the 
flow of water downstream from the Euphrates and Tigris rivers into Syria. As such, 
beginning in the 1980s, Syria tried to increase the Kurdish conflict in Turkey in order to 
get Turkey to compromise over the supply of water (Sayari, 1997; Carkoglu & Eder, 
2001; CIV9 December 7, 2010, Ankara; CIV11, January 4, 2011, Ankara). It provided a 
safe haven for PKK militants and Abdullah Ocalan in order to exert pressure on Turkey 
over a water-sharing treaty for the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers. In 1983, Turkey 
openly declared its anger with Syria for supporting the PKK (Carkoglu & Eder, 2001, p. 
60). As such, TurkeyÕs domestic Kurdish issue Ògained an external dimension in the form 
of the PKKÓ and became one of the top issues in TurkeyÕs relations with Syria.130  
As argued before in the Iran case, despite resistance from the military-bureaucratic 
camp,131 Turgut Ozal, prime minister (1983Ð1991) and subsequent president (1991Ð
1993), supported Kurdish cultural rights and tried to cooperate with them. He established 
relations with Iraqi Kurdish leaders and tried to develop political and economic relations 
with Syria. As head of a single party government, he was able to make some changes in 
TurkeyÕs traditional foreign policy of disengagement towards Syria (Aydin, 2005; CIV4, 
October25, 2010, Brussels; CIV9, December 7, 2010, Ankara), as in the case of Iran132. 
During his visit to Damascus in 1987, a protocol on security133 was signed between 
Turkey and Syria. With this protocol, Turkey agreed to negotiate both the water and PKK 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Southeast Anatolia region. It included 21 dams for irrigating 1.6 million hectares of Turkish farmland in 
Southeast Anatolia and 19 hydroelectric stations on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. TurkeyÕs claim of full 
sovereignty on the Euphrates River, SyriaÕs most important natural resource, caused problems between 
Syria and Turkey. Syria argues that the river is an international river. 
130In this process, the PKK was supported not only by Syria, but also by Greece, Armenia and, to some 
extent, by Russia and Iran, to exert pressure against Turkey. Turkey tried to end aid to the PKK from its 
neighbours. As such, the domestic Kurdish issue and the PKK have become one of the top issues in 
TurkeyÕs relations with these states (Interview with CIV4, October25, 2010, Brussels; CIV9, December 7, 
2010, Ankara).  
131Traditional state institutions and actors refer to the foreign affairs bureaucracy, the military, Kemalist 
media, and elites. 
132 He visited Damascus in 1987 and started negotiations to solve the problems and improve political and 
economic relations between the two countries. 
133 According to the protocol, two countries agreed to Òobstruct groups engaged in destructive activities 
directed against one another on their own territory and [to] not turn a blind eye to them in any wayÓ (Pipes, 
2002) and that Turkey would release 500 cubic meters of water per second to Syria. 
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issues together, which the Turkish military-bureaucratic elites were strictly against. 
Turkey continued to restrict the flow of water into Syria. 134  In these negotiation 
processes, there were also some trade negotiations and economic relations between the 
sides, however, Syria continued its claims on the Hatay province and continued to host 
the PKK leader, Ocalan. The PKK continued attacking Turkey by entering from the 
Syrian side, and Turkey continued to restrict the flow of water into Syria.  
5.4.1 Turkey-Syria political relations during the 1990s 
After the death of Ozal in 1993, Turkey suffered political and economic crises. Ten 
different coalition governments were formed, and the hegemony enjoyed by the military-
bureaucratic camp over domestic and foreign policy decisions increased throughout the 
1990s (for details, see above, Section 5.3 and Chapter IV), which also deeply damaged 
prospects for the progressive development of political and economic relations between 
Turkey and Syria (CIV9, December 7, 2010, Ankara; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels). 
In this process the negotiations between Turkey and Syria over the water and PKK issues 
ended. The Turkish army increased its operation against the PKK within Turkey and 
abroad. The PKK increasingly continued to attack Turkey, entering from Syria and Iraq. 
As such, under the dominance of military-bureaucratic elites, Turkey increasingly 
maintained the externalisation of the Kurdish issue in the form of the PKK and followed 
a security-oriented disengagement foreign policy towards Syria in the 1990s. In this 
process, the exception was ErbakanÕs WP who tried to change TurkeyÕs traditional 
security-oriented disengagement foreign policy towards Syria and the Islamic world, and 
took a soft line against the Kurdish issue, the Islamic world, and Syria. Like Ozal, he 
contacted the Syria administration to engage in trade relations and to build good 
neighbourhood relations with Syria, and the entire Muslim world. However, as argued in 
                                                              
134PKK militants maintained their attacks against Turkey by entering from Syrian side. This was the other 
main reason for Turkey to continue to restrict the flow of water into Syria. In this process, the water issue 
was transformed into a Pan-Arab agenda by Syria. In 1992, the two countries made another agreement 
related to the PKK and the water issue. Turkey promised to allow the flow of enough water from the 
Euphrates River into Syria, and Syria recognised the PKK as a terrorist organisation and promised to halt 
PKK attacks on Turkey from its side. In practice, Syria did not stop the PKK militants from attacking 
Turkey from its territories, and thus Turkey continued the restriction of the water from the Euphrates River 
into Syria. In 1993, Syria again promised not to allow any terrorist activates in its territories against Turkey 
and Turkey promised not to cut the flow of the Euphrates into Syria, but like the previous agreements, this 
one also could not be put into practice (Sever, 2001; Olson, 2006, 1997; Kohen, 1998, 2005; Muslih, 1996). 
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Chapters IV and above in the Iran case, the military-bureaucratic elites viewed ErbakanÕs 
attempts to develop political and economic relations with Syria and the Muslim world as 
a threat to TurkeyÕs Kemalist political regime and territorial integrity. Thus, they further 
securitised and externalised the domestic Islamic and Kurdish affairs and increased their 
pressure on the Erbakan government, which resulted in ErbakanÕs downfall through a 
coup in 1997 (for details, see the above Iran case and Chapters IV). 
In this process, with the increasing influence of the military in Turkish politics, Turkey 
adopted a further tough stance against religious and minority affairs, and the countries 
that were thought to provide support to the Kurdish and Islamic groups in Turkey, such as 
Iran, the Kurdish administration in northern Iraq, Greece, Armenia, and Syria. The 
military further increased operations against the PKK, both within Turkey and abroad. 
The increase in PKK terrorist attacks and media coverage about the Kurdish affair 
resulted in an increase in Turkish nationalism and anti-Syrian and anti-Arabic 
propaganda in the country.135 In January 1996, the Turkish Foreign Ministry sent a 
memorandum to Syria, declaring that if Syria did not halt its support for the PKK, Turkey 
would use its Òright to respond with any measure it deems appropriate at an appropriate 
timeÓ (Altunõsõk, 2004, p. 222)136. Syria did not expel Ocalan and close the PKK camps 
in Beqaa Valley in Lebanon.137 The PKK continued to attack Turkey by entering on the 
Syrian side. This rising tension between the two countries resulted in Turkey freezing all 
political and economic relations with Damascus (Olsen, 1997, p.182; Mufti, 1998, p. 35). 
ÒThe military-bureaucratic camp increasingly began to single out as the main culprit in 
TurkeyÕs war against the PKKÉ and beganÉ gunboat diplomacyÓ (Altinisik & Tur, 
2006, p. 237; see also Aykan, 1999a, p. 177)138.  
                                                              
135As a consequence of increasing Turkish nationalism, for the first time, the marginal National Action 
Party gained an 18 per cent vote and became a coalition partner.  
136 Syria also accused Turkish intelligence of cooperating with Turkmens in an assassination attempt on 
Father Assad and of bombing offices that were considered to belong to the PKK. There were also border 
skirmishes between Ankara and Damascus during this process (Altinisik & Tur, 2006). 
137 Beqaa Valley was/is a Lebanon territory but at that time it was under the control of Syria.  
138 For instance, in early September 1998, Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz warned Syria that Òit would suffer 
severe consequences for its support of the PKK terrorists.Ó In mid-September, General Atilla Ates said, 
ÔÔBy supporting the bandit Apo [Abdullah Ocalan], they [the Syrians] have confronted us with the plague 
of terrorism. We have no patienceÕÕ (as quoted in Olson 2001, p.110). Top-ranking military-bureaucratic 
officials had threated Syria with the using of military force many times if it did not immediately expel 
Ocalan and halt the PKK from camping in Syria and attacking Turkey by entering from its territories. 
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On September 30, 1998, the National Security Council consequently decided to use 
military force against Syria if it did not immediately expel Ocalan and halt support for the 
PKK139. Turkey began to mobilise an additional 10,000 troops along the Turkey-Syrian 
border. Foreign Minister Ismail Cam tried oppose the threat of military force to Syria, but 
he could not overcome the pressure from the military (CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara; 
CIV4, October25, 2010, Brussels). A week later the Turkish government issued a final 
ultimatum to the Syrian government. Referring to Article 51 of the UN Charter, Turkey 
declared that it would use military force if Syria continued to host Ocalan and support the 
PKK (PM Yilmaz, October 14, 1998).140 Damascus initially refused to admit that Ocalan 
was in Damascus or that the PKK had camps in Syria or the Baqaa valley in Lebanon, 
however, Syria soon recognised TurkeyÕs seriousness about using military force; thus, the 
committee met at TurkeyÕs Adana province to negotiate the issue.141 Syria closed the 
PKK camps and ended the logistic support for the PKK. Within the framework of the 
Adana Agreement, the Joint Security Committee comprised of military officials from 
both Turkey and Syria met regularly to discuss border security between two countries. 
With this agreement, the political tension between the two countries was reduced. Until 
2000, however, it was not possible to talk about a real improvement in political and 
economic relations between two countries, although there was a decrease in tension and 
an increase in diplomatic visits at various levels between two countries. Starting with 
                                                              
139 With the announcement of this decision by Turkish Chief of the General Staff Huseyin Kivrikoglu on 
October 2, 1998, the crisis between Syria and Turkey reached its peak: ÒThe crisis is a situation of 
undeclared war between Turkey and Syria,ÕÕ Kõvrõkoglu stated; ÔÔThey [Syrians] have been giving support 
to terrorism since 1984. It looks as though our warnings did not succeedÕÕ (Cumhuriyet, 1998, translated by 
Ozdamar). 
140 See Prime Minister Mesut YõlmazÕs speech at the Turkish Grand National Assembly, October 14, 1998. 
141A day before the Adana agreement between Syria and Turkey ended SyriaÕs support for the PKK, 
President Demirel visited the Hatay province on October 19 and said that ÒTurkey was ready for war if 
Syria will not expel Ocalan.Ó Syria expelled Ocalan from Damascus, and the Adana agreement was signed 
on October 20, 1998. The reason Syria ended its support of the PKK and expelled Ocalan is not a subject of 
this study, but the general idea was that Syria was weak and helpless in light of a Turkish military 
intervention. However, in an interview with Bashar Assad conducted by well-known Turkish writers and 
journalist Mehmet Birand, Assad said that it was Ònot out of fear, but because we preferred you. We would 
either be friends with the Turkish people or prefer the Kurds and lose you. Because our preference was with 
you, we sent calan outÓ (Birand, 8 November 8, 2009).  
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Turkish President Ahmet Necdet SezerÕs attendance at Hafiz al-AssadÕs funeral 
ceremony in June 2000142, the relations between the two countries began to normalise143.  
The trade volume between the two countries was only $724 million in 2000 (Turkish 
Directorate of Foreign Trade), and both parties, especially people living on both sides of 
border, wanted to increase economic relations, especially border trade, between the two 
countries. ÒDuring this time, in Syria there was not only a willingness to increase trade as 
can be seen in Daily Tishreen that was writing about the opportunities of further 
economic relations with Turkey and talking about a potential of $4 billion trade volume 
(Radikal, 19 June 2002), but there also was an effort to leave the past behindÓ (Tur, 2010, 
p.3). The Turkish military-bureaucratic camp, however, stressed cooperation on security 
matters and viewed SyriaÕs relinquishing of its claim over the Hatay province and the 
maintaining of cooperation in border security with Turkey as prerequisites for the 
solution of the water issues and improvement of political and economic relations (Tur, 
2010, p.3; Altinisik and Tur, 2006, p. 239Ð242). As such, Turkey prepared a declaration 
of principles that Òincluded respect for the territorial integrity of each country as a 
prerequisite for the advancement of relationsÓ (Altinisik and Tur, 2006, p. 239). This 
meant that Syria had to give up its claim over Hatay. Damascus was reluctant to put the 
Hatay issue at the top of the agenda in its relations with Turkey, however, thus, it was 
reluctant to sign such a declaration. This delayed Syrian President AssadÕs expected visit 
to Turkey and the true improvement of relations between two countries (Tur, 2010, p. 3-
4; Altinisik and Tur, 2006, p. 239-242).  
5.4.2 Remarks on TurkeyÕs Syria policy before the 2000s 
The dominant role of the military-bureaucratic elites in the formulation and 
implementation of Turkish domestic and foreign policy through the 1990s and before also 
had a direct impact on TurkeyÕs traditional security-oriented disengagement foreign 
                                                              
142There was no consensus among the traditional state actors and institutions about whether Sezer should 
attend AssadÕs funeral or not. Finally he decided to attend the funeral, which contributed greatly to the 
opening of a new era in relations between the two countries.  
143 Three months after SezerÕs Damascus visit, Syrian Vice President Abd al-Halim Khaddam visited 
Turkey, and a security cooperation agreement was signed between the two countries.  
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policy towards Syria. They saw the Arab world in general, and Syria specifically, as 
untrustworthy and as a threat to the Kemalist political regime and territorial integrity of 
the state; thus, they were reluctant to develop any relations with, and to become involved 
in, the Islamic world. As seen above, the internal and external threat perceptions of the 
military-bureaucratic elite and the image of Arabs in their mind had a strong impact on 
the escalation of political tension between two countries, resulting from the Hatay, water, 
and PKK issues. They aimed to increase Turkish nationalism, limit Islamic influence in 
public life, and promote reluctance to be involved in relations with the Islamic world. 
This is why when the power of these traditional actors and institutions further increased 
in both Turkish domestic and foreign policy, anti-Kurdish, anti-Arabic, and anti-Syrian 
propaganda spread throughout the country. As seen above and also in the Iran case, this 
had negative effects on the foreign policies of these countries towards Turkey as well. 
That is, the disengagement and hard-line policy of the military-bureaucratic elite against 
neighbouring countries in general, and towards Syria and Iran specifically, had negative 
feedback effects on the foreign policy of neighbouring countries towards Turkey. For 
instance, Syria tried to exert pressure on Turkey to gain leverage over the water and 
Hatay issues by supporting the PKK. As such, TurkeyÕs disengagement foreign policy 
towards Syria prevented any constructive attempt to discuss the problems with Syria and 
any possibility of improving political, economic, and cultural relations with Syria and all 
regions (Aras & Koni, 2002).  
5.5 TurkeyÕs Syria policy during the EU accession process 
TurkeyÕs security-oriented disengagement policy towards Syria has also undergone a 
deep transformation throughout the 2000s, until the Syria administration started to use 
force against the anti-regime protesters in 2011. As in the case of Iran, TurkeyÕs new 
foreign policy practices towards Syria have included efforts to strengthen bilateral 
relations and integrations, increase the liberalisation of trade and movement of people, 
promote good governance, and rely on soft power instruments for the solution of 
problems with Syria and within the region.  
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5.5.1 Strengthening bilateral relations and solution of bilateral problems 
Strengthening bilateral relations and relying on soft power instruments for the solution of 
bilateral problems with Syria also assumed a greater role in the new TFP towards Syria. 
Instead of the traditional foreign policymakersÕ prerequisite of improving and 
maintaining security cooperation for the development of political and economic relations 
with Syria, the ruling AK Party government attempted to develop political and economic 
relations with Syria without any prerequisites. This led to the postponed visit of Syrian 
President Bashar Assad to Ankara in January 2004 (Altinisik and Tur, 20006; CIV9, 
January 4, 2011, Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). This visit, the first visit ever 
from Syria to Ankara at the presidential level, ended six decades of the Hatay problem 
between Turkey and Syria. With a declaration signed by Assad, Syria recognised 
TurkeyÕs current borders. This meant that Syria abandoned its claim over the Hatay 
province and accepted it as a part of Turkey. Syria changed its official maps, which used 
to show Hatay as part of Syria. As noted by some interviewees (CIV12, January 6, 2011, 
Ankara; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels), the AK Party governmentÕs constructive 
discourse and dialogue, and their diplomacy-oriented engagement foreign policy 
approach to Syria was very important in SyriaÕs historical decision. In addition to the 
solution of the Hatay issue, the cooperation between the two countries at the security, 
economic, and political levels were also intensely discussed during the visit. At a press 
conference, Assad announced that Syria had the same concerns as Turkey regarding the 
territorial integrity of Iraq and the rising autonomous Kurdish structure in Northern Iraq 
(Altinisik and Tur, 2006, p. 243; and see also Tur, 2010, p. 3Ð5). Referring to TurkeyÕs 
previous declaration, Assad stated that ÒA Kurdish state (in Northern Iraq) would violate 
our red line, tooÓ (CNN Turk, January 8, 2004). An institutional framework for economic 
relations between the two countries was established. As will be discussed further in this 
chapter, the trade volume between the two countries began to increase considerably. The 
two countries also decided to further increase cooperation in fighting against the PKK. 
Assad publicly condemned the PKK attacks against Turkey as Òa heinous terrorist act 
(Middle East News Agency, July 2, 2005) and promised to cooperate with Turkey in 
every respect in its fighting against the PKK. 
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In December 2004, that same year, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan paid a visit to 
Damascus. The cooperation on different levels between the two countries started with 
Bashar AssadÕs visit to Ankara and was further developed with this visit. A free trade 
agreement was signed, and economic delegations from both sides began to come together 
monthly to solve the problems in the area of border trade. During ErdoganÕs visit, the 
water issue was on the agenda again,144 and Turkey promised to allow the flow of enough 
water into Syria. During the press conference, Erdogan said that Syria could fulfil its 
increasing water needs from the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers (Hrriyet, 23 December 
2004). In this regard, the water issue was no longer a political or sovereignty issue.145 It 
was accepted as a technical issue, and it was agreed that officials from both sides would 
come together when it was needed to decide how much water Turkey should allow to 
flow into Syria in a Òwin-win approachÓ (Altinisik and Tur, 2006, p. 242). Erdogan also 
attended the Syrian-Turkish Business Council meeting in Damascus in April 2007 and 
met with Bashar Assad, and accompanied Sarkozy (During the French Presidency of the 
European Union) on his visit to Damascus to talk over the Middle East peace process in 
2008. Ahmet Davutoglu, ErdoganÕs chief adviser on foreign policy since 2002 and 
foreign minister since 2009, also visited Syria 45 times from 2002 to 2010, 
approximately once every two months. The other high-level visit to Damascus that 
contributed to the increasing political and economic cooperation between the two 
countries by increasing trust and solidarity was paid by Turkish President Ahmet Necdet 
Sezer in April 2005, when Syria was isolated internationally due to the assassination of 
former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Although no agreement was signed during 
this visit, it contributed to building solidarity and trust between the two countries 
(Altinisik and Tur, 2006, p. 242). That is, Turkey was, in contrast to the international 
community, in favour of developing dialogue and diplomacy instead of implementing an 
                                                              
144  After the Adana Agreement, the delegations consisted of water-related organisations from both 
countries, which met several times to discuss the water issue. These meetings resulted in a joint protocol 
that was signed in 2001. It Òcall[ed] for cooperation in training, study missions, technology exchange, and 
the conducting of joint projectsÓ (Altinisik and Tur, 2006, p. 242). With this protocol in place, the 
negotiation over the water issue between Turkey and Syria gained an Òintergovernmental network.Ó 
145 The traditional actors and institutions see the water issue as a political and sovereignty issue. In 
contrast to the traditional actors and institutions, the AK Party sees the water issue more as a technical 
issue rather than political and sovereignty issue. 
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isolation and sanction policy for the realisation of SyriaÕs withdrawal from Lebanon, as 
happened with IranÕs nuclear issue.  
5.5.2 Creation of a stable and secure neighbourhood 
The mediation for the solution of issues through dialogue and to create a more stable and 
secure neighbourhood has also assumed a greater role in TFP towards Syria in the last 
decade. As mentioned above, the other basic principle of the AK PartyÕs foreign policy 
approach is to pursue a proactive and multidimensional foreign policy to make Turkey a 
main actor and an Òhonest-brokerÓ in its region. As a consequence of its new dialogue 
and diplomacy-centric foreign policy towards Syria and Iran, its stance on the Palestine-
Israel conflict, and its position on the Iraq war, Turkey has become the only country in 
the region that has good relations with all sides of the conflicts in the region. This has 
enhanced TurkeyÕs trustworthiness and honesty, capability, and credibility in the region 
(Zaman, September 5, 2008; CIV11, January 4, 2011, Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, 
Ankara). As such, as a candidate of the European Union and a strategic partner of the 
United States, and having close relations with Syria, under the guidance of Davutoglu, 
Turkey took an active role in promoting dialogue and diplomacy in solving the Syria-
West, Syria-Israel, Arab-Israel, Syria-Lebanon, and Syria-Iraq problems by mediating 
and carrying out  diplomacy between sides. 
TurkeyÕs mediation in the peace talks between Israel and Syria, which took place from 
2006 to 2009, first entered the agenda during ErdoganÕs visit to Damascus in 2004 
(Birand, Posta, 8 November 2009). Later on, Israel Prime Minister Ehud Olmert 
requested that Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan start mediation with Syria, and the Syrian 
president Bashar Assad said that Syria would welcome Turkish mediation. In this vein, 
during ErdoganÕs visit to Damascus in 2004, Assad emphasised the importance of 
TurkeyÕs EU accession process for Syria and the region, and said that they were watching 
TurkeyÕs multidimensional foreign policy with admiration and were modelling their own 
policy on it. Assad stated that TurkeyÕs good relations with the European Union and all 
countries in the Middle East, including Israel, were attractive to Syria. This made Turkey 
a credible and capable actor in solving chronic problems in the region. As a result, Syria 
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and Israel negotiated indirectly for a year, which was made public in 2008. TurkeyÕs role 
as mediator led to new and positive outcomes such as IsraelÕs unofficial comments to 
President Erdogan about its readiness to withdraw from the Golan Heights, which had 
been captured by Israel in the 1967 Israel-Arab war (BBC News, 27 May 2008; CNN 
News, 27 May 2008; Milliyer Daily, 27 May 2008). Although TurkeyÕs close relations 
with Syria were initially criticised by the West, TurkeyÕs role in the indirect Syria-Israel 
talks and the 2007 and 2008 Lebanon political crises, which allowed the election of 
General Michel Suleiman as President of Lebanon and ended an 18 month political 
deadlock (BBC, 27 May 2008) was praised by both Western and Middle Eastern writers 
and politicians (see Simpson, May 22, 2008; Wall Street Journal, May 22, 2008; 
Associated Press, May 22, 2008). Turkey, Syria, France, and Qatar leaders gathered in 
Damascus (3-4 September, 2008) to assess the situations in Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, 
Darfur, and Israel-Syria via indirect talks. Nicolas Sarkozy, who joined the meeting as an 
EU term president, said that TurkeyÕs prime minister did good job as a mediator and that 
all of Europe was indebted to Turkey because of its role in the Middle East peace 
process. TurkeyÕs participation will be needed again when direct talks start between 
Israel and the Arabs. SyriaÕs President Assad also emphasised TurkeyÕs leadership role in 
this process. Negotiations were halted, however, after IsraelÕs Gaza operation in 2009. 
Until the beginning of the uprising in Syria and the international community and 
TurkeyÕs support of the change of the Asad regime in Syria, the Asad administration was 
willing to resume negotiations under the mediation of Turkey.  
Assad said, ÒWe have full trust in Turkey. Let me give you an example: even if we do not 
ask them, [Turkey] talks about us to Washington, gives our opinions. This is very 
important. Besides, the role it played in negotiations with Israel was very important. 
Because of this, relations came to a point where Turkey can talk for usÓ. He also states, 
ÒHowever Israel has been reluctant to start negotiationsÓ (Sabah, May 18, 2009).  
Turkey played a key role in SyriaÕs withdrawal from Lebanon in 2006 by taking an active 
mediation role between Syria and the West, and the Syria and Lebanon administrations. 
Turkey also played a mediator role in the rising political crises between Iraq and Syria 
after the bomb attacks in the Green Zone in Baghdad in August 2009. Baghdad accused 
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Syria of being behind the terrorist attacks and recalled its Damascus ambassador. Turkish 
Foreign Minister Davutoglu visited both Syria and Iraq and listened to both sidesÕ 
opinions about the developments. He offered mediation via Turkey to find a solution to 
the issue. He suggested the Bagdad administration, Òtells us every message you want to 
be communicated to Syria and give us all the evidence and information and we will pass 
it onto the Syrian sideÓ (Milliyet, September 1, 2009). In this process, the foreign 
ministers of Iraq and Syria met in Istanbul under the mediation of Davutoglu. In this 
meeting, Davutoglu also offered to create a tripartite border security mechanism for Iraq, 
Syria, and Turkey to fight against the PKK, Al Qaida, and BaÕathist forces in Iraq (Ugur, 
2009). As such, the political crises turned into security cooperation between sides as a 
result of TurkeyÕs active and constructive diplomacy. 146     
5.5.3 Promoting good governance and democracy 
Promoting good governance and democracy was also one of the characteristics of 
TurkeyÕs new foreign policy towards Syria. Since 2000, and especially during 2005 and 
2006, while the West was increasingly pushing the isolation and sanction policy against 
Syria, Turkey followed an engagement policy and developed its political and economic 
relations with Syria. At the same time, in parallel with the United States and the 
European Union, Turkey has encouraged the Assad administration to pursue democratic 
reforms in country since 2004. In ErdoganÕs visits to Damascus in 2004, 2007, and 2009 
and DavutogluÕs periodical visits, Turkey called on Assad to make democratic reforms 
for a smooth transition in Syria. For instance, with SyriaÕs increasing hard-line policy 
against the anti-regime protesters, Davutoglu visited Damascus in August 16, 2011. The 
purpose of the visit was to convey the concerns of TurkeyÕs president and prime minister 
along with the message that violence against the civilian population was unacceptable. 
Davutoglu called on the Syria administration to halt violence against civilians and to 
                                                              
146In addition, Turkey made several initiatives that played a crucial role in the prevention of crises in the 
region. For example, the formation of a Sunni coalition in 2005 by Sunni groups, the Tevafuk group, and 
their participation in the 2005 Iraq election, and Turkish initiation of Sunni Shia reconciliation in Iraq. 
Turkey also played an active role in solving the 2007 and 2008 Lebanon political crises; thus, Prime 
Minister Erdogan was invited to the presidential ceremony of Michel Suleyman. Davutoglu, the current 
foreign minister and previous chief adviser of Prime Minister Erdogan for foreign policy, was personally 
involved all these process. 
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make reforms in parallel with the publicÕs demands. The positive outcome of the visit 
was that Syria withdrew its military forces from Hama immediately and TurkeyÕs 
Damascus Ambassador went freely to Hama and observed the situation there. However, 
in the following days, SyriaÕs military continued to use force against the public and anti-
regime protesters. Davutoglu once more clearly warned Assad to immediately halt the 
military operations against the public and to make reforms in parallel with public 
demand. Syria did not keep its promises of reform or to halt the military operations 
against the public. Thus, after August 2011, in parallel with UN and EU decisions, 
Turkey began to implement sanctions against Syria to force the Assad administration to 
stop its use of force and to undertake democratic reforms. Until the last moment, Turkey 
tried help Syria in solving its problems with its own population, with neighbours such as 
Lebanon, Iraq, and Israel, and with the West, through dialogue and diplomacy, and 
increasingly engaging in diplomatic, political, and economic relations with Syria when it 
was isolated by the international community, by calling for the democratisation and 
liberalisation of the autocratic regime, and by carrying out negotiations. To find workable 
solution to the Syrian conflict Turkey has also gathered Syrian opposition groups in 
Istanbul many times in the past three years and taken an active role in the Geneva I and II 
peace conferences on Syria, talking about the issue with Iran, Russia and western 
countries including the USA, Germany, France, and the UK. Unfortunately no solution 
has been so far, possible and Turkey is one of the countries that is worst affected from 
on-going civil war in Syria. According to the Turkish government, as of August 2014, 
one and half million Syrian refugees were living in Turkey (for details see www. 
mfa.gov.tr.) 
Turkey has assumed the role promoting good governance and democracy not only in Iran 
and Syria but also elsewhere in its region, and globally. For instance, the Turkish 
International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA)147 has conducted many 
projects to educate women in the Balkans, the Middle East, and Central Asia about 
                                                              
147 The budget of the TIKA, which promotes good governance, provides development assistance, and 
develops projects and programmes to improve cooperation between Turkey and neighbouring and 
developing countries where Turkey has cultural and historical ties, has increased from 85 million Turkish 
Lira (TL) in 2002 to about 1 billion TL in 2010. 
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womenÕs rights, domestic violence, and illiteracy. 148  Turkey has also sought the 
expansion of political participation and good governance projects among the members of 
the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).149 These projects were included in the 
OICÕs Ten-Year Programme of Action in 2005 and its Chapter at the Dakar Summit in 
March 2008. Interaction between Turkey and neighbouring countries has increased as a 
natural consequence of a greater volume of trade and the reciprocal free-visas agreement. 
As such, many people, students, and civil society activists coming to Turkey from 
neighbouring countries have observed the democratisation of Turkey in the EU accession 
process. Turkish civil society organisations have joined forces with students and civil 
society activists coming to Turkey from neighbouring countries on environmental, 
cultural and educational projects.150  
There are similarities between TurkeyÕs authoritarian political regime and one-party 
regimes in the Arab world in terms of ideology and military control over civil politics. 
TurkeyÕs struggle with authoritarianism and military control over civilians and the 
liberalisation of political and economic systems in the EU accession process has been 
closely followed by many reformists in the Arab world (Kardas, 2012). As mentioned by 
Rashid Al-Ghannushi, the leader of the En-Nahda movement in Tunisia, and Tariq 
Ramadan, the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Turkey serves as a moderate 
and democratic model for the troubled Arab world (TodayÕs Zaman, January 25, 2012). 
According to the 2010 study conducted by TESEV, 61 per cent of Arabs see Turkey and 
its political system as a model (Akgun, 2010, p. 21-22).  
The leaders of Turkey, on the other hand, have been involved in the promotion of 
democracy in surrounding states. They supported revolutionist movements in the Arab 
world and called on unpopular Arab leaders to respect the will of the public and resign. 
All of these actions, and TurkeyÕs active foreign policy in regional affairs, have increased 
the popularity of Turkey and Turkish leaders, especially Prime Minister Erdogan, in the 
                                                              
148 For detailed information on TIKAÕs operational activities and areas of operation, see 
http://www.ecocci.com/DC/PDF/19.04.201017_34Presentation%20of%20TIKA.pdf, last accessed on 
March 9, 2012. 
149 This was especially the case after Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu was elected as the ninth Secretary General of 
Organisation of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in January 2005. 
150 Interview with members of NGOs in Ankara and Istanbul. 
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Arab world. According to the 2011 Arab Public Opinion Poll, Turkey has played the 
Òmost constructiveÓ role in the Arab Spring, and Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan is 
among the most admired world leaders.151 Furthermore, TRT has increasingly begun 
broadcasting in different languages (in 32 languages so far), and is followed closely in 
the Balkans, Central Asia, and the Middle East.152 As such, Turkey and the improvements 
in its social, political, and economic life in the EU accession process have had a 
democratising effect on the region (Kirisci, 2011, p. 32; CIV4, October 25, 2010, 
Brussels).  
5.5.4 Liberalisation of trade and movement of people 
Turkey has liberalised trade with Syria in this new period. The ruling AK Party 
government took into consideration its societyÕs request for the liberalisation of trade, 
especially the population located in TurkeyÕs border provinces, and during AssadÕs visit 
in 2004, they brought to the agenda the opening of a consulate and border centres along 
the Turkey-Syria border to facilitate border trading between the two countries (CIV9, 
December 7, 2010, Ankara; CIV11, January 4, 2011, Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, 
Ankara). As a result, a consulate was opened in Gaziantep and border centres were 
opened in provinces along the Turkey-Syrian border, such as Urfa, Aleppo, Gaziantep, 
Mardin, and Hatay. During ErdoganÕs visit to Damascus in 2004, the FTA was signed, 
and enacted in 2006. To solve the problems facing bilateral and border trade, Assad and 
Erdogan decided that monthly economic delegations from both countries would meet153 
(Altinisik and Tur, 2006, p. 242; CIV9, December 7, 2010, Ankara; CIV11, January 4, 
2011, Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). The increasing dialogue and diplomacy 
brought about the establishment of bilateral economic cooperation mechanisms between 
Turkey and Syria, such as the Joint Economic Commission, the Partnership Council, the 
Industry Follow-up Committee, the Business Council, and the Joint Commission for 
                                                              
151  Telhami et al. (2011), Ò2011 Arab Public Opinion Poll,Ó available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2011/1121_arab_public_opinion_telhami/1121_arab_p
ublic_opinion.pdf, last accessed on January 24, 2012.  
152 See the TRT website, available at http://www.trt.net.tr/Radyo/RadyoAna.aspx, last accessed on January 
24, 2012. 
153 The members of economic society in Ankara and Brussels stated that this decision was taken up on their 
request to Erodogan. This shows that economic society gained power in the EU accession process and 
played a role in the formulation and implementation of TFP.  
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Land Transportation. Legal frameworks, such as the Trade Agreement, the Protocol on 
Economic Cooperation, the Agreement on the Prevention of Double Taxation, the 
Agreement on Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investment, and the Free Trade 
Agreement, constitute the legal ground of Turkish-Syrian bilateral economic and 
commercial relations to facilitate economic cooperation between the two countries. A 
high-level Strategic Cooperation Council was established between the two countries in 
2009, and 47 agreements were signed in the fields of economy and trade on 22 August 
2009.154 As such, the trade volume between the two countries increased more than 
threefold in less than a decade, reaching US$2.272 billion in 2010, up from US$724 
million in 2000.155 In ErdoganÕs visit to Damascus in 2009, the target of trade volume 
between the two countries was set at US$5 billion for 2013. Erdogan said, ÒWe talked 
about this with my brother Otri. There is a political will for this. We will succeed in this, 
God willing.Ó (PM Erdogan, 23 December 2009). With the Free Trade Agreement, in 
addition to the jump in trade volume between the two countries, there was also a 
considerable increase in joint infrastructural projects and investments in Syria by Turkish 
businesses, especially in Aleppo (Chris, 2009). With US$260 million in investments, 
Turkish companies were ranked first as foreign investors with respect to the number of 
projects in Syria. 





2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Turkish 184 281 266 410 395 551 608 797 1.113 1.115 1.642 
                                                              
154Forty seven agreements were signed in the fields of economy and trade between Turkey and Iraq, on the 
same day. 
155Turkey exports electrical machines, mineral fuels, animal and vegetable oil, plastics, automotive and 
subsidiary industry products, iron and steel products, processed petroleum products, chemical products, 
cement, glass, ceramics, products of brick and tile industry, leather products, forest products, wheat, flour 
and margarine to Syria, and imports mineral fuels, cotton, oilseed and fruits, automotive and subsidiary 










729 744 773 824 752 823 795 1.174 1.752 1.442 2.272 
 
Source: State Institute Statistic of the Republic of Turkey. 
http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/Start.do 
Turkey has liberalised visa restrictions with Syria. Turkey and Syria share a border that is 
877km long, and due to the lack of dialogue, diplomacy, and political problems, this 
border has been covered with thousands of anti-person and anti-tank mines since 1956. 
Due to these anti-person and anti-tank mines and political problems, socially and 
economically similar cities, such as Antep, Mardin, Kamisli, Urfa, Hatay, and Aleppo, 
were divided for decades. Many people have relatives on just the other side of the border, 
and they could not visit each other.156 As a result of TurkeyÕs increasing rapprochement 
with Syria, Turkey decided to remove the mines along the border by 2014.157 The 
increasing rapprochement between Turkey and Syria also brought about the mutual 
abolition of visa restrictions between the two countries in 2009. With this change, and the 
removal of the land mines, the border cities that were historically, socially, and 
economically the same were reunited, which increased trade and the number of tourist 
traveling between the two countries. Until the starting of civil war in Syria people from 
Aleppo and other provinces of Syria began to come to Gaziantep, Urfa, for shopping and 
eating, and many people from Gaziantep and other cities began to go to Syria, which 
would have been unthinkable just ten years before (CIV9, December 7, 2010, Ankara; 
CIV11, January 4, 2011, Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). The latest data on the 
                                                              
156Regarding the lifting of visa restrictions, Foreign Minister Davutoglu said, ÒI would like to address the 
Syrian people. Turkey is your second country and Turkish people are waiting for you with open arms 
without a visa É We are lifting the borders which were artificially placed and becoming the people of one 
hinterland. We are turning the economic cooperation to an economic unity. We are hoping that this will be 
a model for all our neighbours.Ó 
157The removing of anti-person and anti-tank mines in Turkey-Syria border came into force in June 17, 
2009 (Official Journey, June 17, 2009). For details, also see http://yenisafak.com.tr/Politika/?i=192992. 
Last access on 20 August, 2011. 
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Turkish economy also shows how this has contributed to the regionÕs economy. 
Gaziantep is becoming one of the most important economic cities in Turkey.158 
 According to data from the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 406,935 Syrian 
tourists visited Turkey in 2008, up from 332,847 in 2007. With the abolition of visa 
restrictions in 2009, the number of Syrian tourists who visited Turkey reached 899,494 in 
2010, an increase of 91 per cent from 509,679 in 2009, and Syria ranked eighth among 
countries sending tourists to Turkey in 2010. According to data from the Ministry of 
Tourism of Syria, 562,932 Turkish tourists visited Syria in 2008, up from 485,953 in 
2007, and with the abolition of visa restrictions, the number reached 1,664,209 in 2010, 
more than double the 2009 total of 733,132, and Turkey ranked fifth in sending the most 
tourists to Syria.   
Table 9. Rate of Increase of Tourists 
 
Year Syrian Tourists Year Turkish Tourists 
2002 126.323 2002 467.648 
2008 406.935 2008 562.832 
2009 509.679 2009 733.132 
2010 899.494 2010 1.664.209 (including daily visits) 
  
Source: The Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism. 
http://www.kultur.gov.tr/EN,36567/tourism-statistics.html 
In summary, the six decades of problematic relations between Turkey and Syria climaxed 
towards the end of the 1990s, and the two countries almost went to war in October 1998 
with the action plan of TurkeyÕs National Security Council against Syria. However, in 
last decade, Turkey has transformed its traditional foreign policy towards Syria from 
security-oriented disengagement to political and economic-oriented engagement. The 




the expansion and liberalisation of trade and the movement of people, relying on the soft-
power instruments for solution of its problems with Syria and peace-making in the 
region. All these are clearly indicators of the deep transformation of TFP towards Syria 
during the countryÕs accession process to the EU. 
5.6 Role of the TurkeyÕs EU candidature in the transformation of TurkeyÕs 
Iran and Syria policy 
As discussed, Turkey had very problematic relations with Iran and Syria during the 1980s 
and 1990s. The internal and external threat perceptions of the military-bureaucratic elite, 
and the externalisation of domestic Kurdish and religious affairs was the main driving 
force behind TurkeyÕs problematic relations, and its security-oriented disengagement 
foreign policy towards Iran and Syria during the 1990s and before. However, as 
discussed above, Turkey has left its traditional security-oriented disengagement foreign 
policy towards these nations over the last decade, and adapted a foreign policy of 
dialogue-, political- and economic-oriented engagement. Turkey-Iran and Turkey-Syria 
(until the Assad regime began to use force against its own people) relations have 
experienced unprecedented levels of cooperation at the political and economic levels.  
This study investigates the influence of TurkeyÕs EU candidature on its foreign policy 
towards its non-EU neighbours. First of all, it is important to note that the examination of 
EU-Turkey relations reveal that the EU has not (specifically) asked Turkey to solve its 
problems with, and develop cooperative political and economic relations with, its non-EU 
neighbours in general, and Iran and Syria specifically (see 2001, 2003, 2008 Accession 
Partnership Document, EC Yearly Progression Reports on Turkey; EU summits (1997 
Helsinki, 1999 Luxemburg) presidency conclusions on Turkey). It is therefore not 
possible to talk about the role of the EU conditionality and adaptation pressure related to 
the transformation of Turkish foreign policy towards Iran and Syria. Accordingly, the 
following section explores whether Ð and if so, how Ð the EU-fostered domestic changes 
identified in Chapter IV (see Sections 4.4.1; 4.4.2 and 4.4.3) have played a role in this 
remarkable change in TFP towards Iran and Syria and the unprecedented level of political 
and economic cooperation between Turkey and these countries considering their 
disengagement and hostile relationship during the 1980s and 1990s. As such, we will 
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investigate how EUisation in one field (F1) has generated changes in another field (F2), 
the secondary domestic impact of the EU, which we called a Ôsecondary domestic 
EUisation mechanismÕ (for details see Chapter II, Section 2.4.3).  
5.6.1 Empowerment of new actors and transformation of TFP  
The rational institutionalist explanation of EUisation proposes that the reforms generated 
by EU adaptation pressure to fill the existing misfit gap between domestic and EU levels 
empower elected and civil actors at the domestic level by providing them with new 
opportunities, and constraining the power of old and autocratic state actors and 
institutions in the domestic political system. This changing balance of domestic power 
and empowerment for new actors and institutions has led to a process of political and 
social change in the associated states (Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999, p. 2-11; Brzel an Risse 
2003, p. 58; see also Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005), including in foreign policy 
(Torreblanca, 2001). As a result of the empowerment of new actors and institutions in the 
formulation of the foreign policies of associated states, they have tried to achieve their 
foreign policy objectives by using soft power instruments rather than hard power 
instruments (for details, see Chapter II, and Torreblanca, 2001). Accordingly, the 
following section will examine how and to what extent the empowerment of government 
and civil society against the military-bureaucratic camp in the formulation of TFP as a 
result of the political, economic, and societal EUisation of Turkey generated by the EU 
and its conditionality has played a role in the above unprecedented level of change in 
TFP towards Iran and Syria over the last decade.  
5.6.1.1 Empowerment of government and transformation of TFP  
As previously discussed, before the 2000s, under the dominance of the military-
bureaucratic elites, Turkey formulated its foreign policy by taking its security concerns 
into consideration. This made it impossible to talk about the solution of problems and the 
potential political and economic benefits of cooperation and relations with Iran, Syria, 
and other neighbouring countries (CIV 12, January 6, 2010, Ankara; CIV8, December 3, 
2010, Ankara). As argued in Chapter IV, however, in parallel with the rational 
institutionalist explanation of EUisation, the harmonisation reforms undertaken to fill the 
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existing misfit gap between the Turkish and EU levels have democratised TurkeyÕs 
authoritarian political system, changed the composition, function, and duties of NSC, and 
have empowered the government and NGOs in the Turkish political system, and in the 
formulation of TFP against former military-bureaucratic elites (CIV1, October 18, 2010, 
Brussels; CIV2, October 22, 2010, Brussels). The power and influence of the military-
bureaucratic camp as points of veto in the domestic and foreign policy-making process 
have been weakened, and thus the AK Party government and NGOs are able to take 
greater initiatives in domestic and foreign policy-making than has previously been the 
case (for details, see Chapter III). According to CIV11 (January 4, 2011, Ankara) Òthe 
control of civil authority over the military has increased as the civil and political elites 
began to take more and more initiative regarding the formulation and implementation of 
TFP.Ó As such, in contrast to the previous governments led by Ozal and Erbakan, the AK 
Party government was able to overcome the military-bureaucratic camp`s pressure and 
put into practice its own multidimensional foreign policy approaches towards Iran, Syria, 
and all of the Muslim world (CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara; CIV4, October 25, 2010, 
Brussels; CIV11, January 4, 2011, Ankara; CIV8, January 3, 2010, Ankara). 
ÒThe change in domestic power relations has played an important role in having more 
cooperative relations with other nations, especially those within the Islamic world. The 
AK Party is luckier than Ozal and Erbakan in being able to practice its own foreign 
policy approach, since the undertaken reforms have weakened the power of the military 
in the formulation of TFPÓ (CIV11, January 4, 2011, Ankara).  
ÒWe know that the EU adaptation reforms have played an important role in [the] justice 
system and civil-military relations. These reforms have empowered the AK Party 
government. It is obvious that if these reforms had not been undertaken, the AK party 
would not have been able to make such revolutionary changes in TurkeyÕs foreign policy, 
especially towards the Middle East.Ó (CIV8, January 3, 2010, Ankara). 
The empowerment of the government, and the high level economic growth generated by 
the harmonisation reforms (for details see Chapter IV, Section 4.4.3) has broadened the 
TFP approach to include economic and political dimensions rather than merely ideology 
and security dimensions. As proposed by the rational institutionalist explanation of 
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EUisation, the empowered ruling AK Party government has tried to achieve its foreign 
policy objectives in relation to Iran and Syria, and other neighbours, by using soft power 
instruments rather than hard power instruments. First, they adopted a dialogue- and 
engagement-oriented foreign policy towards Iran and Syria. This change in approach 
provided an opportunity for high-level official visits between Turkey and Iran and Turkey 
and Syria. These visits brought about an increased trust and dialogue between Turkey and 
these countries (CIV4, 25 October 2010, Brussels). As detailed above (see Sections 5.4.1 
and 5.5.1) during these visits, bilateral agreements on cooperation on economy, security, 
combating organised crime, and education were signed between the Turkey and these 
countries159. As such, the policy of strengthening bilateral relations and relying on soft 
power instruments for the solution of bilateral problems with Iran and Syria assumed by 
the ruling AK Party government resulted in the enhancement of political and economic 
relations and the solution of long-standing PKK, Islamic, Hatay, and water issues 
between Turkey and these countries. 
High level economic growth resulted in the increasing need for new markets and energy 
resources (CIV4, October 25, 2010; CIV11, January 4, 2011, Ankara). This guided the 
AK Party government to liberalise trade and the movement of people with TurkeyÕs 
neighbours in general, and with Iran and Syria in particular, by analysing the benefit of 
developing such relations. Rather, they believe that Òthe best way to solve foreign policy 
issues is to develop economic interdependency and create common interest between 
countriesÓ. Thus Òthe economy is one of the most important foreign policy instruments of 
DavutogluÕs (AK PartyÕs) foreign policy approachÓ (CIV11, January 4, 2011, Ankara).160 
In this regard, to increase the volume of trade and economic cooperation between Turkey 
and Iran and Turkey and Syria, the AK Party government has signed many economic 
agreements, including free trade agreements and free visa agreements, with Tehran and 
Damascus. As such, since 2000, economic cooperation has also strengthened between 
Turkey and these countries. The volume of trade between Turkey and Iran has increased 
ten-fold, and Iran has become the second-largest gas supplier to Turkey (Russia is the 
                                                              
159 For details see Sections Three and Four.   
160 See also many speeches of the members of  the AK Party government such as PM Erdogan, Former 
Foreign Trade Minister Tuzmen, Foreign Affair Minister Davutoglu and European Union Affair Bagis. 
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largest). The trade volume between Turkey and Syria reached $2.272 billion in 2010, 
from $724 million in 2000.161 The number of tourists moving between the two countries 
reached 1,662,209 in 2010, from 467,648 in 2002. Accordingly, in the absence of the 
empowerment of the government against the military-bureaucratic camp in political 
decision-making, increasing political and economic stability and growth, and the 
increasing needs for new markets and energy resources generated by the EU and its 
conditionality in the field of democracy, rule of law and the economic realm (for details, 
see Sections 4.4.1; 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 in Chapter IV), a cost/benefit analysis by the 
government for developing cooperative political and economic relations with Iran and 
Syria would not have occurred. Thus, the above changes in TFP towards Iran and Syria 
would not have occurred. 
The AK Party government ended the externalisation of domestic Kurdish and Islamic 
affairs in its relations with Iran and Syria. As detailed in Chapter IV (see Section 4.4.4 in 
Chapter IV) from the establishment of the Turkish Republic to the beginning of the 
2000s, under the dominance of the military-bureaucratic camp, Turkey saw the Kurdish 
and Islamic movements as the main threats to territorial integrity and the Kemalist 
political regime and sought to solve these issues using hard power instruments. As 
previously discussed (see Sections 5.2.1 and 5.4.1 above), for decades, the externalisation 
and transformation of domestic Kurdish and Islamic affairs out of normal politics caused 
an escalation of the tension between Turkey and Iran, and Turkey and Syria, which 
deeply damaged TurkeyÕs political and economic relations with these countries. The AK 
Party government comes from a non-Kemalist tradition162 that is against the formal state 
ideology and its religious and Kurdish policy and the externalisation of these domestic 
issues in its relations with Iran and Syria. They support the expansion of religious and 
cultural rights in parallel with calls from the EU. Thanks to harmonisation reforms, which 
have enlarged the scope of religious and cultural rights, the AK Party was able transfer 
                                                              
161Turkey exports electrical machines, mineral fuels, animal and vegetable oil, plastics, automotive and 
subsidiary industry products, iron and steel products, processed petroleum products, chemical products, 
cement, glass, ceramics, products of brick and tile industry, leather products, forest products, wheat, flour, 
and margarine to Syria and imports mineral fuels, cotton, oilseed and fruits, automotive and subsidiary 
industry products, paper and carton paper, vegetables, unprocessed animal hide, fertilizer, and wool from 
Syria.  
162Like Ozal and Erbakan, the main figures of the AK Party, such as Erdogan, Arinc, Gul, Davutoglu, 
Cicek, etc., come from a non-Kemalist background. 
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Kurdish and Islamic affairs into the realm of normal politics (CIV12, January 6, 2010, 
Ankara; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; Aras, 2007). Instead of the ideological and 
security-oriented coercive policy approach and discourse of the traditional elites, the 
ruling AK Party government has adopted a constructive dialogue and engagement 
approach towards Kurdish and Islamic issues and ended the externalisation of these 
domestic issues towards Iran and Syria (CIV12, January 6, 2010, Ankara; CIV4, October 
25, 2010, Brussels; Aras, 2007). This has provided an opportunity for Turkey, Iran and 
Syria to focus on market and energy concerns, instead of focusing solely on security 
concerns,  the solution of long-standing problems and the enhancement of political and 
economic cooperation between Turkey and these countries. 
The AK Party government has also played an active role in finding solutions for 
problems in its region. In contrast with the traditional Turkish foreign policy-makers, the 
ruling AK Party government believes that TurkeyÕs historical, cultural, and geopolitical 
background requires it to engage in close political and economic relations with the 
Muslim world (Davutoglu, 2001; CIV12, January 6, 2010, Ankara; CIV4, October 25, 
2010, Brussels; Aras, 2007). The AK PartyÕs ideology, which has brought about a 
dialogue- and engagement-oriented foreign policy towards Syria and Iran and all the 
countries and actors in the region, has enhanced TurkeyÕs trustworthiness, honesty, 
capability, and credibility in the region and has made Turkey an Òhonest brokerÓ in the 
eyes of all actors and countries in the region as well as globally (Zaman, September 5, 
2008; Davutoglu, 2001; CIV12, January 6, 2010, Ankara; CIV4, October 25, 2010, 
Brussels). Having good relations with all countries and actors in the region and with the 
European Union and the United States, has given Turkey an opportunity to play an active 
mediation role in finding a solution to the problems of Iran and Syria, alongside the other 
countries in the region, such as Israel, Iraq, and Lebanon, and the Western world 
(Davutoglu, 2001; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels). The AK Party has promoted good 
governance and democracy in the region, especially in its relations with Syria. On a 
regular basis, Erdogan and Davutoglu have asked Assad to make reforms for a smooth 
democratic transition in Syria (Davutoglu, March 29, 2012). 
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It is worth noting here that the changes in the TFP towards Iran and Syria have not been 
achieved the AK Party government alone. As argued in Chapter IV and noted by Dincer 
(2011), the AK Party is a product of the changing social political and economic dynamics 
of Turkey, generated by the EU and its conditionality. Turkey has developed a political 
and economically-oriented engagement policy, as will be seen below, not just because of 
the success of the AK Party government, but also because the NGOs and Turkish society 
have been driving forces behind TurkeyÕs new foreign policy approach, as put into 
practice by the AK party government. The transformation of TFP towards Iran and Syria 
is linked to TurkeyÕs on-going political, economic and social modernisation in the EU 
accession process. 
In this regard, as was the case from the establishment of the Republic till 2000, in the 
absence of the empowerment of the government against the military-bureaucratic camp in 
the political decision-making generated by the EU and its conditionality, the government 
would have continued to be under pressure from the military-bureaucratic camp. The 
power and influence of the military-bureaucratic camp would have continued as points of 
veto in the domestic and foreign policy-making process. Like the previous governments 
led by Ozal and Erbakan, the AK Party government would not have been able to 
overcome the military-bureaucratic camp`s pressure to put into practice its own 
multidimensional foreign policy approaches.  
Iran and Syria have continued to experience problematic relations with the countries in 
the region as well as with Western countries in the last decade, especially with the US, as 
was the case in the 1980s and 1990s. The Turkish military-bureaucratic elites see 
TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards the Middle East in general and towards Iran and Syria 
specifically as part of the TurkeyÐUS relations. The instability and clashes have also 
increasingly been maintained in the Middle East in the last decade. Considering these 
factors, in the absence of the empowerment of the ruling AK Party in foreign policy 
making in the EU accession process, under the dominance of the military-bureaucratic 
elites, Turkey would have continued to formulate its foreign policy by merely taking into 
account the security concerns of the military-bureaucratic elite arising from the clashes 
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and instability in the region and in IranÕs and SyriaÕs relations with the USA, as was the 
case in the 1980s and 1990s.  
On the other hand, as argued in previous chapter (see Section 4.4.4), under the dominance 
of the military-bureaucratic elites and their domestic threat perception the ruling AK 
Party government would not have been able to adopt a constructive dialogue and 
engagement approach towards Kurdish and Islamic issues and end the externalisation of 
these domestic issues towards Iran and Syria. As such, considering the PKKÕs increasing 
attacks in this period, as was the case in previous decades, the externalisation of these 
two domestic issues would have also continued to cause diplomatic crises and a 
worsening of political and economic relations between Turkey and its neighbours. Turkey 
would have continued to see Iran and Syria as a threat to its territorial integrity or 
political regime and thus would have maintained its  security-oriented disengagement 
foreign policy towards them in last decade, as was the case in previous decades.  
Accordingly, in the absence of the empowerment of the Government in political decision 
making by the EU conditionality and adaptation pressure in the EU accession process, 
under the dominance of the military-bureaucratic elites, as the previous governments, the 
ruling AK Party Government would have been unable to strengthen its bilateral relations, 
relying on soft power instruments to solve bilateral problems with Iran and Syria. Thus: 
a) the high-level official visits between Turkey and Iran, and between Turkey and Syria, 
which brought about increased trust and dialogue between Turkey and these countries, as 
well as bilateral agreements regarding cooperation on economy, security, combating 
organised crime, and education; and b) the enhancement of political and economic 
relations and the solution of long-standing PKK, Islamic, Hatay, and water issues 
between Turkey and these countries; c) the liberalisation of trade and movement of 
people and the expansion of economic interdependency between Turkey and these 
countries, would not have occurred. In the absence of a dialogue- and engagement-
oriented foreign policy towards Syria and Iran and all the countries and actors in the 
region, Turkey would not have become an Òhonest brokerÓ in the eyes of all actors and 
countries in the region or globally. Thus, Turkey would have been unable to play a 
mediating and peace-promoting role in its region.  
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Overall, in contrast to the military-bureaucratic elites, the AK Party government relied on 
soft power instruments for the solution to problems with Iran and Syria, strengthened 
bilateral political and economic relations, liberalised the trade and movement of people 
between Turkey and Syria, and Turkey and Iran, ended the securitisation and 
externalisation of domestic Kurdish and Islamic affairs, and began to play a peace-
promoting role in relations with Iran and Syria, and all neighbours in their region. As 
such, the AK Party government has become the main actor in the transformation of 
TurkeyÕs traditional security-oriented disengagement foreign policy towards Iran and 
Syria and the enhancement of political and economic cooperation between Turkey and 
these countries in the last decade (CIV12, January 6, 2010, Ankara). The democratisation 
of institutional power relations was generated by the EU and its conditionality; therefore, 
their role is significant with respect to the transformation of the TFP towards Iran and 
Syria, and all countries in the region, in the last decade.163 In other words, the reforms 
undertaken to fill the existing misfit gap between the Turkey and the EU have 
unintentionally become the main driving force in the transformation of the traditional 
security-oriented disengagement TFP towards Iran and Syria by empowering the 
government against traditional foreign policy-makers, the military-bureaucratic camp.  
5.6.1.2 Empowerment of civil society and transformation of TFP  
As detailed in Chapter IV, through the EUÕs technical and economic support, the 
redistribution of resources and power, and increasing economic stability and growth, 
NGOs and civil society have developed and gained power in Turkish society and politics 
(see Section 4.3.3 in Chapter IV). The democratised Turkish political system has also 
become more open to the influence of NGOs in the formulation of state policies, 
including foreign policy. As mentioned above, the study argues that two of the main 
reasons behind the transformation of TFP towards its neighbours are: (a) the 
empowerment of new actors and institutions, and (b) increasing political and economic 
stability and growth. In the previous section, we examined the role of the empowerment 
of the government in the transformation of TFP towards Iran and Syria. This section will 
                                                              
163 Almost all interviewees directly and (or) indirectly mentioned that. 
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examine the role of the empowerment of NGOs and increasing economic stability and 
growth in the unprecedented level of change in TFP towards Iran and Syria.  
Considering TurkeyÕs 90 per cent reliance on imports of energy, as mentioned above and 
argued in Chapter IV, the need for energy resources and a new market has increased 
tremendously over the last decade as a result of the high level of growth in the Turkish 
economy. The growth of Turkish economic society has also considerably increased their 
trade with Ð and investment164 in Ð Iran and Syria, and in the region at large. Thus, 
Turkey and its growing economic society have concrete interests in Iran and Syria that 
Òneed some adjustment from their governmentÓ (CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels see 
and DIP3, November 2, 2010, Brussels; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara; CIV9, 
December 12, 2010, Ankara; DIP7, January 7, 2011, Ankara). Iran and Syria are not 
democratic countries; thus, the relationships and solution of problems between states are 
vitally important for the interests of Turkish economic society in these countries (CIV8, 
December 3, 2010, Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara; CIV4, October 25, 2010, 
Brussels; CIV9, December 12, 2010, Ankara). ÒIn these countries (Syria and Syria), É 
the activities and rights of businessmen are not protected by the international community; 
thus if you [ran] into problems with these countriesÕ administrations, you [could] lose 
everything overnight.Ó (CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; see also CIV8, December 3, 
2010, Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara; DIP6, January 5, 2011, Ankara; DIP7, 
January 7, 2011, Ankara). Considering the benefits of developing economic relations 
with Iran and Syria, as noted by our above-mentioned interviewees, engaging in better 
relations with these countries is crucial to the interests of Turkey and its business 
community. The maintenance and increase of trade and economic interests has required 
some adjustment, such as the opening of new consulates, border centres, and gates from 
their administrations; the establishment of new commissions; and the signing of new 
agreements with these two countries. This could not have been accomplished without 
dialogue and close political relations (CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; DIP6, January 
5, 2011, Ankara; DIP7, January 7, 2011, Ankara), and finding a solution to bilateral 
                                                              
164 ÒTurkish businessmenÕs investments abroad amount to roughly 20 billion dollars.Ó (CIV9, December 7, 
2010, Ankara). 
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problems with these countries. The growing economic society forced the government to 
engage in better relations with these countries. 
 Thanks to Òharmonisation reforms,Ó the empowered business associations such as 
TOBB, MUSIAD, TUSIAD, TUSKON, etc., have considerably increased their trade 
with, and investment in, these countries, have prepared reports, and have pressured the 
government to develop a dialogue- and engagement-oriented foreign policy towards Iran 
and Syria for the solution of bilateral problems and liberalisation of trade and the 
movement of people between Turkey and these countries to maintain their concrete 
economic interest (CIV8, December 3, 2010, Ankara; CIV4 October 25, 2010, Brussels; 
CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara).  
In this process, the AK Party came to power with the support of the growing Anatolian 
middle class, which is why it wants to respond to the demands of this group, including 
the development of good relations and the liberalisation of trade and movement of people 
with neighbouring countries, including Iran and Syria. Thanks to the harmonisation 
reforms, in contrast to the previous governments, the AK Party was able to respond to the 
demands of NGOs in the formulation of foreign policy by moving beyond the perceptions 
of threat held by the traditional elite, and by developing close political relations with Iran 
and Syria (with Syria until the UN and EU began to implement sanction due to its 
massacre against its own people) (CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV12, January 6, 
2011, Ankara). This also provided an opportunity for the Turkish business community to 
directly describe their problems to the administrations of these countries, and to proffer 
reports about what should be done to increase economic cooperation with Syria and other 
Arabic countries (CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara; DIP6, January 5, 2011, Ankara; 
DIP7, January 7, 2011, Ankara). In parallel with the suggestions of the community 
commissions, councils, and committees were established and agreements were signed by 
all sides165. During their visits to Iran and Syria, the president, prime minister, and 
                                                              
165 For instance, when the Syrian president Bashar Assad came to Turkey in 2004, he visited TOBB and 
made this statement: ÒIf you bring your problems to our attention when you are doing business in Syria or 
with Syrians, we can solve themÓ (CIV9, December 7, 2010; Ankara; see as well as CIV12, January 6, 
2011, Ankara). As a result, TOBB prepared a report by forming other economic associations which 
included problems and solutions. In parallel with this report, the Joint Economic Commission, Partnership 
Council, Industry Follow-up Committee, Business Council, and Joint Commission for Land Transportation 
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ministers were accompanied by hundreds of members of NGOs including businessmen 
(CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara).166 During these visits, Turkish civil society engaged 
with both Turkish, Iranian, and Syrian officials to discuss the solution of problems and 
the enhancement of business and political relations (DIP6, January 5, 2011, Ankara; 
DIP7, January 7, 2011, Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). Such interaction 
between Turkish civil society and foreign policy-makers brought about new 
agreements167.  
In addition to these, the members of government and the foreign ministry came together 
with the members of NGOs on different platforms to discuss TurkeyÕs problems, and they 
listened to their offers of, and plans for, solutions to issues, and how to increase political 
and economic cooperation with neighbouring countries, including Syria and Iran168. In 
these meetings, the Foreign Ministry informed the stakeholders of its work and policies, 
and Foreign Ministry officials listened to their concerns, noted their demands, and 
reported matters immediately to Ankara. Ankara thus shaped its foreign policy towards 
Iran and Syria in accordance with these demands (DIP7, January 7, 2011, Ankara; 
CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). As a consequence of these events, the problems facing 
border and bilateral trade have been solved by Ankara through dialogue with Tehran and 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
were established. In the following years (2005 to 2007), Damascus allowed 35 Turkish investment projects 
in Syria with a total worth of US$160 million (CIV9, December 7, 2010, Ankara; see also Taspinar, 2008, 
p. 28). 
166ÒThe President, Prime Minister and ministers are acting much like the owners of a big company, and 
they visit other countries with businessman.Ó (CIV10, December 10, 2010, Ankara).  
167 For instance, when Foreign Minister Davutoglu visited Syria in 2009, he invited members of some 
think-tanks and economic associations to accompany him. They met with Bashar Assad over dinner, during 
which Esad and Davutoglu listened to their views of how economic and political cooperation could be 
encouraged between the two countries. As such, TUSKON and TOBB have proffered reports about what 
should be done to increase economic cooperation with Syria and other Arabic countries (CIV12, January 6, 
2011, Ankara). In parallel with these reports, a high-level Strategic Cooperation Council was established. 
The Protocol on Economic Cooperation, the Agreement on the Prevention of Double Taxation, and the 
Agreement on Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investment were signed. The Close Neighbours 
Economic and Trade Association Council with Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria were also established in June 
2010 to establish a free trade area within 5 years (DIP8, January 7, 2011, Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, 
Ankara; CIV9, December 7, 2010, Ankara). 
168 For instance, the Foreign Ministry also organized conferences and visited the cities of Urfa, Gaziantep, 
Hatay, Maras, Van, Agri, Hakkari, and Igdir, which are located on the Turkey-Syria and Turkey-Iran 
borders, as border trade is very important to the economy of Turkey and these cities (DIP7, January 7, 
2011, Ankara; Davutoglu, 2011; Bagis 2010, 2011). During these visits, Foreign Ministry officials met with 
the local business leaders, media representatives, members of universities, and individuals from civil and 
economic societies in these cities. 
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Damascus in accordance with demands and reports of NGOs (DIP7, January 7, 2011, 
Ankara)169.  
Turkish schools and human rights organisations such as the Deniz Feneri Association, the 
Kimse Yokmu Association, and the Insani Yardim Association are very active in Syria 
and Iran and throughout the region in the fight against poverty, illiteracy, and violence. 
The TIKA,170 has also promoted good governance, provided development assistance, and 
developed projects and programmes to improve cooperation between Turkey and Iran 
and Turkey and Syria171. They also contributed the ending of anti-Iranian and anti-Syrian 
propaganda within Turkey by bringing about the pluralisation of free debate in the 
country (CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). As such, they are also becoming a channel for 
the fusion of people and political and economic cooperation between Turkey and these 
countries by changing the image of Turkey in the eyes of people in the region, and the 
image of Iran and Syria in the eyes of the Turkish people. As mentioned above, NGOs 
provide support to many people inside Syria (for details see the web pages of TIKA and 
Insani Yardim Association). All these and TurkeyÕs active foreign policy in regional 
affairs have increased TurkeyÕs popularity in the region, and Turkey has become a 
ÒmodelÓ for on-going transition in the region (see the 2010 and 2011 Arab Public 
Opinion Poll; Shibley Telhami, et al. 2011). As such, Turkey and the empowered NGOs 
have played an active role in promoting peace and democracy, and in the fight against 
poverty, illiteracy, and violence in in these countries, and the region.  
Accordingly, the empowerment of NGOs in the EU accession process has also become 
one of the driving forces behind TurkeyÕs engagement-oriented foreign policy towards 
Iran and Syria, the solution of long-standing problems and the liberalisation of trade and 
movement of people between Turkey and these countries, and TurkeyÕs peace-promoting 
role in the regions (CIV8, December 3, 2010, Ankara; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; 
                                                              
169 For instance, new consulates, border centres and gates were opened in Turkey-Syria and Turkey-Iran 
border provinces to facilitate border trades between Turkey and these countries (for details see above 
section four and six). As such, the government has helped the civil society by giving it credit for 
influencing the foreign policy, and civil society pushes the government to develop political and economic 
relations with Iran and Syria.  
170 Its budget has increased from 85 million Turkish Lira (TL) in 2002 to about 1 billion TL in 2010. 
171 For detailed information about the operational activities and areas of operation of TIKA, see 
http://www.ecocci.com/DC/PDF/19.04.201017_34Presentation%20of%20TIKA.pdf, last accessed on 
March 9, 2012. 
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CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). The liberalisation and democratisation of TurkeyÕs 
authoritarian political regime, due to the EU accession process, in addition to change at 
the government level, has also provided new opportunities for NGOs in allowing them to 
take an active role in the formulation of TFP (for details, see Chapter IV).  
In this regard, as detailed in Sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 in Chapter IV, in the absence of the 
EUÕs technical and economic support and harmonisation reforms undertaken to adapt to 
EU acquice communiteria, a) TurkeyÕs authoritarian political regime would not have 
liberalised; (b) the restrictions on the private sector, and NGOs would have continued, 
and thus c) the Turkish economy, the private sector, NGOs and civil society would not 
have grown, developed, and gained power in political decision-making. Instead, Turkish 
economic society would not have increased their trade with and investment in Iran and 
Syria, or in the region. In the absence of the benefit of developing economic relations 
with Iran and Syria, engaging in better relations with these countries would not have been 
crucial for Turkey and its business community. They would thus not have prepared 
reports or pressured the government to develop a dialogue- and engagement-oriented 
foreign policy for the solution of bilateral problems and liberalisation of trade and the 
movement of people between Turkey and these nations. Even if they had prepared reports 
and pressured the government to develop a dialogue- and engagement-oriented foreign 
policy towards them, under the pressure of military-bureaucratic camp, like the previous 
government led by Ozal and Erbakan, the ruling AK Party government would not have 
been able to respond to NGO requests, even if they wanted to. Thus, the opening of new 
consulates, border centres, and gates, the establishment of new commissions and 
councils, and the signing of new agreements with these two countries would not have 
occurred. In the absence of these adjustments and the signing of agreements with Iran and 
Syria, it would not have been possible to discuss increasing trade, or the free movement 
of goods and people, at least in such a manner. 
Accordingly, although the EUÕs technical and economic support and its conditionality in 
the fields of democracy, rule of law and the economic realm do not aim to alter TFP 
towards these countries, they unintentionally played an important role in the 
transformation of TurkeyÕs traditional security-oriented disengagement foreign policy 
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towards them by bringing about economic stability and growth, empowering NGOs and 
civil society, and making the Turkish political system more open to their influence. 
5.6.2 Increasing respect for and protection of religious and minority rights 
and transformation of TFP 
As previously discussed (see Sections 5.2.1; 5.2.2; 5.4.1; 5.4.1 in this chapter), the 
transferral of domestic Kurdish and religious affairs out of the realm normal politics and 
their externalisation had caused an escalation of ideological confrontations, political 
tension, and diplomatic crises between Turkey and Iran, and between Turkey and Syria 
during the 1990s and earlier. It caused the worsening of economic relations between 
Turkey and these nations for decades. As detailed in Section 4.4.4 in Chapter IV, 
religious and minority rights have been broadened through harmonisation reforms 
undertaken to adapt to EU acquice communiteria in the EU accession process (see 
Section 4.4.4). Domestic Kurdish and religious affairs have thus been transferred into the 
realm of normal politics. The ability to settle Islamic and Kurdish affairs at home has 
ended the cyclical confrontations between Turkey and Iran, and Turkey and Syria (Aras, 
2007; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels). Kurdish and 
Islamic affairs have not re-emerged as issues and are no longer a threat to relations with 
Iran and Syria and other neighbours. In contrast to the 1990s, there have not been any 
threats from the military to Turkey-Iran and Turkey-Syria relations in this new period. 
Political tension and diplomatic crises between Turkey and Iran stemming from the 
externalisation of those domestic issues are now in the past. This has not only provided a 
conducive atmosphere for solving issues with Iran and Syria, but also with Kurdish 
administrations in Northern Iraq, and to developing cooperative political and economic 
relations (CIV8, December 3, 2010, Ankara; CIV11, January 04, 2011, Ankara; CIV9, 
December 7, 2010, Ankara; CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara).  
In this regard, in the absence of EU conditionality and adaptation pressure in the field of 
democracy, rule of law and in civilian control over the militaryÑwhich, as previously 
argued, resulted in the empowerment of the government, NGOs and civil society in 
political decision makingÑand with respect for, and the protection of religious and 
minority rights, the transformation of domestic religious and minority affairs into the 
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realm of normal politics would not have occurred. Domestic religious and minority 
affairs would have continued to cause political and economic crises and a worsening of 
political and economic stability and growth at home as well as ideological confrontations, 
political tension, and diplomatic crises between Turkey and Iran, and Turkey and Syria, 
as was the case in the 1980s and 1990s.  As such, the EU and its conditionality in the 
field of democracy, rule of law and in civilian control over the military has also played a 
key role in the transformation of TFP towards Iran and Syria by increasing respect for, 
and the protection of, religious and minority rights, and transferring domestic Kurdish 
and religious affairs into the realm of normal politics, enabling Turkish society and 
policy-makers to deal with and end the externalisation of these domestic issues.  
5.6.3 The military as a veto player 
As argued and delineated in Sections 4.3.1; 4.3.2 and 4.4.4 in Chapter IV the Turkish 
military, founder of the Turkish Republic, considers itself the owner and guardian of the 
state and its political system (Kemalist political system) and territorial unity (see Sections 
4.3.1; 4.3.2).  In addition to its dominant role in, and sensitivity to, domestic politics, the 
military was also sensitive to foreign policy. As argued, until the first half of the 2000s, 
the Turkish army was the main actor not only in the formulation of Turkish domestic 
policies, but also Turkish foreign policy. For decades, the militaryÕs high perception of 
threat that emerged based on the perceived safety of Kemalist political regime and the 
west, south coast, and eastern boarders of country and territorial unity was one of the 
main driving forces behind TurkeyÕs security-oriented disengagement foreign policy 
towards neighbouring countries and the Islamic world.  
Concerning its ideology and security concerns arising from the Kurdish and Islamic 
affairs and security of east borders, the Turkish army cannot be expected to have a 
positive attitude towards the AK Party's new political and economic-oriented engagement 
foreign policy towards Muslim world in general, and towards Iran and Syria in specific. 
The army and the bureaucratic elite are against the development of close political and 
economic relations with both the Islamic world and Iran and Syria, which have been 
considered threats to Kemalist political regime and/or territorial integrity of state. Indeed, 
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the Turkish armyÕs sceptical attitude towards the Islamic world and Iran and Syria has 
ideological and historical roots. First, the Army sees Muslim world in general and Iran 
specifically as a threat to its political regime.  Second, due to the growth of Arab 
nationalism in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire and the alliance of the Arabs with 
the Allied forces against the Ottoman Empire in World War I, the military-bureaucratic 
elites who founded the Republic accused Arabs of Ôstabbing Turks in the backÕ in World 
War I, which fed into TurkeyÕs anti-Arabic sentiment172 (Aras and Koni, 2005, p. 50). In 
addition to their security concerns regarding the safety of the Kemalist regime and the 
image of Arabs in their mind, the military-bureaucratic elites have reservations regarding 
TurkeyÕs new engagement-oriented foreign policy towards Iran and Syria due to the 
perceived threat from the Hatay, and Islamic and Kurdish (PKK) affairs. At least we 
know that the generals, such as the Secretary General of the NSC General Tuncer Kilinc; 
General Aytac Yalman, the Commander of the Land Forces; General Cumhur Asparagus, 
the Commander of Air Force; General Sener Eruygur, the Commander of the 
Gendarmarie; General Cetin Dogan, the Commander of the First Army who has a strong 
mistrust of AK Party government, have serious concerns about the governmentÕs foreign 
policy towards the Islamic world (Heper, 2005; CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; 
CIV12, January 6, 2011, Ankara). They believe that developing close political relations 
with the Muslim world in general and Iran and Syria in specific is not serving TurkeyÕs 
security and international profile, interests, and identity (CIV12, January 6, 2011, 
Ankara). These elites believe that the development of close political relations with Iran 
and Syria would weaken TurkeyÕs ability to counter political Islam and the PKK, damage 
TurkeyÕs international identity, destroy close relations with western world, and harm the 
strategic partnership with the USA. Accordingly, in principle, they are against the 
development of close political relations with the Muslim world in general, and with Iran 
and Syria in particular.  
                                                              
172After independence, the images of Arabs in the minds of traditional Turkish state actors and institutions 
found their place in history and schoolbooks, TV documentaries and programmes, and the discourse of 
traditional state actors and institutions. The image of Arabs in the military-bureaucratic elites of the 
Turkish Republic, was one of the driving forces behind TurkeyÕs anti-Arabic sentiment and its traditional 
disengagement foreign policy toward Syria and the Arab world (CIV4, October 25, 2010, Brussels; CIV8, 
December 3, 2010, Ankara). 
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Specifically, concerning the development of political and economic relations with Syria, 
the Turkish military had reservations173; Syria should relinquish its claim over the Hatay 
and should cooperate in border security with Turkey (Altinisik and Tur, 2006, p. 239Ð
242; Tur, 2010, p. 3). It is argued that for this reason, Syria cut its support to the PKK and 
expelled Ocalan in 1998, and until the first years of 2000s, there were no real 
improvement in political and economic relations between Turkey and Syria. Concerning 
the development of political and economic relations with Iran, the military also had 
reservations, claiming Iran should cooperate with Turkey in border security and in the 
fight with political Islam and the PKK (Cetinsaya, 2003; Olsen, 2002; Tol, 2010). The 
military has forwarded their reservations regarding the development of political and 
economic relations with Iran and Syria to the government in NSC.  
Thanks to harmonisation reforms, however, the composition, function, and duties of the 
NSC were changed, thus the government does not need to prioritise the militaryÕs 
viewpoints in the formulation of domestic and foreign policy. In contrast to previous 
decades, the government was able to consider the voice of NGOs and civil society, and 
implement a foreign policy towards Iran and Syria in parallel with its own foreign policy 
approach and interests, which are considerably different from those of the military. In this 
regard, as argued in previous sections, in the absence of EU conditionality and adaptation 
pressure in the field of democracy, rule of law and in civilian control over the military, 
the function, duties and composition of NSC would not have changed and government 
and civil society would not have gained power in foreign policy making. Thus, as was the 
case during the 1980s and 1990s, the threat perception of the military-bureaucratic elite 
would have continued to determine TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards Iran and Syria. 
Accordingly, it would not have become possible to talk about political and economic 
oriented engagement foreign policy towards them, and thus the development of political 
and economic relations with Turkey. 
                                                              
173In the second half of the 2000s, especially after 2008, thanks to harmonisation reforms, the military did 
not declare its opinion regarding the development of political and economic relations with Syria and Iran. 
Thus, we do not know whether the military still has the reservations mentioned above regarding the 
development of political and economic relations with Iran and Syria. However, we know that the 
government does not need to, and does not prioritise, its reservations in the formulation of its foreign policy 
in general and toward Iran and Syria specifically.    
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5.7 Conclusion  
This chapter analysed the transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy towards Iran and 
Syria throughout TurkeyÕs accession process to the EU and the influence of the EU-
fostered domestic changes. In accordance with the research questions and hypothesis, it 
sought to respond to the question of whether has there been a change in TurkeyÕs foreign 
policy towards Iran and Syria since Turkey achieved candidate status in 1999. If so, in 
what direction has TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards them changed during the countryÕs 
EU candidature? How has the EU-fostered domestic changes played a role in the rising 
changes in TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards them? The ideas and information generated 
in the study data were categorised according to identified key issues, concepts and 
themes, and analysed with the analytical toolkits of the theoretical framework, rational 
and historical institutionalism. Thus, the focus was on different concepts, such as the 
empowerment of new actors and institutions against the veto players and the cost/benefit 
calculation of policy change (rational institutionalism), and unintended consequences of 
the EUisation of TurkeyÕs political system (historical institutionalism). Triangulation and 
counterfactual scenario approaches were employed to ensure the validity of the findings 
so that the study represents fair and accurate accounts of the collected data.  
The research revealed that, first, before TurkeyÕs accession process to the EU: (a) Turkey 
followed a security-oriented disengagement foreign policy towards Iran and Syria; (b) 
relations with Iran and Syria were considered part of domestic Kurdish and Islamic 
affairs as well as Turkey-US relations; (c) the externalisation of the domestic Kurdish and 
Islamic affairs by the military-bureaucratic camp caused ideological confrontation, 
political tension, and diplomatic crises between Turkey and Iran and between Turkey and 
Syria, thereby leading to the worsening of political and economic relations between 
Turkey and these states throughout the 1990s and before. TurkeyÕs foreign policy 
towards Iran and Syria has undergone a deep transformation throughout TurkeyÕs EU 
accession process, from security-oriented disengagement to political and economic-
oriented engagement. TurkeyÕs new foreign policy towards Iran and Syria has included 
efforts to strengthen bilateral relations, the reliance on soft-power instruments for 
solutions to problems, the liberalisation of trade and movement of people, and the 
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promotion of peace and good governance. EU conditionality and adaptation pressure in 
the fields of democracy and the rule of law, and in the economic realm, has 
unintentionally had a very visible influence on Turkish foreign policy towards Iran and 
Syria by: (a) changing the institutions, institutional structures and institutional power 
relations, (b) empowering the government and civil society against the militaryÐ
bureaucratic elites in political decision making, (c) accomplishing political and economic 
stability and growth, (d) increasing respect for and protection of religious and minority 
rights, and transferring domestic religious and minority issues into the realm of normal 
politics, and thus (e) changing the institutions, interests, preferences and demands that are 
involved in foreign policy-making. As such, through bringing about the changes 
identified above at a Turkish level. EU conditionality and adaptation pressure for the 
convergence and alignment of TurkeyÕs authoritarian political regime to the EU acquis 
communautaire have produced unintended outcomes in TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards 
Iran and Syria, in addition to the intended outcomes in TurkeyÕs domestic politics. 
Consequently, the cases of Iran and Syria served to answer the research questions, to test 
the hypothesis of the study, and to substantiate the validity of the findings and 
interpretation of the study through allowing us: a) to demonstrate the changes in Turkish 
foreign policy during the EU accession process, b) to shed light on the reasons for and/or 
causes of changes in Turkish foreign policy, and c) to maximise confidence in the 





The aim of this study was to examine the influence of TurkeyÕs EU candidature on its 
foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours. It has argued that the influence of the EU 
on TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours during TurkeyÕs EU accession 
process is, to a large extent, a secondary consequence of the EU conditionality and 
adaptation pressure for the convergence and alignment of TurkeyÕs authoritarian political 
regime to the EU acquis communautaria. The primary objective of EU conditions and 
adaptation pressure in the fields of democracy, the rule of law and the economic realm 
was not to change TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours; however 
unintentionally they have caused changes in the rules, ideas, interests, priorities and 
demands that are involved in foreign policy-making towards TurkeyÕs non-EU 
neighbours through liberalising TurkeyÕs authoritarian political regime. In other words, 
EU condition and adaptation pressure in the fields of democracy, the rule of law and the 
economic realm have had an unintended impact on TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards its 
non-EU neighbours in addition to the intended impact on TurkeyÕs domestic politics.  
The focus of this study was the liberalisation of TurkeyÕs authoritarian political regime 
through the harmonisation reforms undertaken to adapt to the EU acquis communautaire 
and the consequent influence on TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours. 
The study examined, first, the changes in the Turkish political system: to what extent it 
has adapted to EU acquis and the role of EU condition and adaptation pressure in this 
process. Next it examined the changes in TFP towards selected non-EU neighbours 
during the countryÕs EU accession process, including the direction of change. Finally it 
analysed the influence of the EU-fostered domestic changes generated by the EU on TFP 
towards selected TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours.  
This study used the concept of ÔEuropeanisationÕ to characterise the overall effects of 
changes to TurkeyÕs domestic and foreign policy generated by its EU candidature; the 
rational choice and historical versions of the new institutionalist theory have provided the 
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theoretical framework for this analysis. Semi-structured interviews, case studies, 
academic journals and documentary analysis were the main methods used to collect and 
analyse the data needed to address the research question and test the hypotheses on which 
this research was based. The findings and the interpretation proposed have been validated 
by triangulation and the creation of counterfactual scenarios. 
6.2 Europeanisation and new institutionalism 
The ideas and information generated in the study were analysed using the explanatory 
instruments of Europeanisation and the rational choice and historical versions of the new 
institutionalist theory (see Sections 1.3 in Chapter I; 2.4 and 2.6 in Chapter II and 3.3.5 in 
Chapter III). To this end various concepts have been used to account for the influence of 
the EU on the transformation of TurkeyÕs domestic politics and foreign policy towards 
selected neighbours during the EU accession process, including the misfit gap; EU 
adaptation pressure (Europeanisation); path dependency; critical junctures in EU-Turkey 
relations and their unintended consequences (historical institutionalism); the 
empowerment of new actors and institutions against the veto players and the cost-benefit 
calculation of rule compliance (rational institutionalism).  
There is a direct relationship between the misfit gap between Turkish and EU regulations 
and practices regarding democracy, the rule of law and the economy, EU adaptation 
pressure, the peace and quality of EU-Turkish relations and ongoing changes in Turkey in 
these fields (for details see Sections 4.4; 4.4.1; 4.4.2; 4.4.3; 4.4.4 and 4.5 in Chapter IV). 
To analyse the influence of the EU on changes in TurkeyÕs domestic politics, therefore, 
the concepts of the misfit gap, EU adaptation pressure, path dependency, critical 
junctures, punctuated equilibrium, empowerment of new actors and cost-benefit 
calculation of Turkish actors in compliance with EU directives were used. The lack of 
EU conditions and adaptation pressure related to TFP towards selected TurkeyÕs non-EU 
neighbours and hence the lack of a direct relationship between the quality and peace of 
EU-Turkey relations, critical junctures in Turkey and EU relations, a cost-benefit 
calculation in rule compliance and the ongoing changes in TFP towards TurkeyÕs non-EU 
neighbours meant, however that these concepts could not be used to analyse the role of 
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the EU in the transformation of TFP towards the selected cases. As previously argued 
(see Sections 1.3 in Chapters I and 2.6.2 in Chapter II), the low intensity of EUÐTurkey 
relations and the significant differences between Turkish and European identities and 
political cultures also meant that the explanatory instruments of socialisation, 
experimental learning and political change provided in SI theory were not helpful in 
accounting for the EUÕs role in the transformation of TurkeyÕs political system and its 
foreign policy towards its non-EU neighbours during its EU candidature. From this its 
follows that the analytical frameworks developed to account for the EUÕs influence in the 
domestic sphere, through embedding Europeanisation with the rational and sociological 
versions of new institutionalist theory (for details see Section 2.6.2 in Chapter II) do not 
provide an analytical framework which can account for the influence of the EU on TFP 
towards TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours. 
The issue is not however that noted by Brzel and Risse (2000: p.4), Ôwhether Europe 
matters, but how it matters, to what degree, in what direction, at what pace, and at what 
point of timeÕ. Different states and regions, as well as different policy fields, require the 
use of a different analytical logic because of the disparate natures of different institutions, 
identities, traditions, policies, states and regions (Schimmelfennig, 2010: p.10). Various 
scholars (Brzel, 2003, 2007, 2009, 2012; Checkel, 2001; Heritier et al., 1996; Knill and 
Lehmkuhl, 1999; Knill and Lenschow, 1998; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2010; 
Lehmkuhl, 1999; March and Olsen, 1995; Schneider, 2001; Sedelmeier 2011, 2012; 
Wong, 2007; Wong and Hill, 2011) have analysed the domestic impact of the EU focus 
on various variables (for details see Section, 2.4 in Chapter II). 
The important question in the context of this study was how to assess the influence of the 
EU on TFP towards its non-EU neighbours. Examination of Turkey-EU relations and the 
transformation of TFP towards its non-EU neighbours revealed the existence of close 
relationship between EU adaptation pressure in the fields of democracy, the rule of law 
and the economic realm and liberalisation of TurkeyÕs political system (for details see 
Sections 4.4; 4.4.1; 4.4.2; 4.4.3; 4.4.4; 4.5 in Chapter IV) and between the liberalisation 
of TurkeyÕs political system and the transformation of TFP towards TurkeyÕs non-EU 
neighbours (for details see Sections 5.6; 5.6.1; 5.6.1.1 and 5.6.1.2 in Chapter V). Drawing 
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on theories of the domestic impact of the EU we saw that HIÕs concept of Ôunintended 
consequencesÕ could be used to analyse this relationship. The concept of unintended 
consequences was therefore the primary explanatory concept used in the analysis of the 
role of the EU in the transformation of TFP towards selected TurkeyÕs non-EU 
neighbours. The unintended influence of the EU conditions and adaptation pressure in the 
above-mentioned fields on the institutions, interests, preferences and demands that are 
involved in Turkish foreign policy-making towards selected non-EU neighbours was 
analysed. As such, as argued previously and will be summarized below a new 
mechanism, the secondary domestic ÔEUisationÕ mechanism, was introduced to account 
for the EUÕs influence on TFP towards TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours. Consequently, this 
study has used the conditionality mechanism to account for the influence of the EU on 
the transformation of TurkeyÕs domestic politics and the secondary EUisation mechanism 
to account for the influence of the EU on the transformation of TFP towards TurkeyÕs 
non-EU countries. 
6.3 Research design 
The literature review of EUisation in Chapter II (see Sections 2.3; 2.4; 2.4.1; 2.4.2; 2.4.3 
and 2.5) and of research designs in EUisation study in Chapter III (see Section 3.2) have 
revealed that the main research design models used in empirical research on EUisation 
are top-down and bottom-up research design models. Second, they are designed to assess 
the primary direct and/or indirect influence of the EU on domestic change or the 
relationship between the EU input and domestic change. This study also assesses not just 
the influence of the EU on domestic change, but the influence of the changes in TurkeyÕs 
domestic sphere generated by the EU on the changes in TFP towards its non-EU 
neighbours, which we have termed the secondary domestic influence of the EU (see 
Sections 1.2 and 1.3 in Chapter I; 2.4.3 in Chapter II and 3.2 in Chapter III).  
Analysis of the secondary influence of the EU required a two-stage analysis: first, 
examination of the alterations in F1 (in this study, the fields of democracy, the rule of law 
and the economic realm) during the countryÕs EU accession process and the EUÕs role in 
these changes and second, analysis of changes in F2 (in this study, outcomes of TFP 
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towards selected countries) and the role of changes in F1 generated by the EU conditions 
and adaptation pressure in changes in F2.  
Accordingly, although top-down and bottom-up research designs are useful for analysis 
of EUisation in F1 produced by the EU conditions and adaptation pressure, they are not 
comprehensive in fully explaining the unintended influence of EU on TFP. We therefore 
developed a new research design model for use in this study by utilising top-down and 
bottom-up research design models. The research design model used in this study 
summarised as (F2)w = (F1=X). As noted previously (see Section 3.2 in Chapter III) X 
indicates the cause (EU input), F1 indicates the primary effect (domestic change in a 
field/s), F2 indicates the secondary effect (the change in another field), and W indicates 
the relationship between F1 and F2. 
In this regard, the empirical analysis in our study was divided into two stages. In the first 
stage started with an analysis of the sets of institutions, rules, ideas, actors and policies in 
the fields of democracy, the rule of law and in the economic realm (F1) in Turkey before 
1999 (t1) before the announcement of TurkeyÕs EU candidature (see Sections 4.3.1; 
4.3.2; 4.3.3 in Chapter IV). Changes in F1 were tracked over time up to 2014 (i.e. during 
TurkeyÕs EU accession process: t2). We attempted to identify alterations in F1 and the 
EUÕs influence on any alterations (see Sections 4.4.1; 4.4.2; 4.4.3; 4.4.4 and 4.4.5 in 
Chapter IV). This first stage of analysis laid the ground for the second stage, examination 
of the secondary influence of the EU on domestic changes in Turkey (in this study TFP 
towards Iran and Syria).  
The second stage of analysis began with analysis of the sets of rules, ideas, actors and 
policies influencing TFP towards selected non-EU neighbours (F2) before t1 (see 
Sections 5.2.1; 5.2.2, 5.4.1; 5.4.2 in Chapter V). F2 was tracked over the years to t2, and 
we tried to identify alterations (see Sections 5.3.1; 5.3.2; 5.5.1; 5.5.2 and 5.5.3 in Chapter 
V) and the influence of changes in F1 on alterations in F2 (see Sections 5.6.1; 5.6.2 and 
5.6.3 in Chapter V). In this way we analysed the relationship between the changes in F1 
(changes in the fields of democracy, the rule of law and the economic realm) generated 
by X (EU input) and the changes in F2 (changes in TFP towards non-EU neighbours). 
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6.4 Methods of data collection and analysis 
The research questions central to this study required evaluation of verbal data and so a 
qualitative method of inquiry, based on collection and interpretation of verbal data 
(Ritchie & Spencer, 1994) was used rather than a quantitative method of inquiry based on 
statistical analysis of numerical data. Interviews, case studies, academic journals and 
documentary analysis were the main sources of data although quantitative data, such as 
tables, graphs and figures, have also been used to illustrate changes in TurkeyÕs domestic 
politics, economic conditions and balance of trade with selected neighbours during the 
EU accession process. 
We selected the deviant case method as the most appropriate case study method for 
analysis of causal relationships and thus best suited to testing the main hypothesis of this 
study (for details see Section 3.3.2 in Chapter III). First of all we identified sets of 
background factors in accordance with the analytical requirements of the study. Second, 
after examination of possible cases we selected Turkish foreign policy towards Iran and 
Syria as cases (for details see Section 3.3.2 in Chapter III). Then possible causes of the 
changes in TFP towards Iran and Syria were examined to determine whether our 
hypothesis was true or false. In Chapter V it was revealed that during TurkeyÕs EU 
candidature TFP towards these countries moved from security-oriented disengagement to 
political and economic--oriented engagement. Second, the lack of EU conditions, 
persuasion and adaptation pressure on TFP towards selected countries and the lack of the 
changes in the political regime and international policy of these countries did not 
preclude changes in TFP towards them. Third, the EU-fostered domestic changes 
generated by the harmonisation reforms have become the driving force of changes in TFP 
towards these countries.  
Given that a) nondemocratic foreign policy-making mechanism, b) dominant influence of 
military-bureaucratic elites perception of threat, and c) securitisation and externalisation 
of the religious and minority affair in formulation of TFP before TurkeyÕs EU accession 
process (for details see Sections 4.3; 4.3.1; 4.3.2; 4.3.3 in Chapter IV and Sections 5.2; 
5.2.1; 5.2.2; 5.4; 5.4.1; 5.4.2 in Chapter V) and d) the changes in all these mediating 
factors in foreign policy-making during the accession process (for details see Sections 
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4.4; 4.4.1; 4.4.2; 4.4.3 in Chapter IV and 5.6; 5.6.1; 5.6.2 in Chapter V), the findings of 
this study can be generalised to TFP towards TurkeyÕs other neighbours and to regional 
and global policy, except with respect to Cyprus and Greece174. On the other hand, 
considering non-democratic foreign policy-making mechanism, lack of and/or weakness 
of NGOs and the dominant role of the non-democratic actors and institutions in 
formulation of foreign policy in the autocratic political regimes, the finding of study can 
also be generalised to analyse the influence of the EU on the changes in other autocratic 
statesÕ foreign policies that are subject to EU conditionality and adaptation pressure in the 
field of democracy, rule of law and the economic realm. The secondary domestic 
EUisation mechanism introduced in the analysis of EU influence on Turkish foreign 
policy could also be employed to analyse the impact of the EU in the domestic sphere, 
specifically to analyse the influence of the changes in a field/s generated by EU input on 
the changes in another field/s.  
As detailed in Section 3.3.3 of Chapter III and Section 1.4 of Chapter I, the sources used 
in this research can be classified into five larger groupings: (1) primary documentation 
from government (Turkish), the EU and NGOs; (2) semi-structured interviews with 
selected experts on the Turkish political system, Turkish foreign policy or TurkeyÐEU 
relations; (3) secondary data from books and other publications and seminars, 
conferences and other scientific gatherings; (4) secondary data from academic journals 
related to four key disciplines (EUÐTurkey relations, TFP, Europeanisation and New 
Institutionalism) and (5) Internet pages (for details of data-collection see Sections 3.3.3  
and 3.3.4 in Chapter III). A total of 20 semi-structured interviews were conducted with  
people in Turkey (in Istanbul and Ankara) and in Belgium (in Brussels), including 
officials from the Turkish Foreign Ministry, thinktanks, trade unions and human rights 
organisations (for details of interviews see Section 3.3.4 in Chapter III). These interviews 
were very helpful in shedding light on the experiences, knowledge, opinions and attitudes 
of informants in relation to TurkeyÕs domestic politics and policy, Turkish foreign policy 
                                                              
174 The increasing ambiguities and uncertainties in EUÐTurkey relations in post 2005 period has had a de- 
Europeanisation impact on TurkeyÕs Cyprus and Greece policy (for details see, Eryilmaz, 2006; Aras 2009; 
CIV7, November 3, 2010, Istanbul; CIV8, January 3, 2010, Ankara; DIP1, October 21, 2010, Brussels; 
DIP2, October 26, 2010, Brussels) 
 
  216 
and TurkeyÐEU relations. 
Literature and document reading and analysis were used to give a preliminary overview 
of EUisation and its mechanisms, including the influence of the EU on member and non-
member statesÕ polity, politics and policy and on EUÐTurkey relations, the Turkish 
political system and Turkish foreign policy in particular. Specific research questions and 
hypotheses were formulated on the basis of this preliminary analysis of the field; the 
theoretical framework of the study and the research design were then determined.  
Several themes were identified from the preliminary analysis of extant research and 
documentation: Europeanisation; new institutionalism; EU accession criteria; Turkish 
political system; misfit gap between Turkey and the EU in several spheres; EUÐTurkey 
relations; liberalisation of the Turkish political system during the EU accession process; 
TFP towards non-EU neighbours (Iran and Syria) before the accession process; changes 
in TFP towards Iran and Syria during the accession process and the possible causes of 
changes in Turkish political system and foreign policy towards selected cases during the 
accession process. We then searched the previously identified primary and secondary 
sources for material relevant to a) concepts and explanatory instruments useful for 
analysis of the impact of the EU on TurkeyÕs domestic sphere; b) the Turkish political 
system and Turkish foreign policy before the accession process and changes to them 
during the accession process and c) possible causes of changes in the Turkish political 
system and foreign policy towards selected non-EU neighbours. Data were filed under 
the appropriate theme heading and then relationships between themes were analysed (for 
details see Section 3.3.5 in Chapter III). Analysis began after data were abstracted from 
their original context and organised thematically.175 Ideas generated early in data analysis 
were later incorporated into the theoretical framework governing the study. The research 
questions were addressed systematically by combining theoretical ideas and empirical 
data. 
First of all the relationships among the misfit gap between Turkey and the EU in 
identified fields, EU adaptation pressure, critical junctures in EU-Turkey relations, 
                                                              
175 In fact, the analytical process was started in the course of data collection by thinking about what was 
being read, seen and heard. 
  217 
TurkeyÕs application of a cost-benefit calculation to rule compliance and ongoing 
changes at Turkish level in these field were analysed. First the misfit gap between 
Turkish and EU norms and regulations regarding democracy, and the rule of law and the 
economic realm were investigated by examining relevant primary and secondary data. 
Then EUÐTurkey relations were explored to determine whether they generated high-level 
EU adaptation pressure. Third, the EUÕs technical and economic support for Turkish 
actors and institutions and harmonisations reforms was investigated to assess whether and 
how the EU empowered new actors and institutions to enable them against veto players in 
the Turkish political system to achieve the necessary changes in the identified fields at 
Turkish level. We also investigated how actors and institutions empowered by the EU 
responded to EU adaptation pressure to reduce the misfit gap between the EU and Turkey 
in the identified fields. After this we looked at the cost/benefit calculation of Turkish 
actors in compliance with EU rules and calls. Finally we analysed the relationship 
between ongoing changes in Turkish domestic sphere generated by EU input and changes 
in TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards selected Iran and Syria during the accession process 
(for details see Section 3.3.5 in Chapter III). As part of this analysis we explored the 
unintended influence on Turkish foreign policy towards selected countries of the EU 
conditions and adaptation pressure in the fields of democracy, the rule of law and the 
economic realm.  
Triangulation and development of counterfactual scenarios were used to validate the 
analysis and interpretation of the data in the study. Information and evidence gleaned 
from various sources of data were cross-referenced between and within the data types to 
demonstrate the credibility and validity of the data analysis. Changes and causes of 
changes in TFP towards the selected countries inferred from one source were confirmed 
by checking against at least one other source. A counterfactual scenario was developed to 
improve understanding of the EUÕs role in inducing change in Turkey at the domestic 
level and EU influence on TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards selected countries. We 
considered what might have happened had Turkey not become a candidate for EU 
membership, with all that entailed in terms of EU conditions and adaptation pressure in 
the fields of democracy, the rule of law and the economic realm, EU technical and 
economical support and their unintended influence on TFP towards the selected TurkeyÕs 
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non-EU neighbours. The counterfactual scenarios we developed were very helpful in 
eliminating other potential explanatory variables and corroborating that, in the absence of 
the EU conditions applying to the fields of democracy, the rule of law and the economic 
there would have been no change in institutions, institutional structures, institutional 
power relations, political and economic instability and neglect of religious and minority 
rights in Turkey. In the absence of such changes there would been no change in the 
interests, actors, demands and priorities involved in formulating Turkish foreign policy 
towards non-EU neighbours generally and Iran and Syria specifically and therefore there 
would have been no change in TFP towards Iran and Syria over the last decade. 
6.5 Major findings of the study 
The first major finding of this study was that TurkeyÕs security-oriented foreign policy of 
disengagement towards selected non-EU neighbours, i.e. Iran and Syria, has undergone a 
fundamental transformation during TurkeyÕs EU accession process. Previously Turkish 
foreign policy towards Iran and Syria was based on the paranoid mindset of a military-
bureaucratic elite which viewed Turkey as a country that was Òsurrounded by seas from 
three sides, and by enemies from four sides.Ó176 The list of threats to national security 
included almost all of TurkeyÕs neighbours, including Syria, Iraq, Iran, Russia and 
Greece. Turkey, therefore, had limited and very problematic relations with Iran and Syria 
until the end of the 1990s. Political and economic relations with Iran and Syria were very 
problematic and limited. The entire Arab world was also traditionally outside Turkish 
foreign policy interests. Yet over the last decade, Turkey moved beyond its traditional 
security-oriented agenda in its approach to foreign policymaking towards Iran and Syria. 
TFP towards Iran and Syria shifted from being ideology- and security-oriented 
disengagement to a policy of more economic, political and diplomatic engagement. 
Turkey has employed soft power - negotiation, cooperation and dialogue - to solve 
problems with Iran and Syria. It may not have solved all of its problems with them, but in 
contrast with previous decades, Turkey has developed good relations with Iran and Syria 
and incredibly increased its political and economic relations with them (with Syria until 
                                                              
176 Domestic policy, including education policy as well as foreign policy was based on the paranoid 
mindset of military-bureaucratic elites. This perspective was taught in all schools, beginning in primary 
school.  
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the SyriaÕs military began to use force against the public and anti-regime protesters) and 
other countries in the region (for details see Sections 5.3; 5.3.1; 5.3.2; 5.5; 5.5.1; 5.5.2; 
5.5.3; 5.5.4 in Chapter V). 
This study has revealed that the increasing economic interdependence of Turkey and its 
non-EU-neighbours has become one of the main drivers of the new Turkish approach to 
foreign policy. Liberalisation of the movement of goods and persons has assumed a 
greater role in TFP towards Iran and Syria and other countries in the region over the last 
decade. FTAs have been signed with neighbouring countries and with many other 
countries within and outside the region.177 High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council 
Agreements were signed and the Close Neighbours Economic and Trade Council 
involving neighbouring and other regional countries was set up to develop political and 
economic relationships and promote regional integration.178 As a result TurkeyÕs foreign 
trade increased more than fivefold, going from $67 billion in 1999 to $375 billion in 
2013. TurkeyÕs exports also increased fivefold, from $26 billion in 1999179 to $145 
billion in 2013. Liberalisation of trade with its neighbours meant that during the same 
period TurkeyÕs trade with its neighbours and with the Arab world increased more than 
the average increase (Tocci, Altinisik and Kirisci, 2011; DIP6, January 5, 2011, Ankara). 
During this period TurkeyÕs trade with its neighbours increased about ninefold and trade 
with the entire Middle East increased about sevenfold, whilst trade with the rest of the 
world increased about threefold180.  
Second, the liberalisation of TurkeyÕs visa policy became one of the main planks of its 
new approach to foreign policy. Turkey liberalised visa requirements for citizens Iran and 
Syria and of many countries in the Balkans, the Middle East, the Mediterranean and the 
Caucasus.181 As a result, the number of tourists visiting Turkey has increased by about 
                                                              
177 FTAs have been signed with 18 countries, and FTA negotiations with more than 10 further countries are 
ongoing. The European Union has overlapping FTAs, except in the case of Georgia (for details, see 
Chapters IV and V). 
178 With Syria and Iraq in 2009; with Greece, Russia, Lebanon, and Jordan in 2010. 
179 TurkeyÕs imports increased fivefold, from $48 billion to $240 billion during the same period.  
180 All statistical information is based on data provided by the Turkish Statistical Institute and is available at 
turkstat.gov.tr 
181 From 2002 to 2013, Turkey reached agreements for mutual liberalisation of visa requirements with 60 
countries, including Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Ukraine, Russia, Iran, Fas, Jordon, 
Kosovo, Lebanon, Libya, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Syria, Tunisia, and Qatar. For the list of all 
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120 per cent, from 13.2 million in 2002 to 34.910 million in 2013.182 During the 2002-
2011 periods the number of entries from immediate neighbours increased about 400 per 
cent. Over the last decade resolution of foreign policy problems using dialogue increased 
and the creation of a more stable and secure neighbourhood assumed a greater priority in 
TFP (Tocci, Altinisik and Kirisci, 2011; CIV11, January 4, 2011, Ankara). Turkey has 
attempted to settle its foreign policy problems through dialogue and diplomacy, and it has 
become a leading mediator and diplomatic force in micro- and micro-crises affecting the 
region. Finally, Turkey has undertaken many reforms to consolidate democracy within 
the country in order to comply with EU norms and conditions relating to democracy and 
the rule of law (for details see Sections 4.4; 4.4.1; 4.4.2; 4.4.3; 4.4.4 in Chapter IV). It has 
also promoted good governance and democracy in its region and globally (for details see 
Sections 5.5.3 in Chapter V).  
6.6 Role of the EU in the transformation of TFP 
The second major finding of this study, based on an analysis of data which used the 
concept of Europeanisation and the rational choice and historical versions of new 
institutionalist theories, was that EU conditionality and adaptation pressure in the fields 
of democracy and the rule of law, and in the economic realm intended to align TurkeyÕs 
authoritarian political regime with the EU acquis communautaire, have unintentionally 
left a very visible influence on TFP towards Iran and Syria by: (a) changing the 
institutions, institutional structures and institutional power relations, (b) empowering the 
government and civil society against the militaryÐbureaucratic elites in political decision 
making, (c) accomplishing political and economic stability and growth, (d) increasing 
respect for and protection of religious and minority rights, and transferring domestic 
religious and minority issues into the realm of normal politics, and thus (e) changing in 
the institutions, interests, preferences and demands that are involved in foreign policy-
making towards them,   
                                                                                                                                                                                         
countries with respect to which Turkey has liberalised its visa regime, see the Turkish Foreign MinistryÕs 
website at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/default.tr.mfa, last accessed on March 1, 2014. 
182 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Culture and Tourism, available at www.kultur.gov.tr, accessed October 
25, 2014.  
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There used to be (and to some extent there still is) a high-level misfit gap between 
Turkish and EU norms and regulations relating to the rule of law, civilian control over the 
military, respect for religious and minority rights and liberal, free-market economics (for 
details See sections 4.3; 4.3.1; 4.3.2; 4.3.3 in Chapter IV). This high-level misfit gap 
between Turkey and the EU resulted in considerable EU pressure on Turkey to adapt to 
EU norms and regulations, referred to as EU adaptation pressure (for details see Sections 
4.4; 4.4.1; 4.4.2; 4.4.3; 4.4.4 in Chapter IV). In the accession partnership documents and 
later in regular progress reports, the EU asked Turkey to address the misfit gap between 
Turkish and EU norms and regulations within a certain time frame; first as a condition of 
accession negotiations and later as a condition of EU membership. 
As detailed previously (see Section 2.3 and 2.4.1 in Chapter II) the EUisation framework 
specifies that capable actors and institutions are needed to achieve the necessary changes 
at domestic level. If domestic actors and institutions are not capable of implementing the 
necessary changes the EU provides technical and economic support to increase their 
capability to act (for details of this argument see also Brzel and Risse, 2003, 2007, 
2009). In Turkey the forces resistant to reform were stronger than the pro-EU actors and 
institutions (for details see Sections 4.3, 4.3.1; 4.3.2 in Chapter IV) and so the EU 
provided funding, education and other forms of assistance to make the pro-EU actors and 
institutions more capable of implementing the required changes at national level (for 
details see Chapter IV). At the same time the EU stated clearly that Turkey had to adapt 
to the EU acquis communautaire in the fields of democracy, the rule of law and 
economic realm if it wished to benefit from EU economic aid, start accession 
negotiations and to become a full member of the EU. As it was argued in Chapter IV (see 
Section 4.5), in the long term the political and economic costs to Turkey of not being on 
track for EU membership would have been incredibly high. Thus, by calculate the long-
term benefits of improved relations with the EU, the TGNA has enacted nine reform 
packages - known collectively as the Ôharmonisation lawsÕ since 2002 to adapt TurkeyÕs 
polity, politics and policy to the EU acquis communautaire. As will be summarized 
below, the harmonisation reforms implemented to reduce the misfit gap between Turkish 
and EU norms and regulations have resulted in liberalisation of TurkeyÕs authoritarian 
political regime and the above noted changes in Turkish domestic sphere.  
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The harmonisation reforms changed, first, institutional power relations, which has 
increased the authority of the Turkish government and Turkish NGOs in the political 
decision-making relative to the militaryÐbureaucratic elites (for details, see Sections 
4.4.1; 4.4.2; 4.4.3 in Chapter IV). These newly empowered actors and institutions played 
a key role in the EUisation of TurkeyÕs polity, politics and policy, and the transformation 
of Turkish foreign policy towards Iran and Syria. In contrast to the old political decision 
makers, the EU-empowered actors and institutions have relied on soft power to solve 
foreign policy problems, strengthen bilateral political and economic relations with Iran 
and Syria and liberalise trade and movement of people between Turkey and them as well 
as the other countries in the region (for details see Sections 5.3.1; 5.3.2; 5.5.1; 5.5.2; 
5.5.3; 5.5.4 in Chapter V). 
Second, the accession process engendered a liberal environment, EU adaptation pressure 
to adopt the Copenhagen political criteria and empowerment of new actors in the political 
decision sphere offered Turkey the opportunity to transfer religious and minority affairs 
to the realm of normal politics (for details see Section 4.4.4 in Chapter IV). 
Normalisation of religious and minority affairs has meant that they are increasingly 
subject to open debate in the media and academic and civil societies, which has in turn 
contributed to recognition of certain cultural, religious and minority rights in line with the 
EU requirements for civil democracy (for details see Section 4.4.4 in Chapter IV). This 
new stance on religious and minority rights is reflected in the TFP approach to ending the 
securitisation and externalisation of domestic religious and minority affairs and so, in the 
last decade, religious and minority affairs have not caused political and diplomatic crises 
between Turkey and Iran and Turkey and Syria which created the climate for 
development of political and economic relations (for details see Section 5.6.2 in Chapter 
V).   
Third, the economic reforms undertaken to adapt to EU acquis communautaire curtailed 
state dominance of the economy and resulted in greater fiscal and monetary discipline 
and sustainable growth to the Turkish economy183 (for details see Section 4.4.3 in 
                                                              
183 After several decades, the Turkish economy experienced single-digit levels of interest and inflation rates 
while more than doubling its GNP. TurkeyÕs gross domestic product (GDP) increased to $840 billion in 
2013, from $196.3 billion in 2002, and the Turkish economy became the sixth biggest economy in Europe 
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Chapter III). This resulted in increasing need for new market and energy resources. This 
is reflected in TFP approach to include economic interest towards Iran and Syria. The 
empowered economic society has concrete interests in neighbouring countries, also push 
the government to liberalise trade and movement of people with them; this could not have 
been accomplished without dialogue, close political relations and efforts to find a 
solution to bilateral problems with them. As such, Turkey has significantly developed its 
political and economic relations with Iran and Syria and other countries in the region (for 
details see Sections 5.6.1.2 in Chapter V). 
The findings of this study summarized above reveal that although neither the EU nor the 
Turkish actors intended the liberalisation of TurkeyÕs political and economic system to 
effect changes in TFP towards Iran and Syria, this process had an unintended impact on 
the institutions, actors and interest which shaped TFP towards them; thus TurkeyÕs new 
foreign policy approach was an unintended consequence of the changes in TurkeyÕs 
domestic sphere generated by EU conditions and adaptation pressure in the fields of 
democracy, the rule of law and the economic realm. In other words, EU conditionality 
and adaptation pressure for the convergence and alignment of TurkeyÕs authoritarian 
political regime to the EU acquis communautaire have produced unintended outcomes in 
TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards Iran and Syria, in addition to the intended outcomes in 
TurkeyÕs domestic politics. This finding of the study introduced a new mechanism by 
which the EU exerts an influence on national or domestic affairs (for details of 
mechanisms of EUisation operating at national or domestic level see Chapter II, Sections 
2.4, 2.4.1, 2.4.2); this has been termed Ôsecondary domestic EUisationÕ. Secondary 
domestic EUisation involves changes in institutions, actors, interests, priorities and 
demands in a field or fields (in this study, TFP towards its non-EU neighbours) produced 
by EUisation in another field or fields (in this study, the fields of democracy and the rule 
of law and the economic realm). 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
and sixteenth biggest economy among 30 OECD countries, despite ranking twenty-sixth in 2002. The GDP 
per capita also increased more than threefold in the last decade, reaching $11,000 in 2013, up from $3,492 
in 2002. With an 8.5% growth rate in 2011, Turkey became the third fastest growing G20 country after 
China and Argentina. Its average growth rate was 6.5% in last the 10 years. According to OECD 
estimations, with an annual average growth rate of 6.7% from 2011 to 2017, Turkey is expected to be the 
fastest growing economy among the OECD countries. 
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Secondary EUisation is the process by which, although the EU neither intentionally seeks 
to diffuse its norms, practices and policies nor to play an active role in the diffusion of 
those norms, practices and policies at domestic level, the intentional empowerment of 
new actors and the diffusion of EU norms, practices and policies in one or more domestic 
fields produces unintended changes in interests, priorities and demands in another field or 
fields with consequence for policies and practices. In this way the EU indirectly causes 
changes in certain fields although it neither intends such changes nor plays an active role 
in them. In some ways secondary domestic EUisation resembles the indirect domestic 
EUisation (for details of indirect EUisation see Section 2.4.2 in Chapter II); however, in 
secondary EUisation, unlike indirect EUisation, the domestic actors do not intentionally 
or directly attempt to adapt to or comply with EU rules, practices and policies. In 
secondary domestic EUisation changes in the rules, norms, implementations and policies 
in one field - which were not an objective of the EU or the domestic actors - arise as a 
consequence of intentional EU-influenced changes in another field. 
6.7 Contributions of the study 
A review of the literature on EUisation revealed that the majority of studies focused on 
the impact on the member statesÕ socio-economic policies and practices of the EUÕs 
economic, social and environmental regulations and directives. They looked at how 
member states adapted their institutions, policies and practices to comply with EU 
regulations and requirements and how internalisation of EU regulations and directives 
gradually affected the policies and practice of associated states. The impact of the EU on 
the foreign policy of associated states in general and Turkey in particular is a relatively 
new subject of academic debate. Although it is a relatively new subject of academic 
debat, as noted previously,  the majority of scholars  focused on  the  influence of  the EU on 
associated  states  foreign  policy  found  out  that  foreign  policies  of  associated  states  have 
been significantly changed, if not transformed, as a result of EU membership. The need for 
research  on  the  impact  of  the  EU  on  associated  states'  foreign  policies,  therefore,  has 
increased.  In  this  regard,  this investigation of how Turkish foreign policy has been 
transformed during TurkeyÕs EU accession process and the role the EU has played that 
transformation has contributed new empirical data to the existing Ð limited - literature on 
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the influence of the EU on the foreign policy of associated states in terms of the process 
and outcomes. 
Most scholars researching the influence of the EU on the foreign policy of associated 
states argue that, due to the nature of CSDP, the EUÕs influence on the foreign policy of 
member and candidate states takes the form of a horizontal process of experimental 
learning and socialisation (for details see Section 2.6.1 in Chapter II). This study has 
revealed, however, that EU conditionality and adaptation pressure in the fields of 
democracy and the rule of law, and in the economic realm have unintentionally left a very 
visible influence on Turkish foreign policy towards Iran and Syria. As such, Evidence 
collected for this study suggests that the concept of Ôunintended consequencesÕ is also 
useful in analyzing EU influence on the foreign policy of associated states, whose 
national actors and institutions have relatively strong voices and are not generally subject 
to European law or EU regulations and norms.  
As outlined above, this study embedded Europeanisation with rational and historical new 
institutionalism and introduced a new mechanism, secondary domestic EUisation, and a 
new research design model to analyse the domestic impact of the EU. As such, it also 
constitutes a contribution to the analytical and methodological framework of 
Europeanisation in studying the domestic impact of the EU. Additional studies are 
needed to test this emerging model against the existing models of Europeanisation in the 
foreign policy realm and in other fields. Accordingly, this study also introduces avenues 
for further research. Such research would investigate the impact of EUisation in one field 
or fields on another field or fields using the research design and theoretical entities 
introduced in this study. In this regard, I am planning to investigate the unintended 
impact of EUisation in the fields of democracy and the rule of law and in the economic 
realm on the foreign policies of other associated states by utilizing the research design 
and theoretical entities introduced in this study. 
This study has examined EUÐTurkey relations outside the EUÐTurkey negotiation 
framework, with a focus on the unintended impact of this process on the Turkish foreign 
policy towards TurkeyÕs non-EU neighbours, and thus serves as one of the fewÑif not 
onlyÑacademic studies of the transformation of a candidate stateÕs foreign policy 
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towards non-EU countries in the EU accession process and of the unintended impact of 
the EU accession process on an associated stateÕs foreign policy based on the Turkish 
case. As such, it contributes to the growing literature on EUisation and the explanation of 
the mechanism and factors that generate changes in the foreign policies of associated 
states in the EU accession process. 
6.8 The challenges encountered  
This study analysed the influence of TurkeyÕs EU candidature on its foreign policy 
towards non-EU neighbours; it did not address the influence of other exogenous factors 
on TFP towards these countries. There are methodological problems in distinguishing 
between the impact of the EU and the impact of other exogenous and endogenous factors 
or ongoing changes at domestic level. There were no EU conditions or adaptation 
pressure which could have directly influenced TurkeyÕs foreign policy towards its non- 
EU neighbours, Syria and Iran, and therefore no direct mechanism by which TurkeyÕs 
candidacy for EU membership might have influenced its foreign policy towards them. It 
is therefore more difficult to demonstrate the causal role of the EU in the transformation 
of TFP towards these countries. This study used counterfactual scenarios in an attempt to 
circumvent this problem. Interviewee reliability must also be a consideration; there is a 
risk that interviewees will give inaccurate or dishonest answers, we tried to address this 
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